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I. INTRODUCTION  
US air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just two years, raising 
the question: can the US Air Force (USAF) defend its expeditionary air bases?1  
Considering that all air bases in Iraq are actually Air Force camps collocated with Army 
camps, the more accurate question may be: can the US military defend its expeditionary 
air bases?  Illustrating the fact that the Air Force may already know it cannot defend its 
air bases using its current doctrine, Lieutenant General Ronald E. Keys told a Naval 
Postgraduate School audience in October 2004 that air base defense (ABD) was one of 
the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the USAF.2     
Poor base defense could be devastating to the conduct of a war and the American 
public’s perception of the military’s performance.  This statement has an historical basis.  
It was an air base attack that precipitated the conventional force build-up in Vietnam.  On 
November 1, 1964, small units of the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa air base with mortars 
and sapper teams, destroying seven aircraft and damaging eighteen more.3  The event 
was viewed by Washington as the first substantial attack against US forces in Vietnam 
and directly resulted in the conventionalization of the war as “regular” Army, Marine, 
and Air Force units were brought in to defend US air bases.4  The insurgent enemy of 
Vietnam is similar to the insurgent enemy of today and similar to the insurgent enemy 
that has been the primary enemy of air bases for the last 50 years.  The insurgent seeks 
targets of symbolic and strategic value and that is why air bases are often a target of 
choice.  
 
1 Colonel Robert Holmes, Director of Air Force Security Forces, “Security Forces Transformation” 
brief to the Air Force CORONA Conference, Dec 2004. 
2 At the time, General Keys was the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, 
AF/XO. 
3 Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973.  (Washington D.C.: USAF 
Office of History, 1979), 11.  Sapper attacks normally constituted four to six person teams that tried to 
penetrate through the base defense perimeter in order to detonate explosives on parked aircraft, for 
example, or assault a target with small arms. 
4 Fox, 12. 
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Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the US – arguably the most 
critical terrain in the American way of war.  USAF as well as Royal Air Force (RAF) 
leadership recognizes air bases as strategic terrain because they house the combatant 
commander’s key supporting fire assets.5  The importance of airpower in the modern way 
of war cannot be overstated.  The rapid pace of maneuver warfare by special operations 
forces as well as Army and Marine battalions and brigades requires fire support that is 
responsive, long-range, precise, and lethal.  Only airpower can meet these requirements.  
In the early stages of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, artillery support was 
negligible in its battlefield impact when compared to airpower.   
However, the combatant commander’s dependence on airpower goes beyond just 
fire support but, maybe as importantly, on airlift as well.  Flexible and rapid operations 
such as Task Force DAGGER and Operation Anaconda would have been impossible 
without the Air Force’s inter-theater and intra-theater airlift fleet.  Additionally, most 
humanitarian assistance, response to natural disasters, and other Military Operations 
Other Than War are essentially airlift operations. 
In recent years US aircraft have also become as high as payoff targets as air bases.  
As aircraft have become more capable and more expensive, the numbers of aircraft 
procured have been dramatically reduced.  The result is each aircraft has practically 
become a strategic asset, and a strategic liability, because each aircraft carries a greater 
portion of national military power.  Yet it is not only the link to fire support, airlift, and 
cost that defines the importance of air bases, it is something more critical.  Air bases, at 
the operational level of war, are the United States’ logistical, command, and 
 
5 Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), John Hall (Royal Air Force 
(RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), and 
Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and 
RAF Honington, UK on 7-9 Mar 2005.  RAF also considers air bases as strategic terrain for the same 
reason but by RAF doctrine defines the Ground Defense Area around an air base as under the control of the 
Air Base Commander. As a result, the RAF Regiment has always focused defensive operations off-base 
rather than on-base; however, the Regiment have enhanced their internal base defense processes recently by 
merging with the RAF Police.  Yet the Regiment still views their primary purpose in base defense as 
achieving a greater situational awareness than the enemy. 
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informational centers of gravity.  Clausewitz called a center of gravity (COG) “the hub of 
all power and movement” and air bases certainly fit the bill.6     
Deployed command and control headquarters are consistently located at air bases: 
CENTCOM headquarters is adjacent to Al Udeid air base in Qatar; US and Multinational 
Force and Corps headquarters in Iraq is adjacent to Baghdad International Airport; 
Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) was located on Tan Son Nhut Air 
Base; and Taegu air base served as 8th Army’s Headquarters during the Korean War.   In 
response, media outlets center their operations at the air bases.  The result is the air base 
has become the focal point of the information battlespace.   
This fact has not been lost on the enemy in Iraq, but it has been lost on the USAF.  
Insurgent and terrorist forces continually attack air bases in Iraq even though the payoff 
in terms of damage to air operations, numbers of wounded-in-action (WIA), and numbers 
of killed-in-action (KIA) are relatively minimal.7  The inability of the insurgent to cause 
major damage is because insurgents do not usually attack with decisive force but instead 
attack in whatever tactic or method is available to them.  The preferred tactics are acts of 
terror such as car bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings but also often include guerrilla 
actions such as stand-off attacks and ambushes.  These tactics allow the insurgent to 
influence the US center of gravity – the political will of the US public, and protect the 
insurgent’s center of gravity – the local population, while remaining nearly invisible to 
the decisive force of the US military.  The insurgent air base attack, therefore, is more so 
a form of information warfare.  Since air operations are normally disrupted little by the 
insurgent attacks, the USAF often views air base defense as successful even when under 
consistent enemy fire.8  To the USAF and the US military in general, it’s not worth the 
 
6 Antulio Echevarria II. “Center of Gravity: Recommendations for Joint Doctrine”. Joint Forces 
Quarterly, Issue 35 (2004): 13-14.  Cited in Andrew F. Krepinevich testimony before House Committee on 
Armed Services, Measuring Success in the Iraq.  108th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2005, 2. DoD Definition 
is “those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom 
of action, physical strength, or the will to fight.” 
7 Air base attacks in Iraq, though more numerous, have not really come close to approaching the 
ferocity of the VC/NVA attacks in Vietnam.  Fox documented several multi-battalion assaults and standoff 
attacks of more than 200 rockets/mortars against air bases in Vietnam. 
8 This is a reference to the current air base attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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costs of interdicting or pursuing the insurgents, because of the relatively minor physical 
damage the insurgents cause to the air bases and USAF resources.     
Insurgents could affect far more casualties by putting more effort into suicide car-
bombings and improvised-explosive device (IED) ambushes.  The reason the insurgents 
do not is because the air base attacks have strategic impact.  The insurgents attack 
because, as the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual (2003) points out, small wars are best 
understood as “information wars”.9  As the informational center of gravity in operational 
terms, attacks against an air base can directly influence the US strategic center of gravity 
– the will of the American public.10  Therefore, the air bases attacks may appear to be 
harassment attacks at the tactical level but are informational attacks at the strategic level.  
The US does not view the attacks as informational in nature but instead views the 
attacks as trying to achieve a tactical objective: harassment.  The US believes the 
insurgent values the same thing that the US military values, its military resources.  The 
insurgent, in this conventional view, seeks to maximize the physical damage to US 
airpower in order to somehow defeat US airpower.  And if physical damage is the goal of 
the insurgent, then the US military, and the Air Force in particular, assumes the insurgent 
will want to attack the resources through a ground assault or a saboteur because at close 
range the insurgent has a much higher percentage of success in destroying US resources.  
The Air Force than applies an engineering or technical solution to the base defense.  This 
technical solution often centers on stopping an enemy’s conventional ground attack and 
insider threat with fields of fire, large response forces, massed technology, hierarchical 
command structure, barriers, fences, checkpoints, facility hardening, and identification 
systems.  However, these sound and functional measures predominantly assist only in 
limiting damage and in the base recovery after attack.  These USAF actions are not 
proactive in nature and do not prevent, deter, or disrupt air base attacks.   
 
9 United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual (Draft), 2004, 53. Cited in Christopher Ford, 
“Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency”. Parameters, Summer. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Us Army War College, 2005, 43. 
10 Krepinevich, Testimony Before Congress, 2. 
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The consequences of this apparent indifference and ignorance are significant.  
Consider a humanitarian, stabilization, or peacekeeping mission that might not have the 
political importance of Iraq, a single significant air base attack could result in mission 
cancellation and a political embarrassment for the United States.   
If the USAF did understand the importance of air bases in the information war 
and the nature of an insurgent threat then why would the Air Force counter this threat 
with a base defense doctrine based on a conventional and internal threat instead of a 
flexible, unconventional, and distributed effort?  The answer is because USAF leadership 
does not understand insurgency and has yet to see how the USAF’s air base defense 
strategy is helping lose the information war.  Yet to win this information war, the USAF 
will have to implement a counterintuitive air base defense doctrine: base defense not 
centered on the air base but on the physical, political, and informational battle space of 
the local area.  This new approach to air base defense not only counters the insurgent 
threat symmetrically but also plays to the primary strength of USAF security forces: a 
police background. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Questions 
Based on case and threat analysis, what tactics, techniques, and procedures of air 
base defense are most effective? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
What is the threat to US/Allied air bases?  
What is the enemy objective(s) of air base attacks?  
What has been the USAF’s historical doctrine for countering the threat? 
What has been the impact of this USAF doctrine on the enemy? 
What impact does USAF technology have on enemy tactics?    
What models of conflict best account for the enemy tactics and enable effective 
base defense operations? 
What historical case studies demonstrate effective strategies to countering the 
threat? 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
In this study, I used historical data and contemporary information that led me to 
discover that the principal enemy of the expeditionary air base has not changed for the 
last 60 years and will not for the foreseeable future – the insurgent.  As part of my 
methodology, I do not distinguish between the insurgent and terrorist and in doing so 
accept the arguments of Ariel Merari in his essay, Terrorism as a Strategy for 
Insurgency.  Merari’s essay emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency 
and concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by 
circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use 
concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle.11  Terrorism, as a form of insurgency, is 
practically always one of these modes.12  Therefore, throughout this work I will use the 
terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” interchangeably. 
I reviewed the history of joint and USAF air base defense and air base defense 
doctrine.  I discovered that historical and current air base defense doctrine as incapable of 
countering the insurgent foe.  Since the current doctrine was insufficient against the 
insurgent, I researched other models of unconventional and counterinsurgency conflict 
and found the models very applicable to base defense since both strive to achieve the 
same thing – local security.13  I used these models to develop new air base defense 
principles to counter the insurgent threat.  I then researched case studies that demonstrate 
the positive effect of unconventional air base defense plans and use the new air base 
defense principles to evaluate the cases to show how effective the principles are in 
assessing and predicting air base defense performance.   
For the purpose of this thesis, I evaluate air base success based primarily on the 
level of enemy activity in the vicinity of air bases (ground attacks – standoff and 
penetration, convoy ambushes, kidnappings, hijackings, etc.).  In this way, I accept and 
 
11 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency”. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 5, 
No. 4, Winter (1993): 213.  Retrieved on 16 Jul 2005 from http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/academic/intrel/research/cstpv/pdffiles/Terrorism%20as%20a%20Strategy.pdf 
12 Ibid.  
13 I did reject counterinsurgency models that supported the use of brutal tactics.  Although these tactics 
may be effective, it would be impossible to implement such a strategy without destroying the American 
public’s support. 
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assume that for the insurgent, the act and impact of symbolic violence is still the main 
avenue that the insurgent group uses to announce their power, intention, and capacity for 
achieving their political goals, just as it was for the Anarchists over a century ago.14  
Further, I examine only cases where the adversary is ground-bound, not threats to air 
bases that are aerial in nature (aircraft, paratroopers, etc.).  In my analysis I also do not 
consider operational and strategic threats to air bases in the form of ballistic missiles or 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.   
The case studies and analytical models are then used to develop a new doctrinal 
framework for air base defense.  I found the New Principles of Air Base Defense to be 
descriptive and predictive of a successful defense.  I believe the counterinsurgent tactics 
would be effective in an environment like Iraq, in a smaller contingency such as Bosnia, 
and also on the Korean peninsula.  In Korea, North Korea sleeper agents and special 
forces units could be disrupted and destroyed before being able to mount effective attacks 
against air bases using these New Principles.  And if the North Korean units separate 
themselves from South Korean populations in order to prevent being exposed than the 
North Korean units become vulnerable to the full technological and firepower advantage 
of the US military. 
My research builds on the previous work of Roger Fox and Alan Vick as well as 
interviews with USAF and US Marines Corps Vietnam and Iraq veterans, members of the 
United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment, El Salvador Air Force, Pakistani 
Army, and law enforcement personnel.  My research also draws upon my own experience 
in conducting air base defense operations in multiple geographic regions, to include 
Panama, Peru, Korea, Jordan, and Afghanistan.  Further, I have supported air base 
defense operations through joint operations centers or prisoner/detainee missions in 




14 Merari, 232.  This symbolic violence is otherwise known as Propaganda of the Deed. Originally an 
anarchist belief, first espoused by Peter Kropotkin, that promoted bold actions by one person will inspire 
action by others. 
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C.  ORGANIZATION  
In Chapter II, I give a historical account of air base defense and the threat to air 
bases from World War II to the present.  Particular emphasis is placed on how the World 
War II and Cold War models have remained pervasive in the USAF up to the present day 
and how this has had a detrimental effect on air base defense operations.  Instead, a 
proper analysis of air base attack data shows the threat to air bases not as conventional 
forces or Cold War saboteurs but unconventional insurgents and terrorists.  In Chapter 
III, I outline the five major problems with air base defense today.  The five problems are 
Joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine, the use of technology, the structure of air base defense 
command and control, and the organization of the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigation.  In Chapter IV, I present an explanation of the nature of insurgency and 
describe the system of growth employed by an insurgency in order to grow and achieve 
some political outcome.  Moreover, I explain that insurgency as a political, not a military, 
endeavor that cannot be combated with conventional military tactics.  Instead, I come to 
the conclusion that the theories of counterinsurgency provide the most sound basis for 
designing a capable air base defense because at its core, counterinsurgency is a fight to 
maintain local security – the same challenge that faces air base defense.  In Chapter V, I 
examine two models of counterinsurgency, Gordon McCormick’s and Julian Paget’s, to 
uncover the essential principles of what tactics are most effective in defeating an 
insurgent threat and attaining local security.  I then restructure these principles for 
application in an air base defense environment and present these New Principles of Air 
Base Defense as a new basis for doctrine.  
In Chapter VI, I present case studies of the two most significant US conflicts 
where air base attacks were a major enemy focus: Vietnam and Iraq.  I apply an analysis 
of each case study using the New Principles of Air Base Defense presented in Chapter V.  
Finally, Chapter VII is my concluding chapter where I summarize my analysis of air base 
defense and the need for new principles of air base defense that are more applicable to the 
insurgent threat.  I also identify areas for further research. 
For those that read this study, I recommend reading it in its entirety to ensure the 
understanding of the nature of the threat to air bases; the US military’s response to this 
  9
                                                
threat; why this response is unable to counter the threat; and how applying the theories of 
counterinsurgency provide the best method for defending an air base and defeating a 
local insurgency.  If the reader is well-versed on the history of air base defense than 
Chapter II would be repetitive and could be skipped.  The same is true of Chapter III for 
those readers who have a deep understanding of the current air base defense doctrine and 
tactics employed by the US military.  Chapter IV is unique in that it weaves theories of 
insurgency by Andrew Krepinevich and integrates them with Martha Crenshaw’s theories 
of terrorism but those readers with a background in the study of insurgency could skim 
Chapter IV.  Chapters V-VII, however, must be read in their entirety as they breakdown 
the counterinsurgent theories and develop essential principles to apply to the air base 
defense environment.  These principles are then evaluated with historical case studies.     
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Air base defense (ABD) is one of the most important defensive operations for the 
American military.  Air bases are the center of command, logistics, and information for 
the range of conflict from Operations Other Than War to Nuclear Warfare.  Military 
relief to Rwanda in 1994 was flown into an air base in Uganda guarded by US and 
Ugandan security forces and was directed from the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott 
Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois.  If nuclear war were to commence tomorrow, most of it 
would be implemented from USAF bases and directed from US Strategic Command at 
Offutt AFB.  The Iraq war is certainly no exception to the centrality of airpower.   
The invasion of Iraq was directed from a location adjacent to Al Udeid Air Base 
(AB), aircraft from numerous Southwest Asia air bases provided more close support fire 
than land artillery (for the first time in warfare), and the first bases established were air 
bases (at Basra and Tallil) so cargo and personnel could flow quickly to the front.  
Further, one of the first high-profile enemy operation was the damaging of a contract 
cargo aircraft with a surface-to-air missile flying into Baghdad in November 2003.15  
And with US Army and Marine casualties rising from convoy ambushes in late 2004, the 
USAF expanded airlift operations in Iraq and eliminated the need for hundreds of 
 
15 “US Military Plane Hit by Missile on Takeoff from Baghdad”, (December 2003).  Retrieved on 22 
Jul 2005 from http://www.spacewar.com/2003/031210145216.zt66p66d.html 
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convoys – casualties dropped.16  What does this mean?  Simply that, command and 
control, firepower, and maneuverability in the US military are synonymous with air 
operations, and this makes air bases the focus of both U.S. and enemy attention.   
If air bases are the bastions of US power, then if they are under attack, what 
message is being sent to the local populace?  To the US public?  It is a message of 
strength for the insurgent and weakness for the US.  This serves the insurgent in two vital 
ways: it strengthens the insurgent’s hold of his own center of gravity (the local 
population) and attacks the US operational center of gravity (the air base) and strategic 
center of gravity (the American public).  As a result, the US military (in particular, 
USAF) must be able to defend air bases from attack not only to protect resources and 
personnel but to win the information battle.  
 
16 Eric Schmidt.  “US Convoys Go Airborne”.  The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 15, 2004. 
Retrieved on 22 Jul 2005 from 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041215/news_1n15convoys.html.  It should be noted that 
initially these actions reduced US killed, but US casualties have risen back to a level slightly above those of 
Jan 2004-Oct 2004 although still below the numbers of Nov 2004 – Jan 2005 that initially sparked the 
increased airlift to reduce convoys.  As other data has shown, is that the insurgents have gotten more 
efficient at bombings, small arms ambushes, and stand-off attacks.  In addition, Iraqi Police and Army 
(including National Guard) casualties have steadily risen from 109 in Jan 2005 to over 300 in Jul 2005.  
Casualty data was retrieved on 22 Jul 2005 from http://icasualties.org/oif and correlates with open source 
data compiled for a J-3 briefing, Top Five Most Deadly Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures as of 1 Apr 
2005.  
  11
                                                
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF US AIR BASE DEFENSE 
Air base ground assaults (and, therefore, air base defense) is ultimately linked to 
the air power theories of Douhet and Mitchell that extolled a key to air superiority was to 
take advantage of the vulnerability of the enemy’s aircraft on the ground.  Simply, 
aircraft are much easier to kill on the ground than in the air.  However, it wasn’t until 
World War II that the assault of airfields became an essential component in conventional 
operations.  The Japanese initiated attacks on the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia by 
first bombarding and then capturing airfields.  From 1944 to 1945 the Japanese executed 
a massive offensive in China to overrun the eastern air bases used by Major General 
Claire L. Chennault’s Flying Tigers.17  The battle of Midway, which was one of the most 
critical Naval battles of WWII, started as a Japanese attack against the Navy and Marine 
air base defenders on Midway Island in order to seize the runway facilities.  The German 
actions in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France during its 1940 offensive and 
the assault on Crete in 1941 were all efforts to use paratroops and infantry to capture 
existing Allied air bases for use in Axis air and ground offensives.18  The legendary 
American island-hopping campaign in the Pacific theater was essentially a calculated 
effort to capture existing airfields, or terrain to establish airfields, in order to attack other 
Japanese-held islands, mainland Japan, and the Japanese fleet.  Further, one of the most 
famous US operations during WWII was “Merrill’s Marauders” assault and capture of the 
Myitkina airfield, the only all-weather runway in Burma.19  In response to the focus on 
air bases as primary targets of conventional operations, air base defense became a 
pressing need.    
Air base defense in World War II emphasized the need for capable and substantial 
conventional defenses comprised of air defense artillery, conventional (i.e., infantry) 
ground defense forces, and passive defenses such as protective shelters for aircraft.  This 
 
17 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 3. 
18 Fox, 2; Alan Vick,  Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest.  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 21-33. 
19 Ronald Spector, “The Road to Myitkina,” in From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient 
and Modern Times, edited by John Arquilla (New York: University Press of America, 1996).       
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perception assumes a conventional opponent capable of air attack and conventional 
ground assaults.  Besides for the unconventional tactics employed by the British Special 
Air Service in North Africa, the perception of a conventional threat to air bases was 
correct.20   
The British established the first dedicated air base defense force in February 
1942.21 The Royal Air Force Regiment came into being mainly due to the debacle at 
Maleme, Crete where “divided command” of defense forces led to the loss of two 
airfields and then the entire island to the Germans.22  The U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) 
followed suit later that same year with the establishment of 296 air base security 
battalions.23  Both the RAF and USAAF similarly viewed the chain of command of the 
base defense units – all base defense forces were the responsibility of the air base 
commander.  Each force was also composed of static units and mobile units that were 
organized to intercept and flank attacking forces.  However, by mid-1943, the decreased 
threat of invasion, the air supremacy of the Allies, and the lack of ground attacks by Axis 
forces against Allied airfields resulted in the deactivation of both British and US air base 
defense units.  By war’s end, the US would deactivate all air base ground defense forces.  
The British took a different view and maintained the RAF Regiment as part of a 
“balanced Air Force” and, as a result, the RAF Regiment would see action in the UK’s 
post-war colonial insurgencies.24   
 
20 Vick, 56-65; During the vital timeframe between just prior to the First Battle of El Alamein in June 
1942 (where the offensive of Rommel’s Afika Corps was first stopped) and the Second Battle of El 
Alamein in October 1942 (where Afika Corps suffered its first and decisive defeat), the SAS were able to 
destroy 241 Luftwaffe aircraft that were to support Rommel’s ground operations.  In June 1942 alone, the 
SAS destroyed eight percent of Luftwaffe aircraft in North Africa.  The air base attacks not only destroyed 
aircraft but forced the redistribution of resources (soldiers and weapons) to the air base defense mission and 
the reduction of sorties by the Luftwaffe.  These destructive and harassing attacks were critical in the Allies 
achieving air superiority over the battlefields of North Africa in late 1942 and leaving Afrika Corps without 
the ability to use blitzkrieg air-ground tactics against the Allies. 
21 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,3.  The RAF Regiment peaked at about 85,000 personnel during 
WWII. 
22 Michael D. Bean, “United States Security Forces in an Era of Terrorist Threats” (master’s thesis, 
USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999), 21.; A.C. Carlson, Air Base Defense. (Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University), 2. 
23 Fox, 3. 
24 Fox, p.4.; Wayne Pursuer, “A Historical Perspective and Vision for the 1990’s” (master’s thesis, Air 
War College, 1990),  7. 
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However in 1947, the United States Air Force (USAF) became a separate service.  
As part of being a separate service, the USAF became responsible for its own base 
defense. And even though the Army-Air Force Agreement of 1947 and the Key West 
Agreement of 1948 did not specifically spell out the Air Force’s air base defense 
responsibility or how air base defense would tie-in with the Army’s area security mission, 
the USAF’s responsibility for its own air base defense was implied in both documents.25  
The Korean War did little to alleviate this vagueness.  USAF took it upon itself to 
defend its bases by assigning the Air Police as the main air base defense force.  Starting 
with less than 10,000 personnel in 1950, the Air Police expanded to 39,000 by the end of 
1952 but the Air Police had no doctrinal guidance on how to employ forces in air base 
defense.26  The USAF did not publish guidance on base defense until March 1953 and 
even then regarded “sustained ground defense operations” as a task the USAF was not 
prepared to take on.27   
Even though in 1953, Air Force Regulation 355-4, Defense – Local Ground 
Defense of Air Force Installations, defined the responsibility of the installation 
commander to provide protection of air bases from infiltration, guerrilla warfare, civil 
disturbance, and airborne, seaborne, or ground attack, this approach to air base defense 
needed large numbers of airmen not routinely assigned as Air Police to take up defensive 
fighting positions.28  Air Police duties in air base defense were outlined as: 1) providing a 
reconnaissance or observation screen to permit other personnel to continue normal duties 
until the last possible moment; 2) combat patrolling against guerrilla, partisan, or 
irregular forces; 3) perform as a mobile ground fighting unit; and 4) assist in organizing 
 
25 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,4; In 1984, Joint Security Agreements 8 and 9 between the USAF 
and Army would outline more on responsibilities for security in the “rear area” but still did not identify a 
process for how areas of responsibility would be delineated, only that the Army would do it.  This is 
essentially how it remains in Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, 10 Sep 2001 
and Joint Publication 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense, 23 Jul 1996 
26 Fox, 4; Air Police concentrated on enforcement of the law and UCMJ standards. 
27 Fox, 5; Bean, “Era of Terrorist Threats,” 24; Air Force Regulation 355-4, Defense – Local Ground 
Defense of Air Force Installations, 3 Mar 1953. 
28 AFR 355-4, 2. 
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the defenses of installation and the training of personnel.29  The doctrine of AFR 355-4, 
in actuality, was sound in most aspects except in its implementation.  The ABD tasks in 
AFR 355-4 were an “emergency function” to be executed upon the attack of the enemy.30  
The assumption is that the enemy guerrilla force would be detected in enough time for 
the Air Police and other airmen to assume their base defense fighting positions.  Without 
regard to the fact that most Air Police and nearly all airmen were wholly untrained to 
perform this mission, the entire concept provided the enemy such a major advantage in 
time and initiative that effective defense would be extremely difficult.  This was known 
at the time and expressed by U.S. Air Force Colonel A.C. Carlson in 1952: 
Air Force bases and ancillary units are static or semi-static, and the 
initiative for attack is invariably with the enemy who can choose his time 
and method of attack. In many instances, the first intimation of action is 
the explosion which destroys aircraft, vital facilities, or the opening of fire 
on personnel.31  
The vulnerability of air bases in Korea may be best illustrated by the Far East Air 
Forces’ (FEAF) own report in 1953 that relayed effective security for air bases in Korea 
was never achieved and that plans were never coordinated to deal with the threat of 
35,000 North Korean guerrilla fighters operating in the allies’ rear area.32  In fact, most 
Air Police were detailed for anti-theft/pilferage missions that correlated more with the Air 
Police’s peacetime duties than that of the threat.  Fortunately for the USAF, the guerrilla 
forces never attacked air bases in Korea.  This was a missed opportunity for the North 
Koreans since disruption of air-to-ground support and air transport for UN ground forces 
could have made an impact at the negotiating table.33
When the Korean War ended, the USAF dismantled air base defense forces just as 
the Army Air Corps had done at the end of WWII.  Some Air Force leaders recognized 
 
29 AFR 355-4, 1. 
30 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,5-6; AFR 355-4, 1. 
31 Carlson, 9; Bean, 19  
32 Far East Air Force Report on the Korean War, “Guerrilla Warfare in Korea”. FEAF CADJ No. 
23973, vol. 2 (September 1953): 132-135; Fox, 6.  Amazingly, there are no reports of the North Korean 
guerrillas ever attacking an air base in South Korea during the war. 
33 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953.  (Washington D.C.: Office of 
Air Force History, 1983) 373-394. 
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this might have been a mistake; however, the needs of the “new look” military required a 
dramatic reduction in Air Police personnel.   The “new look” military was a reduced 
force that relied heavily on strategic nuclear forces and did not view limited wars like 
Korea as the probable future venue for US military forces.  It also maximized the use of 
main operating bases and required little use of forward bases that more often presented 
complicated air base defense challenges.  
Under this strategic direction, a 1957 Air Staff study assessed AFR 355-4 as 
“impractical,” “unmanageable,” and concerned with an “implausible [guerrilla] threat” 
and asserted that “quality base defense could best be achieved by the Internal Installation 
Security Program [AFR 205-5]”.34  AFR 205-5 was the guiding regulation for air base 
security in CONUS and Europe.  It concentrated on protecting USAF assets from 
sabotage through strict enforcement of personnel and vehicle circulation control.  The 
concept stressed fixed posts and physical security barriers to secure assets critical to 
combat operations.35  Point defense was established at the perceived target of the enemy 
attack – the critical resource (an aircraft or command and control facility).  Freedom of 
maneuver was granted to the enemy, on and off-base, in the belief that damage could be 
minimized and the enemy defeated.  However, the concept of AFR 205-5 hinged on two 
major assumptions.   
1.  The enemy wants to damage/destroy what the USAF views as critical assets.   
2.  The enemy will attack using short-range, direct fire weapons such as rifles, 
rocket-propelled grenades, etc.  
These assumptions are still prevalent today and are a major reason why air base 
defense, beginning in Vietnam, has been largely unsuccessful: the insurgent does not 
have to target critical US resources or use direct fire weapons to win the information war.  
And even though frequency of air base attacks and the intensity of the combat are a 
challenge for the insurgency, the insurgent only needs to attack to have a chance at 
victory.  
 
34 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,8. 
35 Air Force Regulation 205-5, Security – Installation Security System, 16 November 1959, 3. 
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The point defense of critical assets was designed to secure against saboteurs, 
spies, and small subversive forces such as undercover communist agents.  Although, no 
communist subversive force had yet attacked USAF resources, this was the threat the 
USAF accepted.36  It is possible, but undocumented, that the USAF wanted the saboteur 
to be the threat and not the “implausible” guerrilla threat because by doing so the USAF 
was able to find a threat it could reasonably counter and limit expenditure on non-
operational resources. 
The USAF’s focus on internal defense and the US military’s vague guidance on 
external base defense actions may have served the “new look” military but lacked 
relevance once the US seized the mission of counterinsurgency in response to 
Khrushchev’s declaration of Soviet support for “wars of national liberation” in 1961 and 
Ho Chi Minh’s announcement of his intention to reunify Vietnam in 1960.37  
On November 1, 1964, small units of the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa air base 
with mortars and sapper teams, destroying seven aircraft and damaging eighteen.38  The 
attack was viewed by Washington as the first against US forces in Vietnam and directly 
resulted in the conventionalization of the war as “regular” Army, Marine, and Air Force 
units were initially brought in to defend US air bases.   The Vietnam War eventually 
ended with 475 documented attacks against US/South Vietnamese (GVN) air bases that 
 
36 This is not to assert that there was no threat of Soviet spies during the 1950’s as there were arrests 
made within the Defense Department and the rest of the government throughout the Cold War.  However, 
with the exception of Robert Hansen, the FBI spy, the number of spy cases has dropped off since the end of 
the Cold War. 
37 Robert S. McNamara, “United States Policy in Vietnam,” (1964), cited in Department of State 
Bulletin (April 13, 1964). Retrieved on 4 Aug 2005 from 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/ps3.htm. Thomas Reeves, A Question of Character: A 
Life of John F. Kennedy. (Pittsburgh, PA: Three Rivers Press, 1997), 411.  Before ever taking office in 
1961, President Kennedy was zealously committed to counterinsurgency in a belief that it was a major 
component in the struggle of east versus west and in stopping the “domino theory” of communist 
expansion.  Although his views predate the announcements of Khrushchev and Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 
provided the first opportunity for Kennedy’s administration to use counterinsurgency as a weapon in the 
fight against communism. 
38 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,173; the attack destroyed five USAF and two RVN aircraft, 
damaged fifteen USAF and three RVN aircraft, killed four USAF airmen, and wounded 30 others.  
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resulted in 100 aircraft destroyed, 1,203 aircraft damaged, 309 service members killed, 
and 2,206 wounded.39    
Roger Fox, in his seminal work Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 
1961-1973, noted that the Army had the initial mission of external base defense in 
Vietnam.  However, the Army quickly abandoned the mission to poorly trained South 
Vietnamese Army units in order to execute offensive operations.  General Westmoreland 
denied the use of ground forces in a static defense in a December 1965 letter because this 
would “cripple decisive offensive operations and delay enemy defeat.”40  General 
Westmoreland needed the Army and Marine units, sent to defend US bases, for a 
conventional campaign he felt would end the war.  His orders stated that “all service units 
and all forces of whatever service finds themselves without infantry protection]…[will be 
organized, trained and exercised to perform the defensive and security functions which I 
have just discussed]…[I reiterate that their participation in self-defense is not an optional 
matter, but an urgent necessity”.41   
Though General Westmoreland’s reasoning was sound, it did demonstrate a lack 
of commitment to the air base defense mission that is still present today.  Strangely, 
USAF leadership determined that Westmoreland’s letter required air base commanders to 
provide “all feasible internal security for self-defense actions” which re-enforced the 
internal actions (i.e., AFR 205-5) the USAF security police were already doing even 
though the Army’s external security had just evaporated.42  This conventional, internally-
focused approach resulted in air base defense operations that never disrupted the enemy.  
As a result, the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were able to operate 
 
39 Fox, 172-208; Vick, Snakes, 114-157.  Of the totals, RVN aircraft and personnel accounted for 25 
aircraft destroyed, 305 aircraft damaged, 154 service members killed, and 504 wounded. 
40 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,27.   
41 Fox, 29. 
42 Fox, 28. 
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through the population with near impunity in the vicinity of most air bases for much of 
the war.43   
Designed to identify and stop a saboteur, the USAF’s internal control measures 
and static posts did prove to be very effective in defeating saboteur and sapper attacks but 
ineffective in combating the VC/NVA who chose to attack air bases with mortars and 
rockets.44  Further, Air Force base commanders had little influence on how security 
operations by the South Vietnamese were performed off the installation.  Even when 
opportunity presented itself to impact security off-base, most USAF commanders chose 
to restrict patrolling by USAF forces.45  Besides for forfeiting any chance to counter the 
VC, the USAF also voluntarily chose to ignore the threat by restricting the development 
of any real overt intelligence gathering mechanisms that patrolling could have at least 
initiated.      
How was the US military, and USAF in particular, ignorant of the threat?  Most 
critically, that the motivation for the VC/NVA’s air base attacks was interpreted by the 
USAF as the VC/NVA’s attempt to destroy aircraft and harass operations in order to 
disrupt USAF missions such as ROLLING THUNDER.46  This interpretation was wrong.  
It was not lost on the VC/NVA that US operations such as ROLLING THUNDER were 
ineffective and actually helped empower the VC by isolating much of the South 
Vietnamese peasant population that were often the inadvertent target of the bombings.47  
Moreover, the VC also had few illusions that they had the capability to gravely disrupt 
US sortie generation.  Bien Hoa AB and Da Nang AB alone had approximately 900 
 
43 Fox’s and Vick’s data on air base attacks supports this conclusion.  Fox and Vick recount only three 
successful saboteur attacks from a sleeper agent.  All other attacks were initiated from an off-base location 
to include thirteen sapper team attacks that penetrated the base perimeter.  However, what is unknown is 
how many sapper teams were scattered by local friendly forces or from the fire of perimeter defense 
positions before reaching the base perimeter. 
44 Vick, Snakes, 128-155. 
45 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,79-110 and 155-168. 
46 Vick, 9-19 and 105-109. 
47 Dennis Drew, “Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure,” (no date).  Retrieved on 6 Sep 2005 
from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew2.htm 
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aircraft just between the two bases and the VC most often attacked in small units with 
limited firepower.48  Why would the VC/NVA attack the air bases?   
The attacks were low-threat opportunities for the VC/NVA to send a message to 
affect the centers of gravity: the South Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the base, 
the operations of the air base, and the will of the American public in general.  This 
message demonstrated that the VC/NVA was capable of challenging the US in its own 
stronghold (i.e., the air base) and conveyed an image of strength, perseverance, and 
audacity. 49  Certainly destroying aircraft and killing American GI’s were prime 
secondary benefits but it was the transmission of the message that was the strategic focus 
of the attacks.50       
However, when the Vietnam ended, the US military refocused on organizational 
needs, and reemphasized the doctrine of offensive, conventional operations that had 
become the US military’s “comfort zone”.  The USAF’s approach to ABD after Vietnam 
was no different from the rest of the military.  The USAF refocused security based on 
point defense of critical resources and the threat of Cold War saboteurs and in doing so 
avoided challenges to the established doctrine, organization, and manpower allocations 
that reorganizing to counter a VC/NVA-type threat would have certainly entailed.  Even 
though since Vietnam insurgent attacks against US or allied air bases have occurred in 
Puerto Rico, Beirut, El Salvador, Somalia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Peru, and, most 
recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USAF has essentially remained faithful to its 




48 Vick, 91.  Vick’s data shows that the vast majority of stand-off attacks fired 10 or less rounds.  This 
allowed the VC to get away and for the VC to send their message that they could challenge the U.S. for 
control of the US’s stronghold: the air base. 
49 Vick, Snakes, viii. The air base attacks in Vietnam were low-threat because of the lack of a coherent 
off-base security operation resulted in 96% of 472 air bases to be stand-off attacks.  This means that at least 
96% of enemy air base attacks were unopposed. 
50 Vick, 91.  Vick’s data shows that the vast majority of stand-off attacks fired 10 or less rounds.  This 
allowed two things: first, for the VC to get away and, second, for the VC to send its message. 
51 This point is reinforced in Chapter III. 
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A. SUMMARY 
Analyzing the history of air base defense, an important conclusion becomes clear: 
the insurgent is the primary threat to air bases, not the Cold War saboteur or conventional 
ground force.  Insurgents attack air bases because the attacks can greatly influence three 
centers of gravity simultaneously: 
1. Insurgent Strategic COG – the population, who view air base attacks as a 
sign of insurgent strength and US weakness or lack of resolve. 
2. US Strategic COG – American public, who often see attacks against air 
bases as signs of the futility of US missions.  Air base attacks of great intensity 
and/or great frequency could force the escalation or cancellation of the entire US 
mission. 
3. US Operational COG – the air base itself, as the US military’s command, 
informational, and logistical focal point attacks against air bases are symbols of 
US power.  
Against this insurgent threat, the Air Force has focused base defense efforts on 
internal security and point defense of critical resources in the belief that insurgents value 
the same resources as the Air Force and that the insurgents will attack using ground 
tactics.  Needless to say, this approach has been of marginal value when insurgents did 
chose to attack.  Further, the Air Force has normally relegated external security of air 
bases to the Army whose dedication to defending air bases has been weak.  Air base 
defense does not provide the Army the large conventional battles or opportunities for 
units larger than a battalion to maneuver effectively.  These are the missions for which 
the Army has planned for and trained for and wants.    
However, after the Vietnam War where an insurgent force continually threatened 
air bases, the USAF chose to return to the Cold War view of threats to air bases even 
though the insurgent threat remained. 
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III. CURRENT AIR BASE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
If one performs a cursory review of joint and USAF air base defense doctrine, it 
appears the US military and the USAF seemed to have learned the lessons of Vietnam as 
it pertains to countering the insurgent threat.  However, five key problems become clearly 
evident when the Joint and Air Force doctrine is analyzed in detail.  
A. JOINT DOCTRINE  
First, the overriding Joint publications concerning air base defense (Joint 
Publication 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, and Joint Publication 3-10.1. 
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense), are clearly based on a 
conventional model of warfare.  The mere mention of “rear area” communicates an 
assumption of a linear, contiguous battlefield.52  If anything, the US experience in 
Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan should have removed this perception.  
The insurgent battlefield is one that has “no flanks, no rear, or, to put it otherwise, it is 
front all round.”53
The defense of a base is seen as an exercise in conventional maneuver warfare.  
Base commanders are responsible for security of their bases out to the base’s legal 
perimeter (i.e., internal security responsibility).  Joint Publication 3-10.1 does advocate 
patrolling beyond the base perimeter; however, the publication provides no method of 
coordinating areas of responsibility and operations with the elements doctrinally given 
the responsibility for the external security of the rear area bases: the Army’s “mobile 
response force (MRF)” and “tactical combat force (TCF)”.  The MRF is normally a 
mounted force of platoon to company strength that patrols the rear area searching for 
enemy forces or responding to enemy force attacks.  The mounted tactics of the MRF and 
the nature of periodic patrolling will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the MRF to 
detect insurgent activity.  The TCF, on the other hand, is larger (normally battalion-sized) 
and its main responsibility is to engage and defeat forces attacking bases.  The TCF 
 
52 David Briar, “Sharpening the Eagle’s Talons: Assessing Air Base Defense,” Air & Space Power 
Journal, Fall (2004). Retrieved on 6 Jul 2005 from 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXL/is_3_18/ai_n6361638  
53 E.D. Swinton, The Defence of Duffer’s Drift.  (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group) 47. 
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concept is a response to conventional threats to air bases, such as the battalion-sized 
assaults that Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut faced during the Tet Offensive in 1968.54  
However, since an insurgency is normally exemplified by acts of terror and hit-and-run 
guerrilla tactics, what exactly is the response force and tactical combat force going to be 
counterattacking against?  Joint Publications 3-10 and 3-10.1 have no response.     
This is not a new problem.  If an enemy fights in a way not defined by doctrine, 
then air base defense typically suffers.  This is particularly true since the assistance 
doctrinally provided by the Army to air base defense is a conventional tactical combat 
force with the mission of defeating conventional enemy forces.55   This in no way 
suggests that the Army has historically only provided tactical combat forces for base 
defense.   
Today, as in Vietnam, the Army is in charge of external base defense at nearly 
every US-led air base in Iraq.  USAF wing commanders have little influence of the off-
base terrain.  Trained police forces (i.e., USAF security forces) have been restricted to 
internal base duties by order of CENTAF and relegated, with a few temporary 
exceptions, to internal access control throughout air installations.56  The Army’s off-base 
operations have been frustrated by the constant threat of ambush and improvised 
explosive devices (IED), its inability to disrupt the recruitment of insurgents, and the 
seemingly impossibility of directly targeting the insurgents with conventional 
firepower.57  The situation is exasperated by the insurgent’s penchant for hit-and-run 
tactics and their ability to hide among the population because the Army’s conventional 
mindset minimizes interactions with the population and neglects the performance of 
 
54 In Vietnam, battalion-sized attacks accounted for 4 of the 472 air base attacks.  Though rare, these 
attacks were a disaster for the VC as the firepower of USAF force, Army response units, and USAF 
gunships decimated the enemy with relatively light damage to the base.  However, the intensity of the 
attacks were a disaster for the US in the information realm. 
55 Tactical Combat Force (TCF) is the term used in Joint Pub 3-10, Rear Area Operations. 
56 Of note, hundreds of security forces personnel are assigned under Army units for detainee 
operations and convoy security but these missions are not associated with base defense. 
57 It should be noted that the US Army’s mentality is, understandably so, to maneuver and destroy 
conventional enemy forces and an insurgency does not provide these opportunities.  The Army, and 
USAF’s for that matter, conventional view of air base defense is to wait to engage the enemy decisively.  If 
the enemy does not present himself in such a manner, than the hope is for the enemy to be incompetent. 
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constabulatory duties that help create a semblance of public order and security.  Instead, 
the Army has pushed much of the population to the side of the insurgent (even some who 
do not prefer the insurgents) because of a strategy that seems to entail risk avoidance in 
order to keep casualties to a minimum.58   This is most evident with the heavy dose of 
vehicle patrols (as opposed to foot) and limited restraint when it comes to the application 
of firepower.  This strategy may help save some US lives in the short run but will not 
defeat an insurgency and will probably result in more US and Iraqi casualties in the long 
run.   
As such, the Army has not interacted with the public (the typical ‘presence’ patrol 
in the Balad air base area entailed a four-vehicle armored convoy moving at 25-50 miles 
per hour through the area) and thus operates with little if any situational awareness.  
Understandably, soldiers without situational awareness or familiarity with the public 
become prone to periods of overreaction and will have a higher tendency to the 
indiscriminate use of firepower.  This lack of situational awareness accounts for the 
reports of harassment of the Iraqi public to include the torching of an Iraqi’s orchards 
even when there was little evidence that the suspect was actually an insurgent.59  This 
experience exemplifies the perils of putting counterforce operations first against an 
insurgent enemy. 
In reality, the Army’s execution of joint doctrine in the Iraqi insurgent 
environment makes it impossible for air base security to be achieved for four reasons: 1) 
the enemy is nearly undetectable until they attack, 2) the enemy is among the population, 
3) conventional forces cannot gain the initiative because intelligence is lacking, and 4) 
the conventional dictum of decisive force “against an enemy’s center of gravity” is not 
 
58 Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), 
Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master 
Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security 
Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force 
Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.  
59 Ibid. 
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realistic because the insurgent’s center of gravity is the local population.60  This relates to 
Clausewitz’s “Trinity”: military, government, and the people.   
Clausewitz believed the opponent’s military to be the center of gravity and, 
therefore, had to be attacked first in order to get the government and, later, the population 
to submit.61  In a counter-insurgency, one must control the will of the people first (e.g., 
center of gravity) before counterforce operations can commence.62  Without the will of 
the people, counterforce operations will most likely achieve insignificant results.  
B. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE 
Second, Air Force doctrine is also insufficient but in a completely different way.  
The Air Force seems to acknowledge the predominance of the asymmetric threat to air 
bases but chooses to counter the threat, strangely, with internal security.  Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-4.1., Force Protection, identifies standoff attacks, which 
constituted over 96% of air base attacks in Vietnam and a favored tactic of the insurgent, 
as the most serious threat to air bases.63  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, Air Force 
Installation Security Program, says “asymmetric threats” using “unconventional warfare 
tactics” are the primary threat to “vital resources”.  And as if still providing the same 
response to General Westmoreland’s letter, Air Force doctrine counters the “asymmetric 
threat” with internal security measures.    
AFI 31-101, which may have correctly identified the threat above, proposes that 
the counter to the threat is circulation control, identification credentials, and point defense 
around critical resources.  Apparently, the asymmetric threat in AFI 31-101 is the cold 
war saboteur, not an insurgent. This is not to say the security measures in AFI 31-101 are 
useless, they are not.  Implementing sound security measures is never a bad idea and 
quite essential against suicide bombers and saboteurs but these internal actions will not 
prevent insurgents from successfully attacking an air base.  As a result, USAF air base 
 
60 Stephen P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, “Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional 
Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004) 15. 
61 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War (translation by J.J. Graham). (London: Penguin Books, 1968) 121-
123. 
62 Basilici and Simmons,  23. 
63 Briar, “Assessing Air Base Defense” 
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defense doctrine is tied to standards and not to the local situation.  Therefore, security at 
Offutt AFB in Nebraska is essentially the same as the security at Balad Air Base in 
Iraq.64   At Balad, Air Force security forces are used almost exclusively to guard access 
to the flightline just as they do at every CONUS base even though Balad is attacked 
almost daily with standoff attacks.65  This internally-focused security approach neglects 
intelligence in favor of standardization.   
The Air Force’s other doctrinal problem is the Tactical Area of Responsibility 
(TAOR).  Air Force Policy Directive 31-3 defines the TAOR as an area that extends from 
the base perimeter that the defense force commander can control with effective fire.66  
Considering that air base defense units are normally armed with the M2 .50 caliber 
machine gun, the TAOR would theoretically extend approximately 1500 meters outside 
the base perimeter.  Within the TAOR, the Air Force expects security forces to patrol the 
area and/or coordinate for joint forces, allied units, or host nation units to patrol the area.  
Beyond the TAOR, the Air Force completely depends on joint forces, allied units, or host 
nation units to control.  Obviously, this line of reasoning has many deficiencies.  First, 
the concept of an “air base TAOR” is not included in joint publications.  Second, does the 
ability to fire on an area equate to control?  If Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and 
El Salvador are any indication, the answer is a resounding no.  The Air Force assumes, by 
defining the TAOR by the capability of weapons that reside on base, that the base can be 
defended from the base itself – continuing the primacy within the Air Force of the 
concept of internal defense (since the 1950’s).  Air Force doctrine also does not identify a 
way of coordinating for the defense of the TAOR and beyond with any other agency.  
 
64 Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), 
Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master 
Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security 
Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force 
Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.  Roger Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, saw the same problem in 
Vietnam.  Fox noted security at Vietnam air bases was based essentially on the security standards for bases 
with nuclear laden aircraft in the CONUS.  These standards were used by HQ 7th Air Force (7AF) to 
inspect and standardize security across Vietnam. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Briar, “Assessing Air Base Defense” 
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The Air Force doctrine assumes some other agency will assist in security of the area 
beyond the TAOR, provides no guidance if no other force exists beyond the TAOR or if 
an existing force is incapable of handling the threat.  Yet to defend the base from the 
base, the Air Force believes it will be able to identify the “asymmetric threat” in time to 
protect the base and its resources.  In this way, the Air Force views the “asymmetric 
threat” as a conventional ground assault, which can be identified and attrited before 
resources have been destroyed.  As has been discussed early, assuming an insurgent will 
act like a conventional force has been unsuccessful for the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan 
against an “asymmetric threat”.   
What is noticeable is what has been left out of air base defense doctrine - law 
enforcement.  The view of societal control in a military sense is very similar to the way a 
cop views the neighborhood where they walk the beat.  Essentially, it is knowing 
everything that happens in the community (at least in a general sense) and being able to 
affect any outcome.  This puts a premium on observation, communication, and the 
gathering of information – which are the cornerstones of effective law enforcement and 
in subverting an “asymmetric threat”.  In fact, the concepts of community policing, which 
seeks to reduce the fear of crime in a community through knowledge, interaction, and 
civic action, and intelligence-led policing, which uses investigation and observation to 
find, fix, and finish serious criminal threats to a community, seem suited to a 
counterinsurgent role.67  Yet even though the Air Force security forces are trained police 
personnel, the Air Force does not view those skills as useful in the base defense role.   
Instead, as Major David Briar observed, Air Force base defense “boils down to putting 
 
67 Gary Potter (Professor of Criminal Justice at Eastern Kentucky University), email message to 
author, 22 Jul 2004.  Controlled experiments indicate that community policing is effective in reducing the 
fear of crime but not necessarily crime itself; although, the dramatic reduction in the crime rate of New 
York City has been partially attributed to a community policing approach.  Intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
is a policing approach that first seeks to understand the environment through a relentless drive to gather 
information and intelligence on the community.  ILP has been effective at reducing the operations of 
criminal enterprises and trafficking organizations.  Intelligence-led policing was developed in the United 
Kingdom as a way of policing Northern Ireland.  ILP and community policing both depend on information 
management, two-way communications with the public, scientific data analysis, and problem-solving by 
individual police officers or small units.  Author Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, made a similar comment 
that the future of US operations will have as much in common with community policing as it does with 
combat.  Kaplan made this comment during an afternoon question and answer session at the Naval 
Postgraduate School on September 15, 2005. 
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bodies, weapons, sensors, and fires in the right place at the right time”.68   If true, this is 
THE conventional approach to base defense that is confounded by the “unconventional 
warfare tactics” of the insurgent.  This approach presents base defense as a technical or 
engineering problem instead of the human problem of controlling information and 
behavior and acquiring intelligence.  The goal of this engineering problem is to finish the 
insurgent through counterforce actions but it misses the critical step of finding and fixing 
the insurgent first (a human problem).69  
C. TECHNOLOGY 
Contributing to the Air Force’s inability in battling an insurgent enemy, is the 
employment of technology.  This is the third key problem in air base defense doctrine.  
Technology has always served the Air Force as a force multiplier in the aerial realm of 
combat.  The Air Force has greatly benefited from an enhanced ability to detect and 
neutralize enemy aircraft at long-range (e.g., air-to-air missiles).   This philosophy of 
long-distance detection and neutralization has become ingrained in the doctrine of air 
base defense as well.  The Air Force has purchased well over $300 million in mobile 
sensor systems since 1995 to enhance air base defense.  The detection systems often 
include infrared sensors, ground radars, infrared cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV), counter-battery radar, and remote firing platforms.  The standard configuration is 
for these sensors to be positioned on-base looking out in order to detect an advancing 
enemy force.  Early detection allows the US defenders to seize the initiative quickly if the 
enemy attacks.  Of course, employing technology in this manner is based on two key 
assumptions about the enemy and the terrain: 
1.  The enemy force will attack in a way that allows their intent to be 
perceived by their actions.  Specifically, the enemy will execute a direct action 
 
68 Briar, “Assessing Air Base Defense” 
69 Benjamin J. Hettingja, “The Defense of Tan Son Nhut, 31 January 1968: A Study in the Nature of 
Air Base Security.” (master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2002).  Hettingja presents base 
defense as human problem and compares this to the Air Force’s misguided attempts of seeking only 
technical solutions to fix air base defense.  However, Hettingja essentially defines the “human problem” as 
that of leadership ensuring the right troop is in the right spot at the right time.  Assuredly, this perspective is 
a vital lesson for combat leadership but in the overall perspective of air base defense, the insurgent is still 
provided free reign to operate, maneuver, and grow.  
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mission or short-range stand-off attack against the base in order to destroy critical 
resources.  This is a conventional force-on-force assumption.70  
2.  There is a clear zone around the air base devoid of natural landscape and 
urban terrain which would disrupt the capabilities of the sensors.  Further, very 
little population can reside in the sensor zones because large congregations will 
make it nearly impossible to discern threatening movements that could be 
detected by the sensors.  A UAV cannot distinguish between a lawful citizen with 
an AK-47 and an insurgent with an AK-47.  Also, hampering this assumption is 
that many of the world’s air bases are built either in urban areas or on the 
periphery of urban areas.71  
Both these assumptions point to a conventional perspective that assumes the 
enemy is willing to execute a “force-on-force” attack and that the population will be a 
negligible factor.  In this false belief, the sensors have created a deficit in air base defense 
strategy by serving to keep the air base’s defenders planted on-base in a response mode 
focused on finishing an enemy force instead of finding and fixing that enemy force.  Of 
course, if the enemy attacks in accordance with the Air Force’s conventional 
assumptions, then the Air Force will most likely finish them.  Which is precisely why the 
insurgents do not attack that way.72
This is not to say that the sensor systems and UAV’s should not be used.  They 
should be and have proven effective in assisting air base defenders but are far from a 
“cure-all”.73  The concept of response forces tied to sensors is certainly a smart idea but 
will never disrupt an insurgency or seize the initiative from an insurgent force.  Response 
 
70 This is very similar to the VC sapper attacks in Vietnam.  However, sapper attacks accounted for 
less than 4% of all air base attacks in Vietnam and less than 1% of the air base attacks in Iraq. 
71 Walter Banning, “Military Base Encroachment: BRAC and JLUS,” (n.d.). Retrieved on 6 Sep 2005 
from http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/dcp/militarybase/index.cfm. US air bases continually face the problem 
of urban encroachment because air bases often are the top or one of the top employers in the region where 
they are located.  This attracts a population to thrive on that economic opportunity.  Also, many of the 
world’s most capable air bases are also airports which are normally built near a population center the 
airport was built to serve.    
72 The Air Force perceives expanding sensor systems and reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines will 
give the Air Force the ability to detect an attack and counter before the insurgent can act.  This is a false 
belief in technology’s ability to consistently provide early detection of attack and has never been the case 
especially when one considers that an air base defense area may cover as much or more than 200 square 
kilometers.   
73 Francis Vangel, “Gunfire Detection System Brings the Enemy Out of the Shadows,” Special 
Warfare, (July 2005) 28-29.  Gunfire Detection Systems have shown to be of considerable value especially 
when confronted by single snipers.  US Army Special Operations Command claims that the system allows 
quick reaction forces to find “its target” approximately 40% of the time.   
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forces are inherently reactive in nature.  Although response forces won’t defeat an 
insurgency, if deliberately and timely executed, they can force an insurgency to absorb 
great punishment and possibly influence the insurgents to reconsider targeting the air 
base.  Of course, the centralized command and control structure of most air base defense 
operations results in a slow and ineffective response force.  However, if a strategy of 
command and ‘decontrol’ is employed, air base response forces could have a much 
greater effect.  Command and decontrol means the sensor-and-shooter are linked more 
than just informational but the shooter makes the decisions on how the team will react to 
the information.  This puts emphasis on small-unit leadership, parallel communication 
and allows quicker, more fluid counter-strikes against an insurgent.  Unfortunately, the 
Air Force has almost unanimously established the main base defense operations center as 
the annunciating point for the base defense sensor systems and communications.74   This 
keeps situational awareness with base defense leadership instead of the maneuver forces.       
Even the most effective use of technology and command will never amount to an 
effective base defense unless it is linked with a strategy that separates the insurgent from 
the population and seizes the initiative.  The use of technology and response forces at 
Balad air base, the most attacked air base in Iraq, provides a feasible example.   
In early 2004, Balad initiated a program to counter the insurgents stand-off 
attacks.  The plan entailed the extensive use of UAV’s, helicopters, counter-battery radar, 
and response forces to attack enemy forces once they initiated stand-off attacks.  Quick 
reaction forces were positioned on-base (often helicopter transported) and off-base in 
vehicles.  The results were more than disappointing – attacks against Balad increased 
dramatically.75  Although, no one factor was ever identified as integral in the failure of 
 
74 Annunciating point is the location where the sensor system alerts an alarm monitor to the possible 
intrusion. 
75 Brad Scott (USAF Intelligence Senior Master Sergeant), communication with author at 820th Force 
Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.  The exact numbers of attacks were 
unavailable to the author but Sergeant Scott said the weather and a reaction to Fallujah may also have 
contributed to the dramatic increase in attacks.  As far as the weather, the insurgents were more active in 
2003 and 2005 during the summer months than during the winter months and 2004 was no different.  Yet 
these comments also speak to the fact that the conventional operation to disrupt the air base attacks at Balad 
was ineffective since it did interdict the summer activity of the insurgents or the disrupt the violent 
response to Fallujah. 
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the defense, it can be assumed that when an enemy is hidden among the population, it is 
almost impossible for a sensor to distinguish between a citizen and an insurgent.  
Secondly, the sensors cannot be everywhere, all the time and in fact very few insurgent 
attacks were ever detected before a rocket or mortar was already in-flight.76  Third, 
insurgents disguised as Iraqi police, Iraqi Army, or normal civilians were nearly 
undetectable to sensors.  The insurgents even figured ways to outmaneuver counter-
battery radar, heliborne forces, and UAV’s by launching stand-off attacks via remote 
systems or timers, just as the VC/NVA had in Vietnam.77  However, based on the 
location of the IEDs, ambushes, and stand-off attacks in Iraq, it is believed the local 
population has been aware of over 90% of the insurgent attacks before the attacks were 
executed.78  If this is true, then it would appear the key to base defense is winning the 
war for intelligence and situational awareness and that, apparently, can only be achieved 
by a focus on interacting with the population.  Technology cannot do that – only defense 
forces in the communities can.  And, in fact, it wasn’t until a population-focused air base 
defense operation -- Task Force 1041 -- was implemented with the smart use of 
technology that air base attacks against Balad began to decrease.   
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The fourth key problem with Air Force air base defense doctrine is the structuring 
of the command and control.  The Air Force’s centralized organization for base defense is 
a problem in itself.  The problem results from a strange mix of “too little” command from 
key USAF decision-makers and the over-control of maneuver forces.  This situation is 
created because the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), AFOSI operations, and the 
Air Operations Center (AOC) are often geographically separated from each other.79   
 
76 Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), 
Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master 
Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security 
Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force 
Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. 
77 Ibid; Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam,125-137. 
78 Ford, “Speak No Evil”, retrieved on 12 Aug 2005 from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/ford.htm.  Ford believes that it is not unreasonable to believe 
that every attack against coalition forces has been in the presence of some noncombatants. 
79 The AOC at the base-level is also commonly referred to as the Wing Operations Center (WOC). 
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BDOC’s, with a myriad of sensor systems and static posts, normally has good 
situational awareness of the ground situation on-base but is often ignorant of the air 
operations situation (i.e., sorties, fuel, supply, maintenance, etc.).  The AOC, on the other 
hand, has a near-complete picture of the air operations situation but remains ignorant of 
the ground situation on-base.  Without off-base operations and limited access to AFOSI 
information beyond periodic threat briefs, both the BDOC and AOC are ignorant of the 
ground situation off-base.  The disconnected situation has three negative effects on air 
base operations: 
1.   The base or wing commander, as the ultimate decision-maker, does not 
take part in base defense planning, coordination, and execution.  This is partially 
due to the fact that nearly all wing commanders are pilots with little knowledge of 
base defense and partially because the wing commander’s AOC is not involved in 
base defense.  The lack of top leadership focus sends a message to allies and 
indigenous forces that base defense is not a priority to the US. 
2.   Any information that is unknown is considered “okay”.  When this 
assumption is broken by the course of events (i.e., a plane is on final during a 
firefight that the AOC was unaware of), then the command centers respond with 
surprise and crisis decision-making that may be counterproductive and 
unnecessary.   
3.   To avoid surprises, the AOC often institutes more centralized command 
procedures due to a lack of trust in air base defense leadership.  The result is a 
slow-down in the decision-making cycle of air base defense.  Dynamic proactive 
(raids, ambushes, patrolling, etc.) and reactive (deployment of quick response 
forces, counter-battery fire, etc.) base defense actions become ineffective in 
responding to tactics of the insurgent. 
Strangely, this type of command is unique to deployed air base defense.  If 
security forces are at home station in a law enforcement mode, they operate through a 
command and decentralized execution (or even decontrol).  For example, a request for 
police response will terminate at the security control center (normally manned by an E-4 
or E-5) and once the information is received and forces are dispatched, the senior ranking 
responder assumes incident command.  The incident commander directs response forces, 
takes responsibility for the communications net, and manages the situation until 
completion.  The incident commanders are expected to take control and handle the 
situation at the lowest possible level and, unless the situation dictates, are not to occupy 
time seeking approval for actions from senior leaders.  Yet these same personnel will be 
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proactive and dynamic under a decentralized control structure and reactive and passive 
under a centralized air base defense control structure.  So how does Air Force security 
forces solve problem?  The answer is counterintuitive – centralize and combine.       
Combining the AOC with the BDOC and AFOSI command centers as a point of 
doctrine allows the wing commander to achieve a level of situational awareness to 
comfortably, or uncomfortably if that is necessary, delegate responsibility to subordinates 
to take command of incidents.80  The fact is that unless the wing commander delegates 
much of his air base defense command and control down to the flight or squad-level than 
the air base defense forces will not be able to perceive and act quicker than the 
insurgents.81  
A combined AOC-BDOC-AFOSI organization combines sensor-to-shooter 
communications with the decision-maker and allows subordinate leaders to act within the 
wing commander’s intent without needing to seek additional guidance.   Further, the 
wing commander will better understand and accept the responsibility of base defense.  
Without this understanding, the Air Force could not effectively combat an insurgent foe 
because coordinating with, training, and advising allied and indigenous forces as well as 
the execution of civic action projects could not be accomplished without the active 
participation of the primary local US decision-maker – the wing commander.     
E. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 
The fifth key problem with Air Force air base defense doctrine is the organization 
of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI).  AFOSI has a few basic 
missions when it comes to air base defense: counter-intelligence (CI), establishing overt 
intelligence networks, and providing threat briefings.  The thrust of CI is identifying 
organizations or agencies that are gathering intelligence on US missions.  In this manner, 
 
80 This comment is based on observations made by Professor Kalev Sepp of the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  In the summer of 2005, Professor Sepp was tasked to travel throughout Iraq to document best 
practices in the counterinsurgency.  On September 14, 2005, Professor Sepp briefed on the need to 
decentralize in order to fight an insurgency.  He relayed a quote from a particularly effective battalion 
commander who commented on decentralizing C2, “we decentralized until I was uncomfortable and then I 
knew we were there.”  
81 The “perceive-act” relationship is analogous to John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act). 
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AFOSI works to uncover criminal organizations, foreign intelligence services, and 
internal agents.  AFOSI has a solid history of uncovering insiders/spies within the Air 
Force as well as organized criminal activities normally constituting service members 
stealing government property.82  AFOSI combines this information and presents analysis 
as threat briefs to the local base commander.  And although helpful to provide local 
commanders situational awareness, much of the thrust of the CI program and threat briefs 
is reactionary in nature and does little to expose an insurgent organization.83  As such, 
AFOSI has been often criticized for being of little utility against insurgents and terrorists; 
however, AFOSI is capable of making a much greater impact in base defense. 
After 9/11, AFOSI’s primary mission became force protection.  AFOSI’s agents 
focused their attention on discovering threats to air base.  To do this, AFOSI is chartered 
as an overt intelligence gathering force (primarily human intelligence, HUMINT).  The 
term overt in this sense means that AFOSI agents cannot use aliases.84  Although the 
inability to operate covertly may hinder them somewhat, AFOSI agents can interrogate 
suspects, pay informants, turn double-agents, establish “dead-drops”, and implement 
surveillance detection operations.85  The problem is that as an overt presence that 
normally constitutes one or two agents, AFOSI needs a permissive environment to be 
effective.  Saigon and Da Nang and Baghdad (March to June, 2003) provide a historical 
pattern that proves with a permissive environment that allows freedom of action and 
maneuver, AFOSI could be a predictive and proactive force.86  The intelligence AFOSI 
gathered allowed the execution of precise, discriminate force in order to disrupt insurgent 
 
82 Phillip Forbes (Air Force Office of Special Investigation Special Agent), communication with 
author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.  SA Forbes related 
that AFOSI’s CI training still focuses CI as if the purpose was finding a Cold War spy and not CI on the 
tactical battlefield. 
83 Interview with field grade US military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) officer.  The source had 
worked with AFOSI throughout his career to include most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
84 Interview with field grade US military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) officer.  The source had 




                                                
operations.  However, without a permissive or secure environment, AFOSI has more 
often than not been ineffective.87   
In the USAF, AFOSI has a chain of command that separates AFOSI from the 
other Air Force organization with the exact same mission of force protection, the security 
forces.88  And it is the security forces that must create and maintain a secure environment 
around the air base to allow AFOSI to perform their force protection mission without 
disruption.  Yet the security forces cannot maintain a secure environment without the 
effective execution of AFOSI’s overt intelligence gathering operations.  This reciprocal 
dependency would be best served by putting both organizations under a single 
commander, just as the Special Police and Military Forces were placed under a single 
commander during the successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, and the 
Philippines.  Both AFOSI and security forces require the efforts of the other to be 
successful yet they have no responsibility to each other.  This doctrinal and 
organizational oversight must be corrected or air base defense will continue to suffer.         
F. SUMMARY  
The joint and USAF doctrine for base defense as well as the USAF’s use of 
technology in air base defense appear to have been created to combat the unconventional 
threat yet none provide an effective framework to counter the insurgent other than killing 
them when they attack.89   
The doctrine views counterforce operations and internal control measures as the 
key to air base defense.  This doctrine fails because the insurgent will not use tactics that 
allow counterforce operations to be effective.  Not only do these strategies and the USAF 
use of technology cede the initiative and intelligence to the insurgent but also the 
strategies appear to accept air base attacks as inevitable and, therefore, let the insurgent 
win the “information war” that is critical to achieving local security.   
 
87 Ibid; SA Forbes made the same comment during his May 2005 interview with the author. 
88 AFOSI agents technically do not work for the wing commander but for regional AFOSI 
detachments. 
89 Of course, this has been extremely difficult for the Air Force as well because of a command 
structure that de-emphasizes senior base leaders and a base defense organization that over-controls 
maneuver units. 
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Organizational culture and constraints also hamper air base defense, especially 
within the Air Force.  The separation of the AOC and BDOC makes for a dangerous mix 
of delayed operations and uninformed decisions.  The separation of the command 
channels between AFOSI and security forces ensures that neither agency will be able to 
maximize their capabilities.  Further, the separated command structures create 
inefficiencies in the overt collection operations of both the security forces and AFOSI.   
Since the conventional approach of joint doctrine and the Army and the internal 
strategies of the USAF cannot defeat the insurgents and defend the air base, the U.S. 
military must look to other approaches that may.  A solution may be found by first 
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IV. INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND THE SYSTEM OF 
INSURGENCY 
  
The history of air base attacks was well documented in Alan Vick’s 1996 RAND 
study, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, as part of Project AIR FORCE.  Vick’s data (along 
with that from Iraq) documents that from 1941-present there had been over 2,000 air base 
attacks which have damaged or destroyed over 2,000 aircraft.90  Surprisingly, lost on 
Vick in his analysis is the significance of the insurgent threat to air bases.  Since WWII 
insurgents have executed every successful ground attack that has damaged or destroyed 
US aircraft or that has wounded or killed US personnel.91   The conclusion is simple, the 
threat to air bases in the modern era is the insurgent and terrorist, not conventional 
forces.92  And the difference is essential – conventional forces seek victorious 
engagements while the insurgent seeks victory in the political battlespace.   
Often insurgency and terrorism are viewed under the auspices of violence alone.  
This is a short-sighted interpretation of the long-term goals of the insurgent.  Terrorist 
expert Martha Crenshaw has noted that terrorism as political violence is basically 
motivated in two ways: instrumental objectives and organizational needs.93  Instrumental 
objectives are the political objectives, the desired end-state, of the insurgent/terrorist 
organization whether that be the establishment of a Sunni-led theocracy (a possible 
motivation in Iraq) or a communist government that was the objective of the VC/NVA 
network in Vietnam.  For success, Crenshaw notes, the environment must be conducive 
to the instrumental objectives of the insurgent/terrorist group or the group will fail in 
 
90 Vick, Snakes, 114-158; Holmes, “Security Forces Transformation” brief. 
91 Vick, 114-158; however, Vick’s data does not include events such as attacks at Khobar Towers in 
1996, an air base attack  in South America in 1997 (which may have been friendly fire), Afghanistan, and 
Iraq.  All of these attacks were executed by insurgents/terrorists as well. 
92 In fact, Martin Van Creveld (1997) in his contribution called “Technology and War II: Postmodern 
War?” in Modern War, demonstrated that without regard to World War I and II and the Korean War, nearly 
every conflict of the 20th Century has been “unconventional”.  Creveld also asserts that modern powers 
fight these wars poorly. 
93 Martha Crensaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” Inside 
Terrorist Organizations, edited by David C. Rappaport (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 18-
22. 
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attaining significant support and become easy prey for the government it opposes.94  This 
view is based on the belief that the objectives of the insurgent group must somehow link 
with the social structure and social mores of the contested environment, i.e., the 
population.  No doubt this would be helpful and probably necessary in the long-run; 
however, not essential in the first phase of an insurgency.   
A. PHASES OF AN INSURGENT SYSTEM 
Although very few insurgencies actually grow through well-defined, distinct 
phases, the concept of Phases provides a good illustration of the life cycle of an insurgent 
system.  Insurgency acts as a system at the local level that a political entity (or group of 
entities) employs to grow in order to eventually become big enough to challenge and take 
over the state/government or at least strong enough to dismantle it.  This is necessary 
because insurgencies inevitably start out smaller and weaker than the state so it must 
remain invisible to the state in order grow.95     
The insurgent system is a plan of organizational growth based on how the 
insurgents “interact” with the population.  The interaction is based on manipulation of 
information to exert control over the population.  The manipulation of information is 
possible because the insurgents strive to either isolate the population from other sources 
of information or to demonstrate to the population that the insurgent’s information is 
more important.  The manipulation is achieved through acts of symbolic violence, 
intimidation or replacement of local leaders, public statements, and attacking the force 
that opposes them (i.e., police, army, outside agencies, etc.).  The goal is that the 
population will process this information and, as a result, behave in a manner that is 
advantageous to the insurgent.   Whether that behavior is as an active fighter, silently 
 
94 Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Political Terrorism,” Political Psychology: Contemporary 
Problems and Issues, edited by Margaret Hermann (New York: Jossey-Bass, 1986) 380-381.; Chalmers 
Johnson, Revolutionary Change. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982).  Johnson makes the 
same assertion as Crenshaw, that the objectives of a revolution must link with the environment it hopes to 
take over or it will fail.  Both Crenshaw’s and Johnson’s view that a successful insurgency needs a 
receptive environment is also an essential part of Mao Zedong’s theory of revolutions. 
95 The term “state” refers to political authority that is combating an insurgency, normally the 
government of a sovereign country.  The fact is that most often the US military assists other nations in their 
fight against an insurgency or the US is the acting state (e.g., CPA) or the US is operating in a country that 
has a insurgent/terrorist threat but the US is not actively combating the insurgent even though the insurgent 
could be targeting US forces.    
 neutral, or as a supplier of resources, as long as it is the behavior the insurgents require 
and expect, than the population will ensure its own safety.96
The insurgents will maintain this system of growth until the state or government 
takes action to disrupt the system and the insurgent’s ability to gain strength from the 
people (recruiting, security, and support).  The state must separate the insurgent from the 
population politically.97  This prevents the continued transmission of the insurgent’s 
narrative, the extraction of insurgent resources (recruitment, logistics, information, and 
legitimacy), and prevents the insurgent’s ability to dictate the public’s preferences 
through fear and intimidation.  The result is a belief that the state will be the winner in the 
struggle.  
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Figure 1.   Open Systems Model of Insurgency.98   
 
96 Most of the population in an insurgency remains generally neutral while possibly having sympathies 
for the side that appears to be winning or with the side that is most representative of the population’s social 
identity. 
97 Models for battling an insurgent and creating a secure environment will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
98 Professor Erik Jansen teaches Organizational Design for Special Operations with the Department of 
Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
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The model shows how an insurgency grows through message (instrumental 
objectives), action (transformation process), culture (attractiveness), outputs of action 
(reputation), and, finally, with positive results towards achieving the instrumental 
objectives (outcome).  These combine to generate the resources needed for growth: 
recruiting, security, legitimacy, and support.  Breaking this system requires the state to 
separate the insurgent from the population physically, politically, and informationally.  
Andrew Krepinevich describes insurgency as a protracted, three-phased systemic 
struggle, with the objective of overthrowing the existing political order or to achieve 
some political concession.99  This paper will use Krepinvich’s theory as an outline for our 
analysis of an insurgency. 
1. Phase I 
  Phase I is the founding of a political movement built around a core organization. 
During Phase I, core members proselytize the instrumental goals of the insurgent 
organization to the population they wish to control.  This is with a focus on a local 
approach to establishing political control and a base of operations.100  Establishing a 
modicum of local political control is made possible, initially, because in Phase I there is 
some freedom of action and political power that the government will not contest and 
provide a starting point for an insurgency.101  The expansion from the initial base will 
 
99 Dr. Krepinevich is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an 
independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning for 
the 21st century.   Dr. Krepinevich’s theory of insurgency in regard to this paper was taken from his 
testimony before the US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services on March 17, 2005.  
Much of Krepinevich’s theory is based on Mao Tse Tung’s writings on revolutionary warfare. 
100 This is akin to Tip O’Neil’s great political observation, “all politics are local”.  The politics in an 
insurgency are also local because each locality has a different political outlook and the insurgency must 
adjust their strategy with each locality.  An example (although at a more regional level) is if the US faced 
an insurgency, the insurgents would have to approach Texas (conservative political slant with loose gun 
control laws) and California (liberal political slant with strict gun control laws) with diifferent strategies. 
101 There is normally a level in a society where a state cannot (or will not) penetrate or influence.  An 
example is that small-time drug dealers in certain neighborhoods operate with near impunity because the 
local government either is unaware of the severity of the problem or does not see the problem as being 
worth the resources needed to combat the problem.  This is political operating space the state has chosen 
not to control.  However, if turf wars between dealers or gangs erupt in the killings of numerous people, 
than the state will often crackdown in order to take control of the problems.  A common response is for 
drug dealers to either slow-down their operation or relocate because they cannot directly challenge the 
state.    
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require at some point for the insurgent to engage in a zero-sum contest for control with 
the state where political power gained by the insurgent is lost by the state – and vice 
versa.102  The Phase I proselytizing needed for the insurgency to grow is not normally 
done from the pulpit, but through Propaganda by the deed.   
Efforts to expand the core organization are anchored in acts of terrorism such as 
murder, sabotage, and local intimidation.  The importance of the insurgent action is 
paramount – the insurgent organization commits acts of terror to advertise their idea, 
strength, and commitment.  But the insurgents are in a precarious position.  They must 
commit these acts of terror while simultaneously staying “invisible” to the state because 
in Phase I, until they can implement a large mobilization, the insurgents are infinitely 
weaker than the state. Remaining active and invisible is why insurgents and terrorists do 
not seek decisive military engagements, but instead usually avoid them.    
Stand-off attacks (mortar, rockets, etc.), car bombs, hijackings, kidnappings, and 
sniping are the hallmarks of insurgent and terrorist operations.   The tactics allow the 
insurgent to appear stronger while also preventing the state from initiating a devastating 
counterattack. If an insurgency is discovered and pursued by the state before it is 
prepared to survive and dictate public preferences, than it will most likely be crushed.  
However, in the initial phases, the insurgency is small and can remain invisible to the 
state.  The size and power of the state makes it visible and vulnerable to 
insurgent/terrorist attacks.  The survival of the insurgent system is dually dependent on its 
ability to remain active yet invisible and the government’s inability to find and fix the 
insurgent.103  The air base, in this regard, is the perfect symbol of the state (and the US 
 
102 Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense 
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).  Dr. McCormick is the Head of the Defense Analysis 
Department at the Naval Postgraduate School at the time of this writing.  Basilici and Simmons, “Bold 
Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 31.  A superb graph of the “insurgent growth curve” is presented. 
103 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts.  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970) 28-45.  This statement assumes that an insurgency is not 
receiving external support.  On p. 38, Leites and Wolf state that a strong enough external supporter could 
maintain an insurgency even without the local population’s support but this would be difficult.  
Nevertheless, isolating the environment of the insurgency is a requirement at all levels: local, regional, 
national. 
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for that matter) and is why the insurgents chose to attack.  Air bases are large, loud, and 
static. 
Due to this asymmetry in power, Phase I of an insurgency is about security and 
growth and air bases are a lucrative and strategic target because air bases present a low-
threat opportunity to attack a US center of gravity and advertise the strength of 
insurgent/terrorist cause (and the weakness of the US’ cause).  The message these air 
base attacks communicate to the contested populations is powerful: we can challenge the 
US in its own stronghold while we remain unchallenged by the US in our stronghold.104    
It must be said that some insurgencies that seek a political concession from the 
government (instead of political replacement) or that cannot generate mobilization among 
the population may remain in Phase I stage of an insurgency intentionally (or by 
necessity).  An example of this strategy is animal rights’ organization that uses violence 
to protest violence towards animals and seeks government assistance in stopping the 
cruelty.  However, these strategies normally fail because groups that remain in Phase I 
must remain underground.  In the underground, the insurgent organization exists without 
reference to the real world and often falls into a destructive cycle.  Unless corrected with 
new external stimuli, the organization becomes corrupted by internal dialogue and 
usually falls into defeat.105
2. Phase II 
In Phase II of an insurgency, according to Krepinevich, insurgents seek to expand 
their base of support.  Attacks now more often target government symbols, whether that 
is facilities, government officials, convoys, etc.  These attacks normally employ hit-and-
run tactics such as large-scale bombings and ambushes but even in Phase II, the 
insurgents still employ the tactics of terrorism exemplified in Phase I.  The insurgent 
attacks also serve to establish geographic areas as physical sanctuaries where insurgents 
 
104 There are two contested populations.  The first is the local community around the air base which is 
deciding whether to place its support behind the state or the insurgent.  The second is the US and world 
public which provide the political support for external involvement in the conflict. 
105 John Boyd,  “Patterns of Conflict,” (computer printout of slide from Pentagon briefing, 1976), 
slide 109.  This is a briefing Boyd first provided in 1976 at the Pentagon and delivered many other times 
until his death in 1997. 
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exert overt control over the population.  In this way the insurgent protects the link with 
the population who support the insurgency with security, membership, and legitimacy.  
These insurgent controlled areas are either normally remote (out the government’s reach) 
or urban (difficult for the government to operate).  However, these insurgent sanctuaries 
are more than just physical; they are mental and moral as well.   
Mental sanctuaries exist in the fact that the insurgent is viewed as the most 
powerful political entity in a given area.  Through this perception, the insurgent is seen 
by the population as the eventual winner in the struggle against the state and, therefore, 
has the power to introduce biased information, ambiguous information, restrict 
contradictory information, and intimidate the public in order to impede the population’s 
decision-making.  The result is a continuous process of adjusting the preferences of the 
population in order that strengthen the insurgent’s control over the population.   Without 
adjusting the preferences of the contested population, the insurgent will never achieve 
mass mobilization. 
As the control of the population is tightened, the moral sanctuary becomes the 
insurgent’s terrain as well.  This is how the insurgent sees “himself” and how the 
insurgent wants to be viewed by the public.  The insurgent is the “freedom fighter” while 
the government is the “oppressor”; the insurgent uses “discriminate force” and the 
government uses “indiscriminate force”; the insurgent stays true to its preached “values” 
while the government is a hypocritical organization.  This moral sanctuary is as important 
to the internal stability of the insurgent organization as a means of organizational identity, 
than it is in influencing the population.  Different from the mental environment where the 
insurgent’s instrumental objectives mainly target the state and the contested population, 
the moral environment is represented by the insurgency’s organizational culture.  The 
goal of the organizational culture is maintaining the internal structure of the insurgent 
organization.106   
 
106 Crenshaw, “Inside Terrorist Organizations,” 18-24.  Crenshaw is saying that if the only motivation 
for terrorist actions was political objectives than assuredly terrorists would be amenable to negotiation, 
amnesty, but the fact is that they usually are not so there must be other factors in their motivations.  These 
are organizational needs. 
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Just as any business organization must commit resources to maintain the 
organizational culture and benefits, insurgent organizations must do the same.  Insurgent 
organizations live in a clandestine environment where often the sacrifice of family, 
wealth, and life itself is often demanded.  The insurgent organization provides an identity 
return for the service of an active member.107  Without this identity of moral superiority, 
the insurgent organization could suffer splinters and defections that would jeopardize the 
existence of the insurgent organization. 
This moral aspect of war may be the most important in an insurgency because it 
represents the unifying principles of the combatant. It is what defines the insurgent, 
sustains them, and constrains them.  The moral aspect of war is the fighting spirit and 
will.  The issue in this moral aspect of war is that what is moral to the US may be 
immoral to the insurgent (and even the contested population) but the vice versa could also 
be true.  In the essence of this moral conflict, each side tries to force the other to either 
abandon their moral code or become hypocritical of their moral claims – not necessarily 
adopt new ones.  Straying from the moral basis causes dissention as unity, discipline, and 
organization are frayed. 
Insurgent leaders are principally guided by the instrumental, political objectives 
of the group but assuredly some of the organization’s membership may not share the 
same aspect of political motivation – or at least not to the same level.  It is their identity 
in the group that provides them status.  Any model of terrorism must take into account 
the varieties and the interactive dynamics of the organizational processes that goes 
beyond the political attractiveness of a group’s instrumental objectives.108  This means 
that insurgent and terrorist actions are not always primarily political but instead may also 
be needed to affect organizational maintenance.  These maintenance “actions” could be to 
spur morale, trust, financing, or simply to keep members active because the group’s acts 
of violence are their identity in the organization.  This identity is a tradition of physical 
violence (even glorification of violence) in order to help shape the group’s identity that is 
at least partially tied to acts of violence.  This violent identity helps shape active members 
 
107 Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 391-393. 
108 Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 381-382. 
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(and prospective recruits) in a way where those that join the organization must accept this 
culture of violence or they will be rejected or even, terminated.  This propensity to use 
‘violence in the name of a higher calling or moral idea’ as a unifying identity for 
underground conspiracies is described in Crenshaw’s essay, Psychology of Political 
Terrorism: 
The problem is to find some commonality in a heterogeneous group of 
individuals, especially in considering cross-national terrorism. One facet 
of personality or one predisposition to which analysts have been drawn is 
the individual's attitudes toward and feelings about violence and 
aggression.109
 
This revolutionary violence is most often not impulsive but the focus of the 
violence is often a purposeful exercise in instilling fear in a community through symbolic 
demonstrations of horror and personal sacrifice.110  The creation of fear not only serves 
instrumental objectives by serving to adjust the preferences of a target population through 
the organization’s perceived strength but begets an attractive (or intimidating) reputation 
among the population.  This reputation gives status to members and begets legitimacy 
and security for the organization.  The result reinforces a member’s identity as a self-
sacrificing warrior.111     
Insurgents must not only make their political objectives attractive to the public but 
also to the organization itself so active membership can grow.  From this perspective, 
violent acts are committed to either to support instrumental objectives (i.e., manipulate 
information – primarily, the relative strength of the insurgency as compared to the state), 
reinforce the moral culture (i.e., organizational culture), or both.  The fact is that this is a 
truly rare occurrence where an insurgent attack is without a need make a political 
                                                 
109 Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 398. 
110 Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicidal Terrorism,” Defeating Terrorism, edited by Russell D. 
Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill Co., 2003) 104.  Hoffman suicide terrorism is 
extremely effective at instilling fear in a community (as he documented it did in Israel) and at relatively 
little cost. 
111 David Tucker, “International Terrorism,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense 
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).  Dr. Tucker teaches International Terrorism with the 
Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.     
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statement, kill or maim, instill fear, or reinforce the moral culture and organizational 
expectations.112   
With the physical, mental, and moral sanctuaries in place, the insurgency can 
implement mass mobilization to challenge the government for ultimate control of the 
state.  Yet just as in Phase I, many insurgents will recognize that they will never be able 
mobilize enough to seize power over the government but are able to achieve enough of a 
base to continue Phase II operations.  The goal would be to achieve a major political 
concession from the government, expel an external supporter of the state, or, over the 
long-term, cause the collapse of the government itself. 
3. Phase III 
If the insurgents are able to achieve mass mobilization, then they can move to 
Phase III.  In Phase III, the insurgents confront the government in main force actions, 
rather than the hit-and-run tactics of Phase II, with the intent of defeating the government 
in open warfare.  The insurgents also continue actions consistent with Phase I and II in 
the hopes of generating enough momentum to convince the government of impending 
defeat and force the government to collapse.  However, a Phase III collapse is different 
from a Phase II collapse.  In a Phase II collapse, the insurgents still may have to contend 
with other political entities for control of the state even after the official government has 
disappeared.  In a Phase III collapse, there is no question that the insurgency is the new 
government.       
B.  PREFERENCES – THE INSURGENT CENTER OF GRAVITY 
 The instrumental approach is based on the belief that individuals and groups 
behave according to their political preferences.113  Political preferences are based on the 
past and present interpretation of information by the group and/or individual.  This 
information includes the nature of the social structure, social mores and norms (as in 
personal identity), expectations of prosperity, and expectations of victory.   
 
112 Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 386-388. 
113 Leites and Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority, 28-47. 
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Social structure and norms are analogous to local ‘attitude’ and are slow to 
change and resistant to contradictory information.114  These have been referred to as 
“pure preferences” because, theoretically, if all things were equal these preferences 
represent the political situation a group or individual would prefer.  This explains why 
within a population there will always be small ‘hard core’ minorities that are 
unconditional supporters of the state and the insurgents.115  The majority of the 
population, even though they may have sympathies for one side (state) or the other 
(insurgent), are capable of being influenced to “support either side depending upon their 
predictions of the others’ behavior and the related estimates of each side’s prospects for 
victory”.116  Expectations of prosperity and victory can be adjusted more quickly, 
especially during a contest.117  The insurgent organization forces this cost-benefit 
decision on the targeted population by challenging the state for control.    Figure 2 
outlines this preference-behavior relationship. 
Expectations of prosperity and victory are also more susceptible to biased 
information and provide the insurgent fertile ground to establish a following in order to 
challenge the state.118  Propaganda by the deed, local intimidation, and psychological 
operations are effective because, instead of challenging the structure of society, the 
insurgent manipulates the view of the public into believing the insurgent will be the 
eventual victor over the state.  In doing so, the insurgency also takes advantage of the 
‘bandwagon effect’ where portions of the population back the insurgency because of a 
desire to be on the winning side.119  A ‘bandwagon effect’ can also occur on the moral 
front where the insurgent’s ability to manipulate information also helps the insurgency 
 
114 John E. Jackson, “Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions,” American Political 
Science Review, (August 1993). 
115 Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen, “Revolutionary Origins and Conditional Mobilization,” 
European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 12, Issue 3, (1996), 377-402.  McCormick addressed this 
issue again in 2002 with Frank Giordano in an internal Naval Postgraduate School paper entitled, “The 
Dynamics of Insurgency.” 
116 Ibid. 
117 Timothy Amato, “Expectations and Preferences in British General Elections,” American Political 




appear not only like the probable winner but also the ‘right’ winner as well.  Moreover, 
by viewing the insurgency as the probable victor the population begins to adjust their 
calculation of future prosperity.   
Initially, the calculation of prosperity may be strictly rational as the population 
determines what form of authority better serves their individual or group goals but this 
calculation can be skewed.  As the expectation of victory swings towards the insurgent 
then expectations of prosperity also begin to swing.  Now the rational calculation is based 
on asking the question: “if I don’t support the insurgency, what are my chances of 
prosperity if the insurgents win?”  If the answer is “none” than most of the population 
will prefer the insurgency and behave in the manner the insurgents want.  This puts the 
insurgency in control of the local area and allows the insurgents to establish a system to 
grow and mobilize support in order to progress through the phases of an insurgency.  If 
the insurgency can control enough “local areas” and establish systems of growth, than 
they will be able to challenge the state.    
Of course, analyzing an insurgency by focusing strictly on preferences, behavior, 
and cost-benefit analysis represents a rational view of an insurgency that may ignore 
some effects of the society.  However, the insurgent will try to adjust the socio-economic 
preferences that most influence the behavior of the targeted population in order to 
achieve control.  These preferences, and costs-benefits, may not be strictly tied to 







Unless the insurgents have overwhelming support, the insurgents must overcome 
their initial weakness by engaging in “symbolic violence” and local intimidation to 
 
Figure 2.   Political Preference – Behavior Model.   
In order to control the population and generate the support to defeat the 
government, the insurgent must do a difficult task: from a position of weakness present 
itself as the eventual winner.  If the insurgent can do this, than it can start changing 
political preferences of the people first through the expectation of victory because it 
provides the quickest path to achieving political power with the contested population. 
C.  SUMMARY 
Why is this important to air base defense?   Any US air operation is a symbol of 
state power and not only the power of the US but also the power of whatever government 
allowed the US to operate from the air base.  This makes an air base a critical target in 
demonstrating the strength of an insurgency and the corruption of the government the 
insurgency is challenging.   
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te local supporters to enhance the relative prospects of the insurgent organization’s 
chance of winning.120  The result is effective recruiting and the ability to conduct more 
symbolic violence and political intimidation (e.g., creating a climate of fear).  If this 
insurgent mobilization is not disrupted by the state, a self-sustaining level of violence and 
mobilization may be achieved by the insurgents.121   This resulting situation will be very 
costly and difficult for forces of the state (and maybe more difficult for an external 
supporter such as the US) to reverse.   
Some of the “symbolic violence” will certainly be attacks against air bases and 
attacks against the local population of 
ttle over who will dictate the behavior of the local population, the insurgent almost 
always wins political power and the state (and the US as a supporter of the state) almost 
always loses political power every time the insurgent attacks, irregardless of whether an 
aircraft is damaged, a US serviceman is wounded or killed, or a local base contractor is 
ambushed and kidnapped.122  Each attack or political action strengthens the insurgent’s 
grip on the population (and its ability to influence the US public), enhances the 
insurgent’s ability to meet its instrumental goals through public support, and serves to 
strengthen the insurgent’s internal organizational needs.   
The impact of the air base attacks could be immediate and severe.123  The host 
government may curtail or cancel the US operations from the base or the US public could 
 the cancellation of the US mission for fear of further involvement, cost, or 
casualties.  If either the host state or the US acquiesces to the insurgent violence, the 
insurgency will be emboldened and strengthened by such action.   
 
120 This is a rare case because normally some aspect is served by the state or the government would 
have never came to power. 
121 McCormick and Owen, 377-402. 
122 However, if an insurgent ambush results in an unacceptable level of casualties (loss of resources) 
captured than this would be a situation where the insurgent loses. An example is MRTA’s raid on the 
Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru that eventually resulted in the death or capture of MRTA’s vital 
leadership.  This is the reason why insurgents use tactics, bombings and standoff attacks, to avoid such 
damage. 
123 The 1964 attack on Bien Hoa air base resulted in the escalation of US involvement. 
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local population) and 
protect
nterinsurgency.   In doing so, the defense of an air base can take 
on a st
Therefore, air base defenders must stop attacks against the air base and the local 
population in order to attack the insurgent’s COG (control of 
 the US COG (US public opinion).  The execution of attacks against an air base or 
its local area provides the insurgency an informational advantage in the contest with the 
state which is why the achievement of local security beyond the perimeter is a must.  
Only with the population behaving in a manner supportive to the host nation and US 
efforts will the insurgents be able to be targeted directly, neutralized, or marginalized.  
Without the population on their side, the insurgent system will be disrupted.  If the 
insurgent’s system of growth is disrupted over a period of time, than the incidents of air 
base attacks will also drop at an increasing rate as an insurgency is forced underground 
into a survival mode.  
  The powerful conclusion is that to be successful, an air base defense mission 
must operate like a cou
rategic effect beyond just providing air power to the combatant commander but 
also contributing to the overall counterinsurgency and stabilization effort of the theater 
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 V. MODELS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The theories of counterinsurgency may provide the most dynamic models for an 
effective air base defense.  At its core, effective counterinsurgency is essentially a 
diagram for achieving local security – the same key task as air base defense.   For this 
thesis, two models of counterinsurgency have been selected to mold new principles for 
air base defense strategy:  Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” and Julian Paget’s 
model  of intelligence in a counterinsurgency. 
A. MCCORMICK’S “MYSTIC DIAMOND” MODEL OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY124  
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Figure 3.   McCormick’s Model of Counterinsurgency at a National Level. 
McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” model of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
strategy applies at all levels in an insurgent conflict.  McCormick’s model provides a 
guiding strategy for interrupting the insurgent system of growth (Figure 1).  As far as 
interpreting McCormick’s model, the US should be viewed as part of the “state” because 
the US will normally be a supporting element for a foreign state in its fight against 
 
124 Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense 
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). This thesis only uses the top of the model.  The bottom of the 
model deals with external support and is in Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional 
Warfare,” 33.   
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 insurgents regardless of whether that support is in the form of training, advisors, financial 
support, or through the actual use of US troops.125     
For the state fighting the insurgents, it is best to observe McCormick’s model 
from a local perspective where the air base defense fight will happen. 
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Figure 4.   McCormick’s Model of Counterinsurgency at Air Base Defense/Local 
Level.126 
The model presents not an asymmetric struggle but a symmetric confrontation 
where the insurgent is poised against the state for control of the population.  Each side is 
executing a progressive (can also be simultaneous) strategy to use the population as a 
base for destroying the opponent.  Strategy A, population focused, strives to modify the 
behavior of the population to prefer the state over the insurgent.   It seeks behavior and 
 
125 Stephen Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” (2004).  Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 from 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi 
126 Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 35.   
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compliance, not “hearts and minds” which is a long-term approach, through the 
adjustment of public preferences.  McCormick would not say in instances where it is 
impossible for the population (Muslims?) to prefer the US but what could be achieved is 
that the insurgents could become not preferred by the public. 
Strategy A directly targets the demand for the insurgency by co-opting the 
population.  This is first achieved by protecting the population from the insurgent.  The 
tactical purpose of any air base defense mission must be to establish a secure local 
environment for the base and the local population.  This is more than just protect from 
the acts of terror or intimidation but isolating the insurgent informationally.  As the 
population’s source of security and information, the state and, in the case of air base 
defense, air base defense forces attain legitimacy of action in the area.  This is important 
since many times Air Force operations may have little if any local legitimacy because the 
focus of air operations normally does not target locals (humanitarian assistance is the 
obvious exception).  However in the realm of air base defense, legitimacy allows for 
freedom of maneuver for base defense and AFOSI units and the public’s participation in 
intelligence and source networks.  In this way, the defenders can achieve a level of 
situational awareness at least equal to or greater than the insurgents.  Legitimacy also 
allows the effective use of tactical information operations and PSYOPS to dispense 
truthful but biased information to the public in order to expand the legitimacy of the state 
and discredit the insurgent.  This constitutes information control. 
As part of the effort to achieve legitimacy, the US will seek to execute training 
and advisory missions with local air base defense forces and police.  Working with 
indigenous forces not only helps in co-opting the local population but also greatly 
strengthens the ability of the US to gather intelligence because information can be 
processed through trusted agents with knowledge of the local society.  Although, 
certainly protecting the population and isolating the insurgent is the first step to co-opting 
the population, many tasks can be executed simultaneously.  Particularly, the training and 
advisory mission where a more professional and effective local/indigenous base defense 
force will secure the base defense area that more quickly, efficiently, and, in many cases, 
more effectively than US forces alone.  In the end, the state and base defense forces will 
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appear to the population as the winner in any local struggle and isolating the insurgent 
allows the US to dictate the information war among the local populace. 
No matter the phase of an insurgency, Strategy A must always be implemented 
because the state must exert control in any contested area and extract information and 
intelligence.  It is also the primary strategy in combating insurgency’s in Krepinevich’s 
Phase I or Phase II of growth.  It is in Phase I and II that the population is the provider of 
insurgency protection and support.127  If an insurgency has reached Phase III, the 
insurgents already have popular support and the state may target the insurgent’s core 
forces directly (Strategy C). 
Strategy B for the state represents interdicting the support structure of the 
insurgents.  However, since the population is the source of support for the insurgents 
(unless an outside actor is the primary source of support), than this strategy is ineffective 
without Strategy A.128  More importantly, the intelligence networks (along with follow-
up investigation, not unlike standard criminal investigations) established during the 
execution of Strategy A allows the state and base defense forces to target the insurgent 
infrastructure discriminately – killing or capturing only those targeted, while 
safeguarding the public from indiscriminate force.  Thus to avoid indiscriminate 
casualties will require more than superb intelligence but also restraint and sacrifice on the 
part of the counterinsurgent forces.  Restraint and sacrifice in the fact that although the 
US can put a 500-pound bomb on any building it chooses, and sometimes that power 
must be intentionally displayed, but more often that level of force must be restrained and 
a more precise, dynamic type of force must be used (e.g., raid).  This paints the US not as 
some weak force that hides behind technology and sandbags but as warriors who do not 
fear face-to-face battle and do not threaten “good” people.  Sending this message is a 
moral victory and required to weigh the population’s calculation of victory decidedly in 
the counterinsurgent’s favor.   
 
127 Even if an insurgency has external support, it still requires the population for security from the 
state. 
128 If the insurgency is surviving off of external support than interdiction and some type of “border 
control” will be necessary at a local and state-level as may diplomatic and economic actions at a state-level. 
  57
                                                
As the insurgent is cutoff from its source of resources, legitimacy, recruiting, and 
information than it will be forced to react much like a criminal organization during a 
community crackdown, either 1) leave, 2) go underground (lower profile), or 3) fight.  If 
the insurgency does choose to fight, this is an advantage to the state because greater 
situational awareness should result in more successful engagements with the enemy.    
Engagements with lower-level operators will provide the state the opportunity to 
demonstrate its power and attrit the insurgent force.  These engagements also provide 
opportunities to expand intelligence through the interrogation of captured enemy and the 
turning of some into sources for the state.129  Offers of amnesty, rewards, and promises to 
those who defect weaken and break off parts of the insurgent infrastructure that can be 
destroyed or manipulated.  As more intelligence is gathered, the core insurgent 
organization can be targeted directly. 
Strategy C for the state represents the targeting the insurgent organization directly 
(i.e., the conventional approach of decisive engagement) but this too is an ineffective 
strategy without first using Strategy A to expose the insurgent organization and Strategy 
B to break it down.  The effect of using Strategy C as the primary strategy has been 
devastating in Iraq with much of the ground forces tied up in force protection actions 
when not implementing “direct action” missions that provide neither presence nor the 
precision to combat the insurgency.130   However, if Strategies A and B have been 
effectively executed than Strategy C is the “payoff” phase in an insurgency where US 
forces can do what they do best, defeat enemy forces in a decisive engagement. 
For the insurgent, Strategy A, as was covered in Chapter III, is the only option 
initially because it is too weak to attack the core state power directly to challenge the 
state’s survival.  More often than not, even attacks against the state (or its supporters like 
 
129 These would be AFOSI missions in accordance with HUMINT operations in the vicinity.  These 
operations could even be expanded to the use of amnesty, harsh or lenient jail terms, or the creation of 
pseudo-gangs. 
130 Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), 
Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master 
Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security 
Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force 
Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. 
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the US) are really a function of Strategy A since the attacks are aimed at the population’s 
cost-benefit analysis and winning the information war.  These attacks strengthen the 
insurgent’s hold on their COG (the population) while attacking the US’ COG (US public 
opinion).  Rarely can insurgents, especially early on, do serious damage to the state.  Air 
base attacks in Iraq by and large fall into this category.  However, if the insurgents 
system of growth is not challenged, the insurgency may grow strong enough to eventually 
attack the state’s support system and economy (Strategy B) or the core state itself 
(Strategy C).  
B. PAGET’S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTER 
INSURGENCY131
Julian Paget argued that battling an insurgency is essentially a fight for 
intelligence and situational awareness in order to isolate and expose the insurgent to the 
power of the state (disrupting the insurgent system of growth).  Paget developed six 
principles in using intelligence to defeat an insurgency.132
Paget’s first principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is to establish 
effective intelligence operations to detect an insurgency before the insurgency has chance 
to act.133  This would be synonymous with trying to find an insurgency before it has even 
committed an act of symbolic violence.  This does make sense in air base defense 
because air base operations are virtually impossible to keep hidden.  Therefore, it should 
be assumed that if an air operation is going to be established for a period of time, it will 
attract local insurgents or international terrorists who are a part of a transnational 
insurgency.  Either way, seeking out an insurgency eliminates the initial political space 
that an insurgency needs to establish its core.  This action dissuades insurgent action or 
makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in the information war.  
This is the “penetrate first” strategy. 
 
131 The model for this section is based on Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of 
Guerrilla Warfare. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967).  RAND used Paget’s model in a strategic analysis by 
Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, A Strategic Framework for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 
Operations.  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992). 
132 Appendix B presents Paget’s principle in greater detail. 
133 It is possible this could be seen as an almost authoritarian penetration of a society but seeking out 
an insurgency prior to its development in this manner is very similar to the FBI’s penetration of many white 
supremacist groups in the US that have yet to commit any violent acts. 
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Paget’s second principle is gain knowledge of the enemy before the insurgency 
becomes a problem.  Similar to the first principle, this principle dictates initiating 
counterinsurgency operations at the first sign of symbolic violence.  Although not 
referenced in Paget’s study, the first two principles basically require the state to act early 
or, in the case of the first principle, to act first.  This is essentially the same concept as 
making a strategic first move in economic game theory.  McCormick and Owen used 
economic game theory to analyze the importance of the state making a strategic first 
move against an insurgent.134   In most cases, making a strategic first move against a 
budding insurgency will be decisive because the insurgency would probably not have had 
time to develop a foundation among the population for recruiting and support, or 
establish greater internal cohesion and motivation from the core insurgent group.135  The 
insurgency will most likely respond by going underground where the inactivity will begin 
to destroy the group identity.   
A conclusion drawn from this principle is that when an air base defense force 
moves into an air base with an insurgent or terrorist threat, it should implement off-base 
unconventional operations (i.e., counterinsurgency) in the local area as a first move 
because this brings the fight to where the insurgent is developing.  The internally-focused 
conventional defense operation, effective against the saboteur, is the proper second move.  
This is an exact reversal of current USAF doctrine and training.  Acting on this principle 
also dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the 
US mission in the information war. 
Paget’s third principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is establishing a 
fully integrated intelligence and operations organization under a single commander.  This 
is Paget’s one principle of organization.  The clearest example of this is the military-civil-
police integrated operation that the British implemented successfully in Malaya.  In the 
 
134 McCormick and Owen, 395-402.  McCormick also covered the topic again with Giordano in 2002. 
135 In the case of the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996 for instance, this “act early” philosophy would 
have amounted to the implementation of more aggressive security measures in response to the attack at the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard six months prior to the bombing at Khobar Towers.  Of course, this strategy 
is more effective as part of a larger counterinsurgent operation, but even executing a limited operation 
within 10 kilometers around Dhahran air base and the Khobar Towers complex may have sufficed in the 
detection, disruption, or the abandonment of the operation against Khobar Towers. 
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present, the US will normally not be the military and civilian authority but this does not 
negate the responsibility for the US to establish a single air base defense operation under 
a single commander that integrates fully with the local civil and police authorities.136  As 
part of this principle, the air base commander should accept Civil-Military Operations 
responsibility for the area around the air base.  The British Royal Air Force operates in 
such a manner and is a major reason for their success in Basra (as a later case study will 
attest).137  This is a significant problem for the USAF.    
The first problem is that USAF air base defense responsibility stops at the fence 
line (or some distance out from the perimeter based on the effective range of base defense 
weapons).  The second problem is that Army and USAF forces have separate chains of 
command so integration is haphazard or based on consensus.  The third issue is the 
separation of AFOSI within the Air Force coordinated defense operations through a 
single commander impossible.  The British solve this problem by placing all defensive 
and Survive-to-Operate forces within the Ground Defense Area under the command of 
the RAF Force Protection Wing commander who reports directly to the wing 
commander.138     
AFOSI is certainly a potential asset to the defense but its separation from the 
overt intelligence and information that security forces are gathering and the security 
forces separation from AFOSI’s information and intelligence ensures neither has clear 
situational awareness.  Effective counterinsurgency is impossible without informed 
decisions, unified objectives, unified effort, and, if possible, unified command. 
Paget’s fourth principle is identifying the gathering of intelligence as the top 
priority of the security organization.  This principle only reinforces the organizational 
 
136 The Combined Defense Operations Centers that operate in defense of US/ROK bases in the 
Republic of Korea are probably the closest examples of such an arrangement involving US forces.  
137 Army Commanders in Iraq who took CMO responsibility were the most effective at reestablishing 
order within their areas.  Lt Gen Patreus, who commanded operations in northern Iraq, is the best example. 
138 Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), John Hall (Royal Air 
Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), 
and Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command 
and RAF Honington, UK on 7-9 Mar 2005.  The Force Protection Wing Commander is normally the senior 
ranking RAF Regiment Officer and is comparable to the USAF Defense Force Commander as defined in 
AFI 31-301, Air Base Defense. 
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mistake of AFOSI’s separation from the security forces.  However, the doctrinal strategy 
of the Army’s conventional mindset is focused mainly on intelligence that supports 
decisive action – a waste of effort in a counterinsurgency.  The USAF’s internal view is 
even worse because it is standards-based and requires no intelligence support at all.  
Neither understands that every community around an air base is its own microclimate and 
every local counterinsurgency will be different based on that microclimate.  Only 
intelligence and local knowledge can bridge the often large gap from doctrinal to strategy 
execution.  Again, achieving an advantage in situational awareness will allow defense 
forces to interdict or minimize insurgent attacks and their effects in the informational 
realm. 
Paget’s fifth principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is to gain and 
maintain the cooperation of the populace.  This is a “hearts and minds” approach but 
Paget presents it as a more limited, realistic model.  The population does not have to 
innately ‘prefer’ the state but must, at least, cooperate and support the state and not the 
insurgent.  Key to this is security and civic action.  Civic action, to Paget, is not number 
of wells dug or supplies handed out (though this can help) but training civic 
administrators to do their jobs effectively and with the knowledge that they serve the 
public.  The public must then be convinced that the civic administrators exist to serve 
them.139  This is also part of McCormick’s Strategy A.  This principle is essential in 
winning the information war in the local area of the air base, achieving legitimacy in the 
population’s eyes, and alleviating the fear of the local community. 
Paget’s sixth and final principle is to penetrate the insurgent organization.  Paget 
suggests that if this can be accomplished, an insurgent organization can be quickly 
dismantled.  McCormick would suggest this is impossible without an effective campaign 
that targets the population (who will expose the organization and allow state forces to 
gain knowledge on it) and the insurgency’s support structure (if members of the 
 
139 Paget, 207-220; Civic administrators that Paget are most concerned about are the military, police, 
fire, judges, teachers and militia, although the idea pertains to all civil workers.  This was also expressed by 
Edward Lansdale, The Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1972).  Lansdale saw the key to hearts and mind was instilling in the civic administrators 
“ideas and ideals” that reflected democratic principles at a village level. 
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insurgency believe they are isolated from the population and that the state will win, they 
may be willing to defect).140  As applied to air base defense this may have limited utility 
but only if AFOSI is separated from the core base defense mission.  Penetrating an 
insurgent organization is a possible AFOSI mission but only as a part of larger strategy of 
a single defense force commander.  However, penetration of other “friendly” institutions 
is also necessary.  This is particularly important when it pertains to other forces involved 
in the base defense mission (indigenous base defense, police, and local military forces) 
and locals with political power such as a strongman, warlord, etc.  US forces, whether in 
a lead or supporting role, must know where the loyalties of the other base defense 
organizations lie. 
Paget’s Principles of Intelligence for Counterinsurgency were analyzed in 1992 
by RAND as a basis for a strategic framework for countering terrorism and insurgency.  
RAND’s research showed that Paget’s third, fourth, and fifth principle (McCormick’s 
Strategy A for the state) were most predictive of a successful counterinsurgency.141  This 
would suggest that implementing Strategy A through the unified Military-Civil-Police 
command structure (Paget’s third principle) would be the optimal basis for 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  And, if insurgents and terrorists are the real threat to air 
bases, the counterinsurgency strategy of intelligence and population security should be 
the basis for a new air base defense doctrine as well.   
C.  A NEW DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE – PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE 
DEFENSE BASED ON COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS 
Since the Korean War, the insurgent has been the main ground threat to air bases 
and in response the USAF and U.S. military has misapplied conventional measures to 
counter the unconventional tactics used by the insurgent.  The results have been 
predominantly poor – every time the insurgent chooses to attack the air base, the 
insurgent succeeds.  This includes over 1,000 air base attacks in Iraq and counting.  The 
air base attacks are not normally damaging to US air operations, but the attacks do not 
have to be.  With each air base attack, the insurgent is winning an information war among 
 
140 Or they may stop believing in the morality of their cause or the brutality of their tactics.  This 
destroys the insurgent’s identity with the insurgent organization. 
141 Hoffman and Taw, Strategic Framework, 119. 
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the local population in the area of the air base, the US population, and among the air base 
defense force who view their conventional attempts at stopping the insurgent stand-off 
attacks as futile.142
The models of counterinsurgency (McCormick’s and Paget’s) provide a baseline 
for a new framework for base defense operations that seek to take the initiative away 
from the insurgent.  McCormick’s and Paget’s models were developed principally from 
analysis of the successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Philippines, and Peru 
(in the mid-1990’s) and may not be directly applicable to air base defense.  There a 
couple reasons for this.  One, none of the research and analysis of these 
counterinsurgencies ever considered the unique environment of the air base although both 
discuss the importance of local security.  Two, both McCormick’s and Paget’s models are 
best understood from a strategic standpoint and are directly applicable at the strategic 
level; however, at the tactical level of the air base, the models tend to be simplistic and 
vague and force the user to extrapolate some conclusions.143  Yet, McCormick’s and 
Paget’s models do identify enduring principles of counterinsurgency and local security 
that are directly translatable to air base defense.  A comparison of McCormick and Paget 
quickly reveals these principles of air base defense.   
Paget’s model concentrates in four areas of emphasis.  These four areas of 
emphasis break down into one area on time and timing; one area on organization; and 
two areas on strategy (intelligence and the population).  McCormick’s model does not 
speak to timing or organization but is strictly a model of three strategies.  These strategies 
are: protect the population to isolate the insurgent and gain intelligence; target the 
insurgent infrastructure in order disable insurgent operations and expose the core group; 
and target the core organization directly with force.  The common aspects of both models 
 
142 Brair, “Assessing Air Base Defense”; United States Air Force Instruction 31-301, Air Base 
Defense, May 15, 2002 regards the standoff attack as very difficult to counter.  In David Madrid, “Master 
of the Bayonet,” (11 December 11, 2004).  Retrieved on 1 Sep 2005 from 
http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special40/articles/1211lpbayonet11Z1.html, Chief Master Sergeant 
Scott Dearduff received an Order of the Bayonet for excellence in air base defense and in his remarks 
commented how his forces could not counter the standoff threat at Baghdad airport.  This situation was 
accepted by the Air Force and the US air base defense community as essentially unavoidable. 
143 This is true of McCormick’s more so than Paget’s which already focused on only one aspect of 
counterinsurgency: intelligence. 
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are evident in the context of principles of timing, principles of organization and objective, 
and principles of strategy.   
Principles of timing compiled from the models of McCormick and Paget are: 1) 
act first or early and 2) maintain level of action.  The sole principle of organization and 
objective is unity of command.  Principles of strategy include: 1) protect the population, 
2) isolate the insurgent, 3) gain intelligence superiority, 4) penetrate the insurgent 
organization, and 5) kill and/or capture the core insurgent group. 
From these universal principles of counterinsurgency, new principles of air base 
defense have been developed along with a new concept of security.  The USAF has 
historically viewed air base defense as something that can be solved with engineering or 
technical solutions that have equated the acquisition of sensors, the placement of barriers, 
and the posting of forces as “security”.  This type of security limits the impact, the 
physical destruction itself, of an enemy attack but has often failed at eliminating the 
ability of the enemy from continuing to attack.  This approach has ignored the human 
components of knowledge, influence, and control as a different path to security.  
McCormick’s and Paget’e perspective of security is reflected in the security approaches 
taken by element of the special forces. 
U.S. Army Special Forces units in Bosnia and Afghanistan are clear examples that 
the ability to interact, influence, and, when needed, control a population is the basis for 
true freedom of maneuver and security.144  In Bosnia, penetrating knowledge of the local 
area, familiarity with local officials and important figures, and the ability to generate 
desired situational outcomes, with precise and deliberate force when necessary, allowed 
these small exposed units to operate freely throughout high threat areas without a single 
 
144 Security for the US Special Operations Joint Commission Observers in Bosnia was outlined in 
Charles T. Cleveland’s 2001 Army War College paper titled Command and Control of the Joint 
Commission Observer Program: U.S. Army Special Forces in Bosnia.  Liaison elements that operated in 
Kosovo used a similar successful approach to security.  In Afghanistan, the security environment 
established by Army Master Sergeant Mark Bryant and his special forces team is recounted in Basilici and 
Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 42.  The British model of camp and base security is 
also based on a “situational awareness” approach that allows the implementation of dynamic and passive 
proactive and reactive measures.  This is based on a handout of the RAF’s perspective of a “Balance of 
Force Protection Effort” provided by Squadron Leader Neal Rawlsthorne and interviews with RAF 
Regiment Wing Commander’s Scott Millington and John Hall. 
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casualty.   This is not to say that an air base is analogous to a small special forces team or 
that air bases should be “open” to promote interaction but air base defenders must 
understand that sandbags, barriers, and fields of fire only allows a base to more 
effectively absorb enemy punishment.  It does not prevent enemy attacks, deter enemy 
action, or, with intelligence, strike the enemy first.  The New Principles of Air Base 
Defense presented below (and in Appendix B) use counterinsurgency theory to develop a 
new approach to defense that protects the friendly forces’ freedom of action in the air 
base’s physical, informational, and moral realm and denies these realms from the 
insurgent.            
1. Act First 
The first proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Act First.   
This is unique because besides for brief mention in a joint publication of sending out 
patrols immediately after occupying an air base, timing as a principle of air base defense 
does not exist.  Act First does not define a tactic to be implemented (such as Protection 
and Penetration) or an organizational imperative (Unity of Effort) but, along with 
Perseverance, is a principle of time.  To understand the importance of acting first, it must 
be understood that any operation at a forward air base will attract attention, including that 
of local and transnational insurgents and terrorists.  Put simply, if a threat did not exist 
before, it will as soon as US aircraft arrive.  The USAF would be wise to be looking for 
it.  Remembering the lesson of McCormick and Paget, acting first can crush an 
insurgency before it begins.     
The method for implementing the principle of “Act First” is the employment of 
counter-insurgent air base defense tactics before or no later than the arrival of US aircraft.  
This can be achieved in one of two ways: 1) operational preparation of the environment 
(OPE) or 2) advanced force operations.    
The Air Force security forces do not have a deep history of Advanced Force 
Operations or Training and Assistance missions (also called Foreign Internal Defense) 
that are more typical for special forces.  The special forces have done numerous Joint 
Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) deployments and other assistance missions to 
influence local security environments around the globe and help prepare battlefields for 
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possible US intervention.  Air Force security forces have done Deployments for Training 
(DFT) in Latin America that are very similar to JCET’s except the DFT’s trained 
indigenous base defense forces.145  With an expanded view of training for base defense to 
include not only the forces on the base but also the local police, militia, and military units 
that are responsible for the external security situation as well, these training and 
assistance missions could make a substantial impact on future air base defense for USAF 
operations.  This dramatic impact is because competent local and base indigenous 
security forces will have functional intelligence and communication channels with the 
local population, legitimacy with the local population, knowledge of the local 
environment, knowledge of US operations, and capabilities to counter enemy forces.  The 
result is effective defense of the air base and efficient use of US resources since much of 
the base defense mission will be executed through USAF advisors with indigenous 
security forces.146   
Of course the argument can be made that there are thousands of airfields 
throughout the world and trying to predict which environment to prepare with training 
and assistance missions would be impossible; however, this is a short-sighted view.  In 
2002, RAND published a study on the limited number of airfields due to infrastructure 
and political limitations that are actually available for use by the Air Force.147  If one 
analyzes this data in conjunction with airfields that the Air Force prefers to use as hubs 
 
145 The author was the team leader for Deployment for Training 7009 to Peru in 1997. 
146 This emphasis on training, assistance, and advising also solves the Air Forces problem of 
perceived Status of Forces Agreement restrictions in performing off-base defense missions.  This is because 
nearly all SOFA’s restrict “unilateral military actions” but encourage training and assistance relationships.  
This is why any airlift pilot can describe how in South America US air base defense forces must remain on 
the base but US Special Operations Forces operate throughout many countries, assisting and advising 
indigenous military forces. 
147 Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases.  (Washington D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002).  Although the report focused on the vulnerability of 
forward air bases and the need for long-range global task forces and “air base ships”, it mistakenly ignored 
that forward air bases are a requirement for future warfare because of the need for airlift irregardless of 
strike aircraft. 
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for airlift during times of peace than an initial list of airfields to be prepared for future use 
could be generated.148  
Whether the USAF current does or does not have qualified personnel to execute 
Advanced Force, Training and Advising, or Operational Preparation of the Environment 
missions with indigenous forces is not a point worth debating, the USAF must do it in 
order to Act First.149  The advisors/trainers must be the best and eager to work with 
indigenous forces and interpreters must be plentiful.  These personnel must be USAF’s 
most intelligent, adaptive, energetic, assertive, and charismatic in order to be successful 
because instilling competence and confidence in an indigenous force while combating 
corruption is not the environment for the marginal or the meek.   
And by acting first the US can ensure certain outcomes.  First, the US can 
compress the initial operating space for the insurgent.  Second, the US can force the 
insurgent to expend more effort and resources to attack the base or choose not to attack at 
all.  Third, acting first will threaten the insurgency’s survival by forcing the insurgency to 
raise its profile in order to garner more resources or go into a dangerous period of 
inactivity.  Finally, the population immediately sees the US level of effort and 
commitment instead of an invisible force behind sandbags.  These outcomes result in a 
positive first impression of US and indigenous defense forces, a perception of the relative 
weakness of the insurgents compared to the defense forces, and the defense forces’ ability 
to dictate the local information war from the earliest stage.  This allows US forces to send 
and control “the message” of any confrontation that occurs in the local area – disabling 
the insurgent’s system of growth.  Iraq provides examples of the advantage of Acting 
First and the disadvantage of ignoring this principle. 
 
148 For Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, air bases the US had used often 
in the past were the first bases chosen for buildup to support air operations.  These include airfields in 
Kyrgyzstan, northern Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, and Tajikistan.  
149 The training and advisory missions could also serve to politically help prepare the environment as 
well by establishing a relationship with a host country’s military that would serve to encourage allowing 
US access to air bases for use in a crisis.  For more on the anti-access threat to air bases, see Christopher J. 
Bowie’s 2002 report for Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments titled, The Anti-Access Threat and 
Theater Air Bases.  
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Of the air bases defended by US forces in Iraq, only Bashur and Tallil took 
advantage of Acting First.  When the 786th Security Forces Squadron was air dropped 
into Bashur airfield in northern Iraq in 2003, they found a capable indigenous air base 
and local defense force to link up with.150  This force was the Kurdish militia that had 
received years of US assistance and were advised by US Special Forces for training and 
operational guidance.  This OPE operation allowed an effective air base defense to be 
immediately established and remains an area hostile to the insurgency.   
Another example of the dramatic impact Act First can have is the strategic and 
decisive first move by the Marines to immediately enact aggressive civic action and local 
security measures at Al Nasiriyah, the site of numerous ambushes on US forces during 
the initial phases of the war, immediately upon the occupation of the area.151   As a result 
of the decisive first move by the Marines, the area has stayed quiet for most of the US 
military’s time in Iraq.  Consequently, nearby Tallil air base has remained largely 
unattacked even though until recently the defenders of Tallil ignored the local 
population.152  The initial actions of the Marines still reverberated with a positive impact 
two years later.  The current Air Force security forces commander at Tallil has 
recognized his shortfall in the gathering of intelligence from the local population and 
energized interaction and involvement with the public.153
As far as the other air bases in Iraq, air base defense forces, Air Force or Army, 
have not been involved in training or assisting local Iraqi Army or Police forces.  In fact, 
 
150 Louis A. Arana-Barradas,  “Bashur Airfield on roll; future not set,”  Air Force Print News Service, 
(April 14, 2003). Retrieved on 1 Sep 2005 from http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=41403930.  
151 Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant) and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces 
Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA 
on 17-19 May 2005. Kerry Sanders, “Return to An Nasiriyah,” (March 17, 2004). Retrieved on 28 May 
2005 at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4532423/. Jason Johnson, (US Marine Corps 1st Lieutenant), email 
communication with author, 3 May 2005.  Lt Johnson was part of the Marine CAP teams in Iraq, and 
although An Nasiriyah was a success, Johnson states that predominantly Sunni areas have been a failure 
against the insurgency.  It is possible that since the Marines fought the tough “Battle of An Nasiriyah” in 
March-April 2003, they may have established a more powerful local security system than they did in areas 
that were defeated more easily.  
152 Melissa Phillips, “Airmen establish early warning network with locals,”  407th Air Expeditionary 




it was not until the spring of 2005 that Air Force security forces accepted a training and 
assistance mission with Iraqi police forces but this was part of a larger effort with Army 
military police and was not coordinated as part of an air base defense effort.  By not 
taking advantage of this opportunity, the Air Force not only violated the principle of Act 
First, but Protection and Unity of Effort as well. 
2. Unity of Effort  
The second proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Unity 
of Effort.  Unity of Effort is a principle of organizational imperative and objective.  
Without unified action, the insurgents will find and expose fractures in the base defense.  
Although Paget used the term Unity of Command, he was referring to the British’s ability 
in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus to link the military-government-police organizations 
because the British were the government in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus.  The US has not 
had this situation available except after World War II and during the Coalition 
Provisional Authority’s duration as the government of Iraq.   Therefore, the US must 
influence allied and indigenous defense force and local political authorities to view the 
execution of the base defense mission the same way and strive for the same short and 
long-term objectives.  The objectives not only must be the same but the method for 
achieving the objectives must be identical, or near to it.  Critical to ensuring this unity of 
effort is the unity of command among external elements (such as US and allies) and the 
integration of intelligence operations of all defense forces.  If AFOSI hides intelligence 
from the security forces, if the US hides intelligence from allies, or if indigenous forces 
hide intelligence from US forces, the defense will suffer.   
However, if defense forces are unified, then the outcomes for the base defense are 
significant.  Often, this unity of effort requires a single US authority that is engaged and 
charismatic with the local political apparatus and the indigenous defense forces.  This 
should be the wing commander or a high-ranking official that works directly for the wing 
commander.   
As mentioned previously, with a unified effort, information and intelligence can 
be viewed through a lens of local knowledge and contacts in order to provide a greater 
level of understanding.  The establishment of trust among all base defense forces allows 
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for efficiency of operation as each component can be trusted to act independently or in 
collaboration with another.  The result is the defense is able to maintain a pace of 
operations that the insurgents cannot match.  Moreover, this trust and integration not only 
allows an increased pace of operations but also a distributed defense operation where 
base defense forces are active throughout a large region which reduces insurgent 
operating space.  This is also what makes effective small-unit action possible. 
The unity of effort and objective must penetrate through the defense organization 
to the lowest levels so small units understand what they must do in order to achieve the 
base defense and counter-insurgent objectives.  Units from the sector and flight-level 
down to the fire team must continuously communicate with the public as well as be able 
to decide and act near autonomously in order to deny the insurgent initiative.  To act in 
this decentralized manner, control must be delegated down to the lowest level.  This 
means that the base defense operations center must often allow the lowest level to control 
sensor assets, communications, friendly forces, and the population.  The command center 
must play a supporting role in order to ensure the right resources, technology, firepower, 
and training is ensured.  The small unit focus prevents paralysis of action by defense 
forces due to leadership trying to attain the precise level of situational awareness that the 
small unit has already attained.  The answer is let the small unit lead.  This allows the 
defense force to Act First in order to preempt or disrupt an insurgent attack.    
Just as important Unity of Effort is that no base defense force usurp the operations 
of another and threaten the ability for the base defense forces to dominate to information 
war against the insurgent by using indiscriminate force and brutal tactics (unless part of a 
intentional base defense operation). 
3. Protection 
The third proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is 
Protection.  Along with Penetration, Protection is a principle of strategy.  Protecting the 
population and isolating the insurgent are key components to Paget’s and McCormick’s 
models for counter-insurgency and are also key in the defense of the base.  However, in 
terms of air base defense, “protection’ takes on an even broader definition.  Not only 
must the defense forces protect the population, as in McCormick’s model, but also 
  71
                                                
protect the base and US personnel as well.  The base and the US personnel represent a 
direct link to US COG – US public opinion.  And the local population is the COG of the 
insurgent.  The US must protect its own COG while isolating the insurgent from its COG.  
This is achieved through presence, train/advise indigenous forces, intervention and 
conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate force, civic action, and force protection.    
Presence by the combined base defense must be a 24/7 effort that is visible 
throughout the area that is sought to be influenced.  This is the first step in showing the 
state’s intention of being the winner in the counter-insurgent struggle.  Patrolling is 
normally the preferred tactic to achieve presence but this is not the periodic patrolling 
that is often cited as the Air Force’s “cure-all” of base defense.    Just as a cop on the beat 
appears to always be around talking and relating to the public, patrols in the vicinity of 
the air base must do the same and this means on foot.  The concept is similar to 
community-policing in this sense.  In a community-policing operation, the police are 
present, or at least are perceived to be, in a community constantly and the result is a 
reduction in the fear of crime, and fear in general, in the high-crime communities.154  The 
reduction in fear in a community ravaged by crime is analogous to the community 
viewing the police as the eventual winner.  The presence builds public trust and 
confidence by protecting the public from the insurgent influence and forces the insurgent 
to either: go away, go underground, or challenge the defense forces.155     
In the context of a counterinsurgency, this becomes a “policing” approach with 
firepower, not dissimilar to John McCuen’s (1972) tactical approach to 
counterinsurgency that he espoused in his book, The Art of Counterrevolutionary 
Warfare.  McCuen argued that small teams must be established to police, communicate, 
and work with the public.  These small teams must be supported by larger maneuver units 
that are also present, visible, and ready to react at all times to ensure the small teams can 
focus on the public and not on their own survival.156 This is a “police leads, military 
 
154 Gary Potter, email communication with author, 22 Jul 2004. 
155 Max Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, (2005). Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 
from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi 
156 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counterrevolutionary Warfare.  (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 
1972); Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism. (New York: Brassey’s Inc., 1990) 128-130.  
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supports” approach that has been the basis of successful counterinsurgency strategy in 
Malaya, Philippines, Kenya, and El Salvador.  Only a military police force has the 
established skills, expertise, and experience to perform these police and paramilitary 
police roles but also military police units are the only US forces experienced to train and 
advise indigenous police units “soft” police skills such as interviews, traffic control, 
vehicle registration, use of technology (sensors, cameras, etc.,) evidence gathering, etc.  
Moreover, military police units can also train paramilitary police skills such as crowd and 
riot control, armored vehicle operations, and SWAT-style raids.  
Air Force security forces units are ideally suited to Presence.  Not only do 
security forces units understand the importance of Presence and how Presence relates to 
the reduction of fear, interaction with the population, and the creation of trust.  Moreover, 
security forces have a vast background of acting in small units while performing air base 
defense at expeditionary locations and police duties at home station.  However, security 
forces, which normally operate in squad-size units, may need more experience in larger 
unit operations to support small unit actions.  In the end, presence in the community 
adjusts the preferences of the public to favor the state because it shows the dedication of 
the state to win. 
Intervention and Conflict Resolution is also key to achieving the principle of 
Protection.  This is also a “police leads” approach.  Base defense forces must be more 
than just seen but must act at the lowest level possible.  Only by protecting the public 
against the acts of the insurgents, criminals, critical or dangerous incidents, etc., will the 
state’s forces look strong, supportive of the public, and dominate the moral ground.  
Intervention shows the public that counter-insurgent forces are concerned about the 
population and not just the insurgents.  It also shows individual sacrifice at the personal 
level.  This develops into a moral authority that disrupts the insurgent’s system of growth 
because it attacks the insurgent’s narrative of being the “moral force”.  It encourages the 
public to expose the insurgents because the insurgent is no longer viewed as representing 
the community.  A security force that is present in the community and intervening on the 
community’s behalf will be recognized as legitimate in the population’s eyes and earn the 
population’s allegiance. 
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Maintaining legitimacy is also greatly influenced by the application of force.  
Restraint speaks to power and moral authority of the defense force.  Just as policemen are 
taught, force must be appropriate to the situation and discriminate force must be standard 
for all counter-insurgent forces in order to be viewed as an element of the state that serves 
the public.  And when force, to include deadly force against the core insurgent 
organization, must be applied it must be done precisely and deliberately to demonstrate 
the competence, capability, and power of the defense force.   
Just as with Presence, security forces already have the perspective as police to 
understand the importance of Intervention, Conflict Resolution, Restraint, and Deliberate 
Force as it applies to serving and securing the public in order to achieve legitimacy.  
Non-military police Army units may not inherently understand these aspects of 
Protection and instead equate everything to the use of force.  And “the more force, the 
better” will not work around an air base because an air base cannot just move to a 
different area if the population reacts bitterly to the Army’s approach to security.  An air 
base must exist with that population, no matter the situation, unless the US is willing to 
cancel the air operations at a possibly high political cost. 
Training and Advising Indigenous Forces maximizes the amount of personnel 
contributing to the counter-insurgent and base defense fight and greatly expands local 
knowledge and intelligence gathering capabilities.  A long-term impact is that it 
establishes military-to-military or security forces-to-police contacts that may develop a 
positive opinion of the US in the area and help support future US air operations.   
Training and advising indigenous forces is a vital step in base defense because it 
facilitates Acting First through either OPE or advanced force operations, ensures Unity of 
Effort through liaison actions, and ensures the Perseverance of base defense actions 
beyond the US presence.  
Related to the training and advising aspect of Protection is Civic Action.    Civic 
Action is primarily training indigenous security forces, training/assisting all other first 
responders, and ensuring the proper execution of any US sponsored project and, possibly, 
  74
                                                
the projects of our allies as well.157  These activities represent the major competencies 
that are expected by a population of the state.  Once these competencies are ensured, the 
other activities of the state and commerce can commence.  Most likely, this will require 
base assistance to Army Civil Affairs personnel but may have to be accomplished even if 
Civil Affairs is absent.158  These civil-military activities help the state eventually act 
without the assistance of external forces (i.e., the US) and provide a tangible benefit to 
the state for accepting the political risk of allowing US air operations.  As the population 
experiences the benefits of the states rule and the costs of supporting the insurgent, the 
population will become the primary engine for informed local knowledge 
(Penetration).159  Civic action, however, may become a more expanded operation, 
especially if projects or services by the host government or non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) are in danger of failure and intelligence assesses that the failure will 
be blamed on the US military.  In this respect, the air base may be forced to establish a 
temporary or permanent Civil-Military Operations Center to better coordinate the civic 
action projects (not to include training of indigenous forces) between the US, the host 
government and NGO’s.  
The Force Protection aspect of Protection cannot be risk avoidance as has become 
custom in the Air Force and Army.  Too often base defense operations stay within the 
base perimeter and allow the insurgent to operate freely and dictate the time and place of 
attack.  This risk avoidance approach also undermines the principle of Protection by 
restricting presence and intervention of base defense forces and cannot ensure a secure 
local environment.  This also undermines the principle of Penetration and prevents the 
extraction of intelligence from the community.  However, Force Protection is essential 
and can be executed smartly without inhibiting other operations.  Force Protection 
 
157 First responders normally constitute police, fire department, medical units, and EOD. 
158 The Air Mobility Warfare Center in Fort Dix, NJ has been training Air Force O-6’s for several 
years on the importance of civil-military operations from the air base and uses case studies from Africa and 
Asia where deployed air base commanders had to establish civil-military operations in the absence of Army 
Civil Affairs personnel.  An air base has essential support capabilities for civil affairs to include medical 
operations, civil engineering, transportation, contracting, finance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
teams.   
159 Leites and Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority, pp. 12. 
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requires intelligent security procedures for internal base security and the use of 
technology to protect US base defenders and minimize risk while maximizing the 
capabilities of off and on-base operations.   As it applies to off-base operations, the 
identification, vehicle registration, checkpoints, barriers, berms, sensors, and cameras that 
are usually a part of an internal Force Protection plan, are important to counterinsurgency 
off-base.  These systems can be used to establish and enforce a circulation control plan 
in, out, and throughout an area that allows defense forces to either force the insurgent into 
an environment the defenders control (i.e., the checkpoint) or to flee the area.  Either 
way, the insurgent is denied sanctuary and mobility. 
Force Protection is vital to protecting the US center of gravity and thus allowing 
the USAF to put more effort into challenging the insurgent’s center of gravity. 
4. Penetration 
The fourth proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is 
Penetration.  Penetration is the other principle of strategy and is linked with Protection.  
By establishing Protection of the population that breaks the insurgent’s link with the 
population, Penetration efforts use that security groundwork to achieve a level of 
situational awareness and intelligence equal to that of the insurgent.  Penetration is 
intelligence-gathering, investigation, evaluation of other friendly forces, and evaluation 
of the success of the base defense effort.   Penetration is not just the penetration of the 
insurgency, though certainly the ultimate goal, but also is penetration of the population, 
friendly forces, and local political officials.   
Penetration of friendly forces is essential because it reinforces that trust that must 
exist to achieve a unity of effort.  Penetrating other friendly forces constitutes 
establishing a network to ensure other friendly forces are not intentionally hindering 
friendly operations or supporting enemy operations.  As has been discovered in Iraq, 
friendly forces have often supported insurgent attacks against air bases.160
Local political officials have also been suspected of supporting air base attacks in 
Iraq as well.  AFOSI would be the lead in establishing a network to ensure indigenous 
 
160 Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major) in discussion with author at 820th Force 
Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. 
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politicians are not intentionally hindering friendly operations or supporting enemy 
operations.  If local political officials were cooperating with enemy forces, civic action 
would certainly be unsuccessful unless the political officials were replaced.  This may be 
an option for an air base commander, whether by direct or indirect means.   
In essence, the principle of Protection is supporting to Penetration.  The purpose 
of protecting the population is to establish a program and a network to gather information 
from the population to expose insurgent infrastructure and leaders as well as other 
friendly forces.    This is through more than just AFOSI sources but will often depend on 
timely information gathered by police and patrols (e.g., through observation, idle 
conversation, and field interviews).  The focus of intelligence-gathering and action must 
be at the lowest level, with those forces that interact directly with the population and 
indigenous forces.  Intelligence analysis must be aligned at low a level as possible in the 
organization order to analyze and assess intelligence quickly and get it back to small, 
operational units for action.  Of course, the best option is to place intelligence personnel 
with each maneuver unit but this may not be possible.  This type of organization reduces 
the need for large number of analysts at higher levels because much of the information 
going up to BDOC or AOC was already analyzed at a lower level.   
Penetrating the population also allows the insertion of information by base 
defense forces as part of an information operations or tactical PSYOP mission to 
influence public opinion.  This also must be empowered to the small-unit (flight or 
squad).  Imagine responding to a car bomb that, despite the efforts of the responding base 
defense forces, kills numerous people.  And, with the help of an interpreter, base defense 
forces on the spot print flyers from the back of a HMMWV in order get the message to 
the population about how the incident happened, the impact, the need to stop this from 
happening again and a request for assistance.  As an overt force, this is an advantage the 
defense forces enjoy because it allows the US and indigenous forces to Act First in the 
psychological arena – and often what is heard first is believed.  The covert insurgent 
organization will not have the same advantage of immediately and overtly expounding on 
their actions without exposing themselves to the power of the base defense force. 
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And finally, to Paget’s ultimate counterinsurgent principle – friendly forces 
penetrating the insurgent organization and exposing the core insurgent organization.  
Once insurgents are identified, defense force leaders must decide whether to capture and 
interrogate or observe to see if other links to the insurgency can be exposed.  This 
requires the population to be supportive of the counter-insurgent forces since most 
surveillance is often detectable by some portion of the public.  If captured and 
interrogated, offers of amnesty, rewards, or leniency in sentencing may be employed in 
combination with a harsher alternative in order to gather information or use captured 
forces as agents for the state.161
The principle of Penetration is the principle of intelligence and investigation and, 
therefore, exposes the insurgents to the discriminate force of the base defense forces and 
the state to kill insurgent cadre (i.e., Protection).  Penetration provides information to 
interdict insurgent violence and detects insurgent attempts to manipulate information.  
And it allows an evaluation of the trustworthiness of other base defense elements and a 
systematic approach to evaluate the ability of the defense force to meet the air base 
defense measures of effectiveness (Appendix C). 
5. Perseverance 
The fifth and final principle of air base defense is Perseverance.  Perseverance is a 
principle of timing and effort and is synonymous with will.  It provides another moral 
component to the base defense mission.  Perseverance means that the state will not be 
outlasted or out-willed.  Perseverance in this way means that once the insurgent’s 
operating space is attacked than that level of effort is maintained in order to not allow the 
insurgency maneuver to adjust and grow.  The reason for this is that both 
counterinsurgencies and air bases tend to be long-term commitments for the US.162 The 
US has numerous bases in the Middle East that were initially thought to be temporary but 
have been used continuously or intermittently for over fifteen years.  Since 9/11, the US 
has established several more bases throughout Southwest and Central Asia that appear 
 
161 This is similar to the concepts of “double-agents” or “pseudo-gangs”.  Normally, this is not a 
regional action an air base would institute on its own but as part of a larger strategy. 
162 The exception to the long-term use of air bases is those operated in a response to a natural disaster 
or small-scale humanitarian assistance. 
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will be used by the US for many years to come.  So if the US initially disables an 
insurgent threat at an air base, it must maintain that level of effort in the base defense 
because the air base operation may be continuous for a decade or more which provides 
time for an insurgency to reestablish itself or the emergence of another insurgent 
organization.   As with Act First, the base defense effort should start before the air base 
operations and continue through the completion of the air base mission.  Perseverance 
ensures that the US does not leave the local security situation around the air base worse 
than when the US arrived. 
D. SUMMARY 
Conventional Army operations are based on decisive action against known enemy 
targets and conventional USAF air base defense is centered around the hope that the 
enemy takes decisive action against the based and then defeating the enemy.  Neither 
have been successful against the insurgent.  The models of counterinsurgency, 
McCormick’s and Paget’s, provide a framework for combating an insurgent threat to air 
bases enemy that Joint and USAF base defense doctrine have been unsuccessful at 
defeating.  Paget’s principles of timing, organization, and intelligence were linked with 
McCormick’s principles of protecting the population, isolating the insurgent 
infrastructure, and destroying the core insurgent organization in order to develop a new 
framework of air base defense and local security.   
From this new framework, New Principles of Air Base Defense have been 
extrapolated: 1) Act First, 2) Unity of Effort, 3) Protection, 4) Penetration, and 5) 
Perseverance in order to execute the air base defense mission against an insurgent.  These 
principles instruct base defense forces in how to eliminate the insurgent’s freedom of 
action and, therefore, the insurgent’s ability to execute information attacks against the US 
mission.  These principles provide the doctrinal basis to guide and evaluate air base 
defense strategy and develop functional measures of effectiveness (Appendix C).     
However, we must to find out if these New Principles are descriptive and 
predictive of a successful air base defense in the “real world”.  To do so, case studies 
where unconventional air base defense strategies were employed in Vietnam and Iraq will 
be evaluated using the New Principles. 
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VI.  CASE STUDIES 
This paper has argued that the insurgent is the primary threat to air bases and that 
to defeat the insurgent threat, unconventional warfare strategies must be implemented 
along with smart security measures that exist in the current Air Force doctrine.  Based on 
this requirement, four historical cases of air base defense against an active insurgent will 
be examined to measure the validity of the argument for the New Principles of Air Base 
Defense. 
A.  METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis of cases will be presented in a chronological manner beginning with 
two cases from the Vietnam War, Da Nang air base and Tuy Hoa air base, and finishing 
with two cases from the current conflict in Iraq, Basra air base and Balad air base.  The 
historical cases will provide accounts of the air base defense activities and quantitative 
data on the amount of enemy activity each base sustained over the timeline reviewed.  It 
is the measure of the strength of the enemy, the number of enemy attacks, and the 
intensity of the attacks that these cases will use to determine the ability of air base 
defense forces to disrupt the insurgent attacks and the success of the air base defense.  
Each case is analyzed qualitatively using the New Principles of Air Base Defense 
based on McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” and Paget’s Model of Intelligence in a 
Counterinsurgency.  The New Principles show a direct correlation with the quantitative 
data and appear to be descriptive and predictive of a successful air base defense effort.      
B. CASE SELECTION CRITERIA 
Vietnam and Iraq were the conflicts chosen for analysis because both provide the 
only well-accounted, long-term data on an aggressive threat to an air base.  Other air 
bases that experienced attacks were considered, to include the Mogadishu airport in 
Somalia and Illopango air field in El Salvador.  However, limited data concerning the 
amount and intensity of the attacks each base sustained led to these air bases being 
eliminated from consideration as part of the case studies but even the scant data available 
supports the thesis of this paper.   
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The attacks against Illopango air field were not successively dealt with by the El 
Salvador Air Force until after the insurgency began to lose ground against the 
government.163  Yet when negotiations in 1990 began between the FMLN insurgents and 
the El Salvador government, the insurgents demonstrated their power by attacking 
Illopango again (essentially an informational attack).   
The attacks against the Mogadishu airport in 1993 were not countered by 
Pakistani forces because it was felt that the attacks did not cause any significant damage 
to the airfield and were just harassment.164  It is unclear if these attacks helped embolden 
the Somali warlords that would eventually execute the ambush on the Pakistani 
peacekeepers in June 1993.  There is no data of air base attacks while the US Marines 
guarded Mogadishu airport in January-March 1993.  It is known, however, that the 
Marines guarded Mogadishu with active patrols and engagement with the public and the 
warlords.   
Possibly the most interesting case not observed is that of the Marine air base 
defense in Beirut in 1983.  The Marines did execute presence patrolling that amounted 
essentially to driving around the area, which is not that dissimilar to Army base defense 
operations in Balad, Iraq in December 2004.165  This had the dual effect of establishing a 
footprint of US force while doing nothing to defend it but to be fair to the Marines there 
was political constraints they were forced to deal with because of the peacekeeping 
nature of the mission.166  Essentially, the Marine experience at Beirut points to the need 
to establish a robust intelligence gathering and analysis operation and the need to 
 
163 Jorge Parada (El Salvadoran Air Force Colonel), in discussion with author, 24 May 2005.  Colonel 
Parada was assigned to Illopango from 1986 to 1990 as a helicopter pilot.  Colonel Parada recalled at least 
six separate air base attacks during his time at the base.  Although he was no longer assigned to Illopango at 
the time of the last attack in late 1990, he recalled that the air base attack was interpreted as a message from 
the FMLN that the FMLN was still a significant threat.  Vick, 155-160, references a major attack at 
Illopango in 1982. 
164 Mateen Mizra (Pakistani Army Major), in discussion with author, 16 Jul 2005.  Major Mizra said 
the Pakistani forces that were a part of the defense of Mogadishu did not see the attacks as warranting much 
of a response because of the limited damage the attacks caused. 
165 Bean, “Era of Terrorist Threats,” 36.  The Marines did perform patrolling but with no objective 
beyond “presence”.  The patrols did not seek intelligence or engagement.  The Marines depended on the 
Lebanese Armed Forces to perform the external security of the air base.   
166 Bean, 36-37.  The Marines were directed to take a “non-combatant” role which discouraged the 
aggressive show of force or the build-up of defenses on the air base.    
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implement those internal security measures the Air Force is so well versed at 
executing.167  In the end though, Beirut constituted only a single attack that provides a 
somewhat weak position to draw conclusions from.   
Da Nang and Tuy Hoa were selected from Vietnam because these were the two 
air bases that employed some unconventional tactics the longest; had similar threats; and 
similar terrain.168   Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were also considered but both did not 
implement aspects of an unconventional strategy until after the Tet Offensive in 1968 and 
replacement of General William Westmoreland with General Creighton Abrahms.    
Continuing with the similarities between Da Nang and Tuy Hoa, a 1969 USAF 
intelligence report described the threat at all both Da Nang and Tuy Hoa as “CRITICAL” 
even though Da Nang had the highest threat of any Vietnamese air base.169  However, Da 
Nang was a base used by the French in the war for independence which meant the 
VC/NVA could fall back on the experience of the Viet Minh in attacking Da Nang.  Tuy 
Hoa was constructed more recently, beginning in 1964.  That said, both Da Nang and Tuy 
Hoa were along routes of infiltration.  Da Nang was located along the primary infiltration 
from the north across the DMZ and Tuy Hoa was located along the central highland 
infiltration route.  Da Nang and Tuy Hoa were air bases located along the coast and had 
similar terrain and population density near the base.  In each case, the population density 
was 12,000-20,000 people within a 5km radius from the perimeter.170  Each base had the 
same directives on internal security from Seventh Air Force security staff.171    
Some differences between Da Nang and Tuy Hoa that could account for the 
possibility of skewed were that Da Nang was directed to have 8,000-meter deep defense 
 
167 Bean, “Era of Terrorist Threats,” 35.  The Marines did receive warning of nearly 100 car bomb 
threats prior to the attack on 23 Oct 1983; however, they were unable to penetrate the population or 
insurgent organization to disrupt the attack and did not establish effective security procedures at the air 
base. 
168 Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were also excellent candidates for analysis.  An extremely detailed 
analysis of the defense of Tan Son Nhut, focusing on the attack of 31 January 1968, is available in 
Benjamin J. Hettingja’s 2002 thesis for the Air Force Institute of Technology titled The Defense of Tan Son 
Nhut, 31 January 1968: A Study in the Nature of Air Base Security.  
169 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 220. 
170 Vick, Snakes, 98. 
171 Fox, 79-87. 
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areas to prevent stand-off attacks in 1966.172  Tuy Hoa was not directed to create such an 
extensive defense area.  AFOSI had a more comprehensive source network at Da 
Nang.173  Finally, Da Nang had major military headquarters (III MAF) on the installation 
while Tuy Hoa did not. 
Two base defense operations in Iraq are analyzed: Basra and Balad.  Basra air 
base is defended by the RAF Regiment.  Basra does not have a large footprint of British 
forces on station but is Iraq’s second most active civilian airport as well as supporting 
British strike and special operations air frames.  The population density in the area of 
Basra is at least equal to Balad with most of the population being Shia and Basra is 
located within miles of the Iranian border.  Basra experienced enemy activity for the first 
15-18 months of its operation but has been quiet recently even though criminal elements 
are beginning to be a problem.   
Balad has been Iraq’s most attacked air base and is located in the dangerous Sunni 
triangle.  Balad air base is also collocated with the LSA Anaconda Army base that houses 
more than 10,000 US soldiers.  Balad is strictly a military air operation.  Although, 
Balad’s threat is higher than Basra’s, the bases still provide a good basis for comparison.   
C.  DA NANG AIR BASE, VIETNAM 
The Marine defense of Da Nang AB was not just an attempt to defend an air base.  
The Marines saw Da Nang AB as key to their part in countering the insurgency.  They 
called it the “ink blot” approach.174  The Marines started by securing the base and then 
working outward by clearing areas of VC but never leaving the terrain they cleared.  
Instead the Marines sought to hold the terrain (and population in the terrain) against any 
VC counter-action.  The Marines designed their defense around these enclaves of local or 
US security.  As it pertained to the Marines, it was a plot of land surrounding vital 
airstrips.175  Without air power, South Vietnamese troops would be in a bind for a swift 
striking capability.  Without Marine security around the airstrips, aircraft and helicopters 
 
172 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 17.  
173 Fox, 139-144. 
174 Originally a French counterinsurgency tactic. 
175 Tom Bartlett, Ambassadors in Green, (Norfolk, VA: Leatherneck Association, 1971) 23. 
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were vulnerable to enemy mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. With the airstrip locked in 
a firm, friendly grasp, allied troops in the field were guaranteed resupply, reinforcements 
and quick medical evacuation.  This plan of action was consistent with the mission of the 
III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF): "to secure advanced air or naval bases…to deny 
the use of seized positions and areas to the enemy…to close with and destroy the 
enemy."176   The Marines took a very strategic perspective in securing Da Nang AB.177
To best fulfill this mission the Marines incorporated all of the GVN security 
apparatus in the vicinity of Da Nang under the III MAF Commander in March 1965.  
Within this area, USAF security police guarded part of the interior of the base with 
emphasis on the flight line, but worked under the III MAF Commander.  The Marine 
units provided patrols, dedicated a battalion of MPs to help defend the base and assist the 
Armed Forces Police in training and working with the local police to secure Da Nang 
City, whose metropolitan area population went from 110,000 in 1960 to nearly 900,000 
people in 1970.  The Marines also developed the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) 
program to counter the insurgency in the villages and hamlets outside of Da Nang.  The 
Marine MP battalion and Armed Forces Police in Da Nang City were instrumental in 
training the local police and maintaining law and order in a city that was rapidly 
developing an industrial capability which, along with Operation ROLLING THUNDER’s 
bombing of the south, brought tens of thousands of rural peasants to the city.  The result 
was a large urban slum.  These conditions invited VC influence but the Marines’ focus on 
law and order with the local police force paid dividends in disrupting the VC’s to execute 
military actions.178  Demonstrated clearly during the Tet Offensive of 1968, Da Nang 
was far less affected than most other parts of Vietnam, particularly Saigon and Hue, even 
though it was Vietnam’s second largest city.  This is not to say that the VC were unable 
 
176 Bartlett, Ambassadors, 12. 
177 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 20. 
178 There is a distinction here between “military actions” and “specific acts of terrorism” such as 
kidnappings, assassinations, small bombings, etc.  In Vietnam, these incidents were tracked separately.  
The VC/NVA were able to commit acts of terrorism throughout the war; however, the pacification and law 
and order efforts did have an effect.  In 1968, about 7000 acts of terrorism were documented but this 
number was down to 4,000 by 1971. 
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to commit terrorist acts or targeted assassinations in Da Nang, because they were.  
However, the VC were unable to execute military operations seen in other cities.   
In the area outside of Da Nang City, the Marines developed their most famous 
counterinsurgent action from Vietnam, and has been resurrected in Iraq, the CAP team.  
A CAP team, normally twelve Marines, was assigned to a village or hamlet where the 
team lived with and trained and led the village militia against the VC or NVA in the area.  
These CAP units often were able to create excellent intelligence networks in their area to 
help CAP and Marine patrols engage local VC units.  In a short period of time, the VC 
began to avoid villages with CAP teams.  This maneuver allowed Marine patrols to 
concentrate in areas between villages and increase their chances of contact with VC units.   
And although the CAP program has often been criticized for not having lasting 
effects in the villages they occupied because of a weak civic action operation, no village 
with CAP was ever lost to the VC.179   CAP led units also accounted for 7.5 percent of all 
enemy killed but represented only 1.5 percent of the Marines in Vietnam, and Marines 
were only about one-third of US forces in Vietnam.180   CAP units also had a lower 
percentage of casualties as compared to Army units deployed on “seek and destroy” 
missions.  This is an effect far beyond their numbers and since many CAP teams were 
within 20km of Da Nang air base, it can be assumed that a large percentage of the VC 
killed were ultimately intending to attack the air base.  However, the CAP program never 
“surrounded” Da Nang air base but was mostly focused around the air base and along the 
main supply routes leading in and out of the Da Nang area.181
From 1966-1968, it is impossible to determine the disrupting effects that the CAP 
teams and Marine patrols had on VC units targeting Da Nang AB or trying to infiltrate 
and disrupt actions in Da Nang City.  To defend Da Nang AB and, simultaneously, 
counter the insurgency, the Marines took the unconventional approach of not focusing on 
 
179 Brooks R. Brewington. (1996). Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement.  
Thesis Paper.  USMC Command and Staff College; Quantico, VA.  p. 21. 
180 Pelli, Frank. (1990).  Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam.  Thesis Paper.  
USMC Command and Staff College; Quantico, VA.  PP. 13-16; Brewington,  pp. 13-19. 
181 Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 
Aug 2005. 
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securing the base itself but on securing the local area and its population.  Several statistics 
point to the effectiveness of the Marines.   
From 1965 thru 1968, Da Nang AB was only the fifth most attacked base even 
though it was the target of VC and, as the closest main air base to the DMZ, thousands of 
infiltrating NVA personnel.  A 1969 USAF intelligence report described the threat at Da 
Nang as the highest in Vietnam.182 During the Tet Offensive, air bases further south, 
specifically Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut, faced VC attacks of battalions and larger.  Da 
Nang suffered no such attacks and very few stand-off attacks but that was not for lack of 
trying.  Several CAP teams and their militias, just four kilometers from the Da Nang air 
base, were able to engage and disrupt multiple battalions of VC/NVA whose intended 
target was the air base.183   Only one sapper attack ever made it to the perimeter and it 
occurred before the advent of the CAP program and before the MP Battalion was 
assigned to the city in 1965.  Da Nang was one of the least mortared bases in Vietnam 
because it was difficult for an enemy to get within 7km of the base without meeting a 
CAP-led patrol, a Marine patrol, local police, Marine MPs, or an AFOSI informant.184   
Out to 7km, the Marines were able to counter ground forces, mortars, and even 107mm 
rockets before they could threaten the base but VC/NVA forces were able to be supplied 
with 122mm and 140mm rockets by 1967.   
With ranges out to 14km, the 122mm and 140mm rockets could not only travel 
further but also carried a far larger warhead than the 107mm rockets that other bases 
faced.  The rockets were also able to be launched by timer so congregations of enemy 
forces that could draw attention of friendly forces or the population, were not necessary.   
 
182 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 220. 
183 Timothy Duffy (former US Marine CAP Sergeant), email to author, 25 Apr 2005. Talis Kaminskis 
(former US Marine CAP Sergeant), email to author, 3 May 2005. Mike Readinger (former US Marine CAP 
Sergeant), email to author, 23 and 24 Apr 2005.  Readinger relayed that he always thought that the CAP 
program was an unconventional approach to defending Da Nang air base.  It must be mentioned that the 
CAP “Echo teams” that intercepted the VC Regiment during Tet suffered massive casualties and were 
nearly obliterated in defense of the base.  However, the main fight was done by only three CAP teams 
totaling about 35-40 Marines and about 150 Popular Force allies. 
184 The secure environment created by the Marines’ actions at Da Nang are credited with helping 
AFOSI establish an effective informant network.  SA Forbes said the lack of a secure environment at Balad 
air base is one of the contributing factors in AFOSI’s inability to establish an effective informant network. 
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At the greater distances, the VC/NVA was able to take advantage of gaps between CAP 
operations to execute the rocket attacks.185  Da Nang AB would be attacked with these 
rockets nearly 90 times over the course of the war and earn the nickname, “Rocket 
City.”186   However, more than 75% of these attacks occurred from 1969-1972, when the 
Marines were pulled out of Da Nang and ended their unconventional operations.  In late 
1968, most of the CAP teams were pulled from their villages and changed to mobile 
operations that proved to be devastating in the Marines ability to maintain their village 
intelligence nets.187   By wars end in 1973, Da Nang was Vietnam’s most attacked base 
even though the internal base defense of Da Nang had remained essentially unchanged 
from 1965-1968.  This suggests that the internal defense actions that the USAF focuses 
on had a limited impact on the actual defense of the base.188      
D.  TUY HOA AIR BASE, VIETNAM 
The defense of Tuy Hoa was not an intentional unconventional operation but it 
turned out much that way.  When Tuy Hoa AB was being constructed and upgraded from 
1964-1968, the USAF employed a huge number of workers from the local community to 
work on the base.  In order to support the construction and operation of the base, the 
USAF helped construct villages and housing in the local area and the US Army took over 
the local rail line and made it run on time.189  Eventually a community of greater than 
16,000 people lived in an area just a few kilometers from Tuy Hoa’s perimeter.190   The 
constant interaction between the base and the local community, the dependence of the 
community on the base’s operation, and the base’s support of law and order resulted in 
the people in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa becoming extremely resistant to Viet Cong 
 
185 Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 
Aug 2005. 
186 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 172-206; Vick, Snakes, 128-153. 
187 Ibid.  Kaminskis and Readinger both called the change to “mobile” CAP teams beginning in late 
1968 as the “worst decision of the war” because the CAP teams lost influence over the intelligence 
networks they established. 
188 It should be noted that though USAF’s actions were incongruent when facing an enemy like the 
VC but still proved effective against a saboteur.  Although being in a country where very few SP’s spoke 
the language and air bases required thousands of host nation workers, the VC was only able to execute 
three successful saboteur attacks.    
189 Fox, 60-67. 
190 Vick, 98. 
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influence.  However, this accidental “hearts and minds” campaign was only possible 
because of the presence of the 25th Regiment of the Korean White Horse Division.   
The 25th Regiment had the singular mission of protecting the population in the 
vicinity of Tuy Hoa from the insurgents.  Although the Koreans were not considered 
successful in developing local Vietnamese security capability, the Koreans were superb at 
using local intelligence to combat and eventually deter VC/NVA forces.191   
Without VC influence, the positive impact the USAF had on the community was 
able to take hold among the locals.  Also contributing was that the population near Tuy 
Hoa air base had very little interaction with offensive Air Force or Army operations that 
made other regions of Vietnam more susceptible to the VC.  Although located in a very 
high threat area, Tuy Hoa AB was attacked only three times from 1965-1972, the lowest 
for any base in Vietnam.192   It is doubtful, though, that the USAF’s internally focused 
defense contributed to Tuy Hoa’s success.   
In fact, in 1967, a 7AF security inspection at Tuy Hoa described the security as 
“poor” and Tuy Hoa AB as having the worst security of any base in Vietnam.193   
However, the report only examined the physical characteristics of security:  fighting 
positions, checkpoints, barriers, fence lines, and aircraft revetments.  It did not consider 
the influence the base had over the community and how that relationship effectively 
disrupted the insurgent enemy.  The Air Force needed the population to construct and 
maintain Tuy Hoa air base and its air operation.  Coupled with the actions of the Korean 
25th Regiment, the defense of Tuy Hoa was unconventional in nature – and thereby 
successful.    
E.  BASRA AIR BASE, IRAQ 
It has appeared that from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency that the US Army 
seemed unable to crack the insurgency, and certainly this article has not argued 
 
191 James L. Collins and Stanley Larsen. (1985). Allied Participation in Vietnam. (Washington D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 1985) 147-169. Donald Graham (former USAF Security Forces Technical 
Sergeant), email with author, 13 Apr 2005. 
192 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 172-206; Vick, Snakes, 128-153. 
193 Fox,  60-67. 
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otherwise, but the British defense of Basra is the exception to that rule.  The RAF 
defenders of Basra are responsible for securing the air base’s ground defense area of over 
220 sq km that includes the base and stretches out to 7km in most directions.194    
Within the ground defense area, the RAF Regiment immediately initiated a base 
defense operation focused on counterinsurgency and the achievement of local security.  
This is not to say that this was obvious at the opening of the base in May 2003.  The RAF 
Regiment freely admits that they do not have doctrine that directs how they operate but 
instead they are encouraged to develop strategy based on the air base defense situation.195   
Two key factors come out of this approach.   
First, the RAF Regiment believes that the most important task is to attain 
situational awareness.196   They have even modeled different base defense scenarios and 
determined that seeking situational awareness is the only correct path.  The second is that 
since the RAF Regiment develops a new strategy for each air base, it makes it difficult 
for them to make a strategic first move against an insurgent.  Though a slight weakness, 
the RAF Regiment makes up for it with follow through.  For example, it took the RAF 
Regiment nearly ten months to gain a clear insight into how they wanted to defend Basra 
but by March 2004, they had developed a comprehensive strategy.  The RAF Regiment 
plan not only accounted for the saboteur threat on-base but continuous patrolling of their 
ground defense area, training and supervising the Iraqi Border Guards, liaison with the 
Iraqi Army and a local pseudo-militia, complete a partial census of their area, and 
implement a civic action program that relocated an entire village to an area where the 
village may prosper.197   
 
194 John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), in discussion with author at RAF 
Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005. 
195 Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal 
Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), and Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion 
with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005. 
196 John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), in discussion with author at RAF 
Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005. 
197 David Blackman (Royal Air Force (RAF) Warrant Officer), in discussion with author at RAF 
Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005. 
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The RAF Regiment had to work by, with, and thru others (other RAF, Border 
Guards, etc.) because their force is only slightly larger than the USAF security forces unit 
at Balad whose task is only to secure part of a flightline that is already internal to the 
base.  By training, supervising, and liaison with the Iraqi forces, the RAF Regiment has 
had the ability to vet those who are untrustworthy and observe local leaders who may be 
trying to work both for the state and the insurgents.  Basra may not have the comparable 
threat of a Balad or Baghdad, the fact is the air base resides outside Iraq’s second largest 
city just kilometers from the Iranian border and has not been attacked since October 
2004.   
F. BALAD AIR BASE (LSA ANACONDA), IRAQ  
As mentioned previously, Balad is a base defense operation that, at least up until 
April 2005, has been ineffective in interdicting the threat of the insurgents in the area.  
Also mentioned were the separate chains of command for the Army, USAF, AFOSI, and 
Iraqi elements.  If fact, the USAF SP unit at Balad is nearly as large as the RAF force at 
Basra even though the SP’s only guard the flight line (more of that internal focus).  It is 
no surprise then that Balad has been the most attacked base in Iraq since the end of 
combat operations in 2003.  The attacks have all been standoff rocket and mortar attacks 
as well as nearby vehicle ambushes, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and 
carjackings of base personnel and contractors.   
In response to the attacks in early 2004, the Army implemented an aggressive 
plan to counter the rocket and mortar attacks that was based around letting the insurgent 
attack the base and then counterattack with decisive force.198   The plan had one fatal 
flaw: without the presence in the community and the cooperation of the public the Army 
could not use their decisive force.  Counter-battery fire and helicopter response forces 
were usually useless because the enemy realized that if they fired from a populated 
location or fire the weapons using a timer, the delay in response would allow them to slip 
 
198 Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), 
Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master 
Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security 
Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force 
Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. 
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away among the population.199   The population was certainly not for the insurgents but 
wasn’t against them either.  The population around Balad validated T.E. Lawrence’s 
observation for the insurgent’s to succeed, “all we need is 2% active supporters and 98% 
neutral sympathizers”.200    
If anything this focus on direct action only encouraged the use of force when it 
was not necessary, such as the aforementioned orchard fire, due to a mixture of long 
deployments, fear of casualties, risk aversion, and frustration.  The result was that just 
five months after the initiation of the direct action plan, attacks against Balad peaked.  In 
response the wing commander asked CENTAF for help on trying to stop the “rocket 
man”.201  Task Force (TF) 1041 was CENTAF’s answer.  TF1041 consisted of 
approximately 200 security forces personnel, mostly from the 820th Force Protection 
Group (FPG), Moody AFB, Georgia. 
TF1041 was put together in November 2004 with the mission to kill/capture all 
insurgents in the most contentious area near the base.202   A 100 sq km area of about six 
Sunni villages north-north west of Balad – a direct action mission that was essentially the 
same as the Army’s had been prior to the task force’s arrival.203   The mission had an 
initiation date of 1 January 2005 for a duration of 60 days.  The mission was clear and 
precise with the Balad’s wing commander ensuring the leadership of TF1041 also 
understood that he requested the task force to stop the rockets and the car-jackings and 
kidnapping – seemingly requiring a counterinsurgency focus.204   How did the team 
reconcile the issue of direct action and counterinsurgency?  The task force commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Bargery, ensured the integration of both of these mission 
 
199 Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) and Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces 
Major), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 
2005. 
200 T.E. Lawrence, T.E. “Evolution of a Revolt,” Army Quarterly, (October, 1920), 119. 
201 Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection 
Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Brad Scott (USAF Intelligence Senior Master Sergeant), in discussion with author at 820th Force 
Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005. 
204 Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection 
Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005. 
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requirements when he restated TF1041’s mission, “This is a war against insurgents, and 
the battlefield is asymmetric.  We can't stay inside the fence and hope the bad guys go 
away. Hope isn't effective in preventing attacks, so we go out and take action…the local 
people are afraid. The terrorists operate (among) them, and we have to win the 
confidence of the local people. If you demonstrate you are a fair and effective alternative 
to the terrorists, you can sometimes earn the people's support and build lasting 
relationships."205   TF1041 had an initial “hit list” but they understood that if they wanted 
that list to grow they had to secure the population.  Four guiding principles were 
established aimed at reducing the fear of the insurgent among the public: precision, 
accuracy, deliberateness, forcefulness.206    
The initial reaction of the Army was mostly one of ambivalence and detachment 
but quickly the support of the Army became integral to TF1041’s mission – especially 
with helicopter support.207   However, the difference between TF1041’s operation and 
that of the Army they replaced became apparent quickly, even to the public.  Although 
nearly all patrols had a mounted element, most of the time the TF1041s operated as 
walking patrols.  This allowed the patrol to be able to move without observation of the 
public, if so desired, as well as maximize interaction with the public to gather information 
and establish presence.  TF1041 had 24/7 presence in their AOR with walking patrols.  
This type of strategy played to the strengths of the unit’s members.  As one squad leader 
put it, “we are all trained cops and we work best with the population”.208   And as the 
RAF Regiment had deemed critical, the walking patrols allowed TF1041 to achieve a 
level of situational awareness that the mounted Army patrols could not.   
With their police experience, TF1041 had a unique mentality that showed to be 
different from the Army approaches – civilian considerations, military working dogs, and 
 
205 Colleen Wronek, “Airmen Track Terrorists Off-base,” 332d Air Expeditionary Wing Public 
Affairs, (March 2005). Contents of Lt Col Bargery’s quote confirmed by Major Christensen. 
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females.  Security forces never operate, homestation or deployed, without considerations 
for civilians.  Air bases are inherently occupied and surrounded with civilians so this 
factor is always a consideration for security forces and their heavy weapons units.  The 
working dogs provided not only an element of respectability anytime that were in contact 
with the public but they also acted as a mobile explosives detector.  Working dogs found 
several weapon caches and an IED during TF1041 and undoubtedly this was a significant 
psychological advantage.209  The advantage of women in combat may not be clearly 
evident but police research indicates that female officers often communicate better with 
women and children and Iraq was no different.  Two squad leaders interviewed credited 
the female team members with gathering far superior information from Iraqi women and 
children and provided enhanced force protection for the patrol because they could search 
women.210   This ensured security and local customs were respected.   
Only lasting for a 60 day period means analyzing measures of effectiveness is 
anecdotal but some details stand out.  Air base attacks dropped significantly lower than 
the previous 60 days and lower than the same time during the previous year.  Moreover, 
TF1041 made 98 “high value target” arrests.211   Maybe a more telling statistic is that 
more than 50% of the registered Sunni voters in the TF1041 area, voted – about four to 
five times the rate of other Sunni areas within the Sunni triangle in Iraq.212  According to 
data and surveys collected by iraqanalysis.org, less than 40% of Iraqi’s country-wide 
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212 Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), in discussion with author at 820th Force 
Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.; Just as importantly, the International 
Herald Tribune reported on 7 Jan 2005 that the region that Basra was located was “too unsafe for voting”.  
This makes the accomplishments of TF1041 look near remarkable.  Retrieved on 31 Jul 2005 from 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/06/news/iraq.html.  
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voted in the January elections with the primary reason being for not voting was security 
fears.213  This speaks to TF1041’s ability to secure the population.  
On their final patrol, Major Glen Christensen, TF1041 operations officer, relayed 
an incident telling of the difference in how the task force operated and the US Army units 
they had replaced: “There were some kids and teenagers we went over to talk to and as 
we were talking an US Army patrol drove up.  The kids began to point and through our 
interpreter we found out they were calling the Army the ‘enemy’.  So I said ‘no, they are 
not the enemy, they are friends like us’.  The response was ‘no, you are police, they are 
the enemy’”.214  
G.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES USING THE NEW 
PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE 
All of the cases studied had times of effective operation; however, some 
differences emerged.   
Act First.  Of the case studies, Tuy Hoa and Basra nearly achieved the principle of 
Act First and as such both were the least attacked of the bases studied.  As discussed 
earlier, the same long-lasting deterrent effect of Act First was observed at Bashur and 
Tallil in Iraq as well.  Da Nang and Balad did not Act First but both acted as early as 
possible and this certainly helped the base defense outcome at each location.215  
Unity of Effort.  Tuy Hoa and Balad did not achieve a unity of effort although Tuy 
Hoa was probably more unified than Balad simply because of the off-base actions of the 
25th Regiment of the Korean White Horse Division.  TF1041, Da Nang, and Basra were 
able to execute unified small unit action and able to interact with the public in an 
effective manner.  Da Nang and Basra did have unity of effort with Da Nang going a step 
further and actually creating a situation that is better described as unity of command.  The 
only failure in this category at Da Nang was the Marines lack of effort to develop local 
political leaders to continue the counterinsurgency fight after the departure of the static 
CAP operations.   This ensured the unity of effort would not persevere.  Each base looked 
 
213 Retrieved on 2 Aug 05 from http://www.iraqanalysis.org/info/55.  
214 Ibid. 
215 Balad in this reference is referring to TF1041. 
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at depended on indigenous or allied forces to do much of the “heavy lifting” in the effort 
to protect the population and secure the local area with Da Nang, Tuy Hoa, and Basra as 
the most prominent examples of the use of indigenous and allied forces off-base, and 
Balad to a much smaller extent. 
Protection.  All four bases can probably credit any measure of success to the level 
of protection accorded their local populations.  Da Nang, through the CAP, MP battalion, 
and other patrolling efforts established good presence throughout most of their AOR 
focused on Protecting the population and the air base.  Da Nang defending forces also 
demonstrated some willingness to intervene on behalf of the population although CAP 
units normally did limited law and order missions.  The Marines operated with restraint 
but were able to apply deliberate force in a very effective manner against VC units.  The 
only Achilles’ heal was the low level of civic action.  The VC was an extremely 
organized and politically focused insurgent group in the area of Da Nang and, even 
though the Marines isolated the insurgents from the population, without effective civic 
action the VC was able to maintain their influence.216  As far as force protection, the 
Marines and USAF forces established an extensive operation that included dynamic and 
passive measures.  In fact, Da Nang was considered to have Vietnam’s most far-reaching 
passive defense measures to include a mass network of hardened structures and sensor 
systems.217  Da Nang’s protection of the public and the base were the focus of the 
Marines operations but still only achieved mixed results for three reasons:  1) the strength 
and resilience of the VC/NVA in the Da Nang area, 2) the decision to abandon the static 
CAP operations and implement mobile operations, and 3) the Marines’ level of civic 
action essentially stopped at training the local Popular Forces (PF) because the focus was 
 
216 Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 
Aug 2005. Lt Harvey said when he returned to Vietnam in the 1990’s he discovered that many of his 
Vietnamese friends were VC sympathizers who actively supported the VC with supplies.  He was shocked 
by this because the family that he stayed with for nearly a year and a half were one of the VC leaders in the 
village.  These people, however, never ambushed any of the Marines in the village and even assisted on 
some ambushes of other VC units.  When asked why they did not attack the Marines or reject the VC, the 
response to Lt Harvey was that they did not attack the Marines because they found them supportive of the 
village and did not want to encourage a larger American response.  As to why they did not reject the VC 
politically, the former village leaders told Lt Harvey that simply there was no other political option.  Of 
note, Lt Harvey was part a mobile CAP program that headquartered out of the village discussed in the 
communication with the author. 
217 Fox, Air Base Defense in Vietnam, 123-133. 
  95
on killing VC/NVA instead of defeating them.  Although the PF were an exceptional 
force multiplier, it was hit-or-miss whether the PF were trained to operate without the 
Marines and there was little emphasis from the Marines to assist (or evaluate) local 
political leaders in more effectively managing their villages or the local PF.     
The effective Protection of Tuy Hoa was predicated on three factors:  1) the 
presence and interaction of the defense forces (Korean and USAF) with the population 
coupled with the ability to apply deliberate force, 2) the population was never disrupted 
by conventional Army operations, and 3) the VC never established a high-level of action 
in the Tuy Hoa area probably because of the Act First strategy employed.  As far as the 
other elements of Protection, the defenders of Tuy Hoa never showed a great willingness 
to intervene, the Koreans were not known for using restraint or civic action and the 
passive force protection measures at Tuy Hoa was considered the weakest in Vietnam.   
The defenders of Basra showed a thorough application of the principle of 
Protection.  The RAF Regiment showed presence, conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate 
force, a high level of civic action and acceptable force protection.  Only “acceptable” 
force protection because the Regiment normally operates without any body armor 
because they feel situational awareness is their shield.  And so far, they have been right.  
The only shortfall of the Regiment (and British in general) at Basra has been combating 
organized crime in the area that has grown enough to possibly present a future insurgent 
threat.   
Balad is a tale of two operations.  Pre-TF1041, the principle of Protection was 
wholly not met at Balad, yet excellent passive force protection measures have prevented 
significant damage as a result of the insurgent standoff attacks.  TF1041, on the other 
hand, operated with interactive presence, some willingness to intervene, restrained in the 
use of force but deliberate and powerful when required, and excellent force protection.  
Only a lack of civic action presents a shortfall in TF1041’s operation and a possible 
limitation in the long-term effectiveness of TF1041’s mission if it was allowed to operate 
beyond 60 days.  Further, by not working with the local forces and political entities, 
TF1041 required a larger dedication of US force.   
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Penetration.  Da Nang defenders were able to establish some effective 
intelligence networks (especially with the static CAP operations) among the population in 
the local villages and in the city Da Nang but mostly failed to gather intelligence on local 
friendly forces or penetrate the VC.  This limited the long-term impact of Marines in 
stopping the insurgency.  The Koreans at Tuy Hoa were able to penetrate the local 
population very effectively and also managed to penetrate some VC units.  As far as 
penetrating local friendly forces, neither the Koreans nor the US tried to penetrate each 
other and yet trusted each other because of the previous experience of the Korean War.  
The RAF Regiment at Basra has effectively penetrated the local population and the 
friendly forces in the vicinity of the base but has not yet penetrated the insurgency.    
Balad, prior to TF1041, achieved very little penetration of the community, friendly 
forces, and the insurgency but were still able to Balad to create a list of possible 
insurgents that resulted in 98 arrests and 18 people detained.  However, it was not until 
TF1041 was created that these arrests were able to be made.  This is because TF1041 was 
able to penetrate the local population but did not penetrate Iraqi friendly forces or the 
insurgency. 
Perseverance.  Da Nang was a base that operated from 1965 to 1973 so it would 
be difficult to say that the defenders did not show perseverance but this study believes 
they did not.  The best example of this is the change from static to mobile CAP teams in 
1968 and the rapid drawdown of Marine forces beginning in 1970.  Both actions showed 
to the public that the US was not trying to win and this was only exasperated by the lack 
of civic action to train forces and politicians to continue an effective defense after the 
departure of Marines.  Tuy Hoa was able to maintain perseverance as has Basra and 
Balad in Iraq.  Sadly, Balad is not troubled by level of dedication, only a poor strategy.  
TF1041, being only 60 days, did not demonstrate perseverance which is why the gains 
were only temporary. 
Overall, the New Principles of Air Base Defense prove to be a synergistic 
solution.  The facets of Protection and Penetration are the base of the defense operation 
because they represent the tactics, techniques, and procedures that must be implemented.  
Acting First provides quick opportunities to achieve the principles of Protection and 
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Penetration.  In fact, the “Act” in Acting First means to implement to principles of 
Protection and Penetration first.   Unity of Effort makes the Protection and Penetration 
principles more effectively and more efficiently achieved.  Unity of Effort is also critical 
in the principle of Perseverance where an engaged and effective indigenous force will 
become a long-term counterinsurgent presence and allow the US to implement a low-cost 
defense strategy.  Perseverance is critical to Protection and Penetration because it 
demonstrates the physical and moral sacrifice the US is willing to make in the security 
effort.  As such, it extenuates every tactic used by US forces because the public interprets 
not just as some short-term solution but a long-term effort.  This will impact the public’s 
preferences on who to support in the counterinsurgent struggle.   
This study considers success as one where the defense is able to disrupt and deter 
enemy attacks while also limiting the damage of the enemy attack.   The New Principles 
appear to be predictive and descriptive of a successful air base defense effort.  Although, 
Da Nang, from 1965 to 1968, and TF1041 appear to possible exceptions but each were 
able to achieve Protection and Penetration which are the staples of the defense.   
Da Nang and TF1041 had some special circumstances.  Da Nang faced an 
extremely powerful and determined opponent in the VC that was already well-developed 
before the Marines arrived in Vietnam in 1965.  Even so, the Marines showed success.  
TF1041’s circumstance is that of time – TF1041 was limited to a 60-day event that 
focused on “capture/kill” operations.  This does make it difficult to extrapolate long-term 












Protection Penetration Perseverance Successful?
Da Nang 
‘65-‘68 
No Yes Yes Somewhat No Somewhat 
Da Nang 
‘68’-73 
No Somewhat Somewhat No No No 
Tuy Hoa Yes No Yes Somewhat Yes Yes 
Basra Yes Yes Yes Somewhat Yes Yes 


























                                                 
218 Although Da Nang and TF1041 did not act first, both acted effectively as early as possible.   
219 TF1041 had a unity of effort between US Army and USAF forces but lacked that unity of effort 
with Iraqi forces. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In the mid-1990’s Project AIR FORCE, a division of the RAND Corporation, 
assessed that in the foreseeable future no conventional opponent could challenge US air 
assets – in the air.220  As such, RAND predicted that adversaries will find alternative 
methods to challenging US airpower.  However, RAND’s study failed to articulate that 
this was not a new development because the insurgent has been the primary threat to US 
airpower for the last 50 years.  Yet the insurgent has not targeted air bases with decisive 
force but instead attacks in whatever method is left available in order to disrupt US air 
operation but, more importantly, to attack the US center of gravity – the political will of 
the US public – while protecting the insurgent’s center of gravity – the local population.  
The insurgent air base attack, therefore, is more so a form of information warfare in 
which every attack is a message to attack and defend the US and the insurgent center’s of 
gravity, respectively.   
The US does not view the attacks as informational in nature but instead attacks to 
achieve a tactical objective: harassment.  The US believes the insurgent values the same 
thing as the US military does, its military resources.  The insurgent, in this view, seeks to 
maximize the physical damage to US airpower in order to somehow defeat US airpower.  
And if physical damage is the goal of the insurgent, then the US military, and the Air 
Force in particular, assumes the insurgent will want to attack the resources through a 
ground assault or a saboteur because at close range the insurgent has a much higher 
percentage of success in destroying US resources.  The Air Force than applies an 
engineered solution to the base defense that counters the enemy’s ground maneuvers and 
insider threat with fields of fire, large response forces, massed technology, hierarchical 
command structure, barriers, fences, checkpoints, facility hardening, and identification 
systems.  Even though this wrongly views the insurgency as a conventional force, at a 
limited level this approach has some merit but it ignores the goal and system of the 
insurgent.   
 
220 Hettingja, Tan Son Nhut, p. 1. 
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The insurgent system is a plan of organizational growth based on how the 
insurgents “interact” with the population.  The interaction is based on manipulation of 
information to exert control over the population.  The manipulation of information is 
possible because the insurgents strive to either isolate the population from other sources 
of information or to demonstrate to the population that the insurgent’s information is 
more important.  The manipulation is achieved through acts of symbolic violence, 
intimidation or replacement of local leaders, public statements, and attacking the force 
that opposes them (i.e., police, army, outside agencies, etc.).  Surely, if the US is a 
supporter of the state or the antagonist in a transnational insurgency than air base attacks 
will be prominent in the plan of the insurgents.  The goal is that the population will 
process this information and, as a result, behave in a manner that is advantageous to the 
insurgent.  Whether that behavior is as an active fighter, silently neutral (which is most of 
the population), or as a supplier of resources, as long as it is the behavior the insurgents 
require and expect, than the population will ensure its own safety.  Of course, the 
behavior desired of the US population is to call for the end of US involvement.  This is a 
political victory for the insurgent. 
Since political victory, or some political conciliation, is the goal of the insurgent, 
the insurgent does not fight by conventional methods but exemplifies acts of terror and 
hit-and-run guerrilla tactics instead.  Fighting the insurgent is not conducive to the 
engineered solution but requires human knowledge and interaction to be successful.  This 
approach is not found in air base defense doctrine but in the theories of 
counterinsurgency of Gordon McCormick and Julian Paget.  With a counterinsurgent 
approach, the defense of the base from the insurgent becomes a symmetric conflict where 
both the insurgent and counterinsurgent struggle for the control of the population and the 
information.  This is security based not solely on sandbags, barriers, and fields of fire that 
only allows a base to more effectively absorb enemy punishment but security that 
prevents enemy attacks, deters enemy action, and strikes the enemy first.   
In order to achieve this type of security, New Principles of Air Base Defense were 
developed from McCormick’s and Paget’s theories of counterinsurgency:  1) Act First, 2) 
Unity of Effort, 3) Protection, 4) Penetration, and 5) Perseverance.  
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Act First is unique in that it is a principle of timing.  The method for 
implementing the principle of “Act First” is the employment of counter-insurgent air base 
defense tactics before or no later than the arrival of US aircraft.  This can be achieved in 
one of two ways: 1) operational preparation of the environment (OPE) or 2) advanced 
force operations.   The implication is that the USAF must find and develop qualified 
personnel to execute Advanced Force, Training and Advising, or Operational Preparation 
of the Environment missions with indigenous forces in order to Act First. 
Unity of Effort is a principle of organizational imperative and objective.  Without 
unified action, the insurgents will find and expose fractures in the base defense.  The US 
must influence allied and indigenous defense force and local political authorities to view 
the execution of the base defense mission the same way and strive for the same short and 
long-term objectives.  The objectives not only must be the same but the method for 
achieving the objectives must be identical, or near to it.  Critical to ensuring this unity of 
effort is the unity of command among external elements (such as US and allies) and the 
integration of intelligence operations of all defense forces.  If AFOSI hides intelligence 
from the security forces, if the US hides intelligence from allies, or if indigenous forces 
hide intelligence from US forces, the defense will suffer.  Implications are considerable: 
1) air base commanders must become intimately involved in the base defense and in 
influencing indigenous forces and local political leaders and 2) AFOSI must be placed 
under the same chain of command as USAF security forces in order unify all base 
defense operations. 
Along with Penetration, Protection is a principle of strategy.  Protecting the 
population and isolating the insurgent are key components to Paget’s and McCormick’s 
models for counter-insurgency and are also key in the defense of the base.  However, in 
terms of air base defense, “protection’ takes on an even broader definition.  Not only 
must the defense forces protect the population, as in McCormick’s model, but also 
protect the base and US personnel as well.  The base and the US personnel represent a 
direct link to US COG – US public opinion.  And the local population is the COG of the 
insurgent.  The US must protect its own COG while isolating the insurgent from its COG.  
This is achieved through presence, train/advise indigenous forces, intervention and 
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conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate force, civic action, and force protection.   
Implications of the principle of Protection include:  1) air base defense operations must 
focus off-base to counter the insurgent; 2) the encouragement of Air Force security forces 
to utilize their experience as police officers operating in small teams; 4) air bases must 
accept the duties of training, assisting, and advising indigenous forces as well as assisting 
or advising in local civic action; and 4) Air Force security forces must also train to 
execute deliberate force actions in units larger than squad-size.  The Air Force base 
defense forces already have the right foundation because they can act like a cop while 
thinking like a cop but can also act like an infantryman while still thinking like a cop.  
This policeman’s attitude allows the defense force to see and interdict problems in the 
community, apply practical solutions, seek out dealings with the population, and not be 
frustrated by the restraints of Rules of Engagement that are almost never more restrictive 
than the Rules of Engagement police deal with on duty in the U.S.  This type of mental 
flexibility accentuates both knowledge and action. 
 The fourth principle of air base defense is Penetration.  Penetration is the other 
principle of strategy and is linked with Protection.  By establishing Protection of the 
population that breaks the insurgent’s link with the population, Penetration efforts use 
that security groundwork to achieve a level of situational awareness and intelligence 
equal to that of the insurgent.  Penetration is intelligence-gathering, investigation, 
evaluation of other friendly forces, and evaluation of the success of the base defense 
effort.  Penetration is not just the penetration of the insurgency, though certainly the 
ultimate goal, but also is penetration of the population, friendly forces, and local political 
officials.   Implications of Penetration are not significant since the security forces already 
have the skills and attitude to effectively interact with a population to gather information 
and AFOSI has some extensive experience in overt intelligence collection; however, 
these forces must be unified in order maximize and synergize the intelligence-gathering 
effort. 
The fifth and final principle of air base defense is Perseverance.  Perseverance is a 
principle of timing and effort and is synonymous with will.  It provides another moral 
component to the base defense mission.  Perseverance means that the state will not be 
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outlasted or out-willed.  Perseverance in this way means that once the insurgent’s 
operating space is attacked than that level of effort is maintained in order to not allow the 
insurgency maneuver to adjust and grow.  The reason for this is that both 
counterinsurgencies and air bases tend to be long-term commitments for the US.  
Implications for Perseverance are similar to Acting First and Protection because 
Perseverance requires the USAF to accept the mission of OPE and civic action in order to 
ensure the long-term security of the air base beyond the need for US use. 
The New Principles of Air Base Defense provide a starting point in planning and 
executing a base defense that protects the friendly forces’ freedom of action in the air 
base’s physical, informational, and moral realm and denies these realms from the 
insurgent.  In doing so, base defense forces can prevent base attacks that the current 
doctrine simply cannot do.     
Preventing an attack has a particular relevance for OOTW air base operations 
similar to those during Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwandan operations where the USAF often 
operates separate from other US forces.  In this environment, a single significant air base 
attack could destroy the American public’s resolve for the operation or push the US to 
greater involvement, as in the case of Bien Hoa in 1964.  
Moreover, in implementing an air base defense plan based on counterinsurgency 
theories, the air base can now contribute to a strategic stabilization effort for a combatant 
commander beyond just providing airpower but by also ensuring an area hostile to an 
insurgency.  The base can establish and maintain a secure area that Army and Marine 
units can expand in order to deny sanctuary to an insurgency.  In light of the results of air 
base defense in Iraq to date, there appears to be no other option. 
A.  TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
           Implementing the New Principles of Air Base Defense and viewing air base 
defense as a counterinsurgent struggle, generates several topics that require further study:  
1.  What training, composition, and organization of Air Force security forces 
teams would best support the Operational Preparation of the Environment, 
Advanced Force Operations, and training/advising/liaison missions?   
2.  What training, skills, and organizational adjustments for security forces and 
AFOSI would be required to implement the principles of Protection and 
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Penetration?  Would it require a change in the composition of a security forces 
squad?  Should it require the homogenous deployment of security forces as 
opposed to deploying as separate squads?  Would it require more AFOSI agents 
to complete advanced HUMINT training?  Would more Anti-terrorism Teams 
(ATT) and Force Protection Groups be the main avenue for providing manpower?  
How to maximize security forces police experience and training while 
simultaneously maintaining a high proficiency in weapons and infantry skills?   
3.  How to restructure and integrate the base defense and air operations command 
and control relationships to emphasize rapid response and the decentralization of 
control and execution?  Can ‘control’ be decentralized in an air base 
environment? 
4.  What designs, systems, and applications for technology in a base defense effort 
can assist in or perform internal security measures in order to free forces for 
proactive operations?  What technologies can be used to support off-base 
operations and promote initiative at the lowest level of the base defense 
organization?  What system designs can promote the decentralized execution of 
the base defense operation?  Can the low-level operator be the annunciating point 
for the base defense detection and observation systems instead of the BDOC? 
5.  In the absence of Army Civil Affairs, what Air Force organization should be 
the lead agency in expeditionary civic action?  What units would contribute to 
Civil-Military operation and how would they contribute?  How would this 
organization be integrated with the operations of the security forces and AFOSI? 
6.  How to most effectively train, organize, and implement plans to maximize the 
number of airmen available for air base defense?  As opposed to the Army and 
Marines, by and large in the Air Force, only the security forces and AFOSI are 
utilized to defend the base while all other airmen only perform their primary 
mission whether that is maintenance, services, or civil engineering.  These 
personnel could takeover much of the internal base security measures and relieve 
security forces to execute more proactive aspects of the defense. 
7.  How can military working dogs be best utilized in a counterinsurgency?  What 
capabilities are most critical?  What level of skill is required?  What changes to 
training would have to be implemented?  
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APPENDIX A.  GLOSSARY 
AB – Air Base 
ABD – Air Base Defense 
AFB – Air Force Base 
AFI – Air Force Instruction 
AFOSI – Air Force Office of Special Investigation 
AFR – Air Force Regulation 
AOC – Air Operations Center 
ATT – Anti-Terrorism Teams 
BDOC – Base Defense Operations Center 
C2 – Command and Control  
CENTAF – Central Command, Air Force Component 
CI – Counter-intelligence 
COG – Center of Gravity 
CONUS – Continental United States 
DFT – Deployment for Training 
FEAF – Far East Air Forces 
GVN – Government of South Vietnam 
HMMWV – Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 
IED – Improvised Explosive Device 
JCET – Joint-Combined Exercise Training 
KIA – Killed in Action 
MACV – Military Advisory Command, Vietnam 
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MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War 
MRF – Mobile Response Force 
MWD – Military Working Dog 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
NVA – North Vietnamese Army 
OOTW – Operations Other Than War 
OPE – Operational Preparation of the Environment 
PSYOPS – Psychological Operations 
RAF – Royal Air Force 
ROE – Rules of Engagement 
SAS – Special Air Service 
TAOR – Tactical Area of Responsibility 
TCF – Tactical Combat Force 
TF – Task Force 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USA – United States Army 
USAAF – United States Army Air Force 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USMC – United States Marine Corps 
VC – Viet Cong  
WIA – Wounded in Action 
WWI – World War I 
WWII – World War II 
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APPENDIX B. PAGET’S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Paget argued that battling an insurgency is essentially a fight for intelligence and 
situational awareness.  This is very similar to McCormick’s preferred Strategy A which 
espouses to isolate and expose the insurgent to the power of the state (disrupting their 













the insurgency has 
chance to act. 
This would be synonymous with trying to find an insurgency before 
it has even committed an act of symbolic violence.  It is possible 
this could be seen as an almost authoritarian penetration of a society 
but seeking out an insurgency prior to its development in this 
manner is very similar to the FBI’s penetration of many white 
supremacist groups in the US that have yet to commit any violent 
acts.  This does make sense in air base defense because air base 
operations are virtually impossible to keep hidden.  Therefore, it 
should be assumed that if an air operation is going to be established 
for a period of time (and should in all cases except possibly 
humanitarian assistance), it will attract local insurgents or 
international terrorists who are a part of a transnational insurgency.  
Either way, eliminates the initial political space that an insurgency 
needs to establish its core.  This action dissuades insurgent action or 
makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in 
the information war.  This is the “penetrate first” strategy. 
 
2.  Gain 
knowledge of the 




Similar to the first principle, this principle dictates initiating 
counterinsurgency operations at the first sign of symbolic violence.  
Although not referenced in Paget’s study, the first two principles 
basically require the state to act early or, in the case of the first 
principle, to act first.  This is essentially the same concept as 
making a strategic first move in economic game theory.  
McCormick and Owen used economic game theory to analyze the 
importance of the state making a strategic first move against an 
insurgent.   In most cases, making a strategic first move against a 
budding insurgency will be decisive because the insurgency would 
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probably not have had time to develop a foundation among the 
population.  The insurgency will most likely respond by going 
underground where the inactivity will begin to destroy the group 
identity.  In the case of Khobar Towers for instance, this would 
have amounted to more aggressive security measures to be 
implemented in response to the attack at the Saudi Arabian National 
Guard six months prior to the bombing of Khobar.  A conclusion 
drawn from this principle is that when an air base defense force 
moves into an air base with an insurgent or terrorist threat, it should 
implement off-base unconventional operations (i.e., 
counterinsurgency) in the local area as a first move because this 
brings the fight to where the insurgent is developing.  The 
internally-focused conventional defense operation, effective against 
the saboteur, is the proper second move.  This is an exact reversal 
of current USAF doctrine and training.  Acting on this principle 
also dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the 
base and challenge the US mission in the information war. 
3.  Fully integrated 
aspects of 
intelligence and 
operations under a 
single commander 
A principle of organization. The clearest example of this is the 
military-civil-police integrated operation that the British 
implemented successfully in Malaya.  In the present, the US will 
normally not be the military and civilian authority but this does not 
negate the responsibility for the US to establish a single air base 
defense operation under a single commander that integrates fully 
with the local civil and police authorities.  As part of this principle, 
the air base commander should accept Civil-Military Operations 
responsibility for the area around the air base.  The British operate 
in such a manner and is a major reason for their success in Basra (as 
a later case study will attest).  This is a significant problem for the 
USAF not only because the USAF responsibility stops at the 
fenceline and Army and USAF forces have separate chains of 
command so integration is haphazard but the separation of AFOSI 
within the Air Force coordinated defense operations through a 
single commander impossible.  The British solve this problem by 
placing all defensive and Survive-to-Operate forces within the 
Ground Defense Area under the command of the RAF Force 
Protection Wing commander who reports directly to the wing 
commander.    AFOSI is certainly a potential asset to the defense 
but its separation from the overt intelligence and information that 
security forces are gathering and the security forces separation from 
AFOSI’s information and intelligence ensures neither has clear 
situational awareness.  Effective counterinsurgency is impossible 
without informed decisions, unified objectives, unified effort, and, 
if possible, unified command. 
4.  Identify the 
gathering of 
This principle only reinforces the organizational mistake of 
AFOSI’s separation from the security forces.  However, the 
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intelligence as the 
top priority of the 
organization 
doctrinal strategy of the Army’s conventional mindset is focused 
mainly on intelligence that supports decisive action – a waste of 
effort in a counterinsurgency.  The USAF’s internal view is even 
worse because it is standards-based and requires no intelligence 
support at all.  Neither understands that every community around an 
air base is its own microclimate and every local counterinsurgency 
will be different based on that microclimate.  Only intelligence and 
local knowledge can bridge the often large gap from doctrinal to 
strategy execution.  Again, achieving an advantage in situational 
awareness will allow defense forces to interdict or minimize 
insurgent attacks in the informational realm. 
5.  Gain and 
maintain 
cooperation of the 
populace  
This is a “hearts and minds” approach but Paget presents it as a 
more limited, realistic model.  The population does not have to 
innately ‘prefer’ the state but must, at least, cooperate and support 
the state and not the insurgent.  Key to this is security and civic 
action.  Civic action, to Paget, is not number of wells dug or 
supplies handed out (though this can help) but training civic 
administrators to do their jobs effectively and with the knowledge 
that they serve the public.  The public must then be convinced that 
the civic administrators exist to serve them.  This is also part of 
McCormick’s Strategy A.  This principle is essential in winning the 
information war in the local area of the air base, achieving 
legitimacy in the population’s eyes, and alleviating the fear of the 
local community. 
6.  Penetrate the 
insurgent 
organization 
Paget suggests that if this can be accomplished, an insurgent 
organization can be quickly dismantled.  McCormick would suggest 
this is impossible without an effective campaign that targets the 
population (who will expose the organization and allow state forces 
to gain knowledge on it) and the insurgency’s support structure (if 
members of the insurgency believe they are isolated from the 
population and that the state will win, they may be willing to 
defect).  As applied to air base defense this may have limited utility 
but only if AFOSI is separated from the core base defense mission.  
Penetrating an insurgent organization is a possible AFOSI mission 
but only as a part of larger strategy of a single defense force 
commander.  However, penetration of other “friendly” institutions 
is also necessary.  This is particularly important when it pertains to 
other forces involved in the base defense mission (indigenous base 
defense, police, and local military forces) and locals with political 
power such as a strongman, warlord, etc.  US forces, whether in a 
lead or supporting role, must know where the loyalties of the other 
base defense organizations lie. 
 
  110
Paget’s Principles of Intelligence for Counterinsurgency were analyzed in 1992 
by RAND as a basis for a strategic framework for countering terrorism and insurgency.  
RAND’s research showed that Paget’s third, fourth, and fifth principle (McCormick’s 
Strategy A for the state) were most predictive of a successful counterinsurgency.  This 
would suggest that implementing Strategy A through the unified Military-Civil-Police 
command structure (Paget’s third principle) would be the optimal basis for 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  And, if insurgents and terrorists are the real threat to air 
bases, the counterinsurgency strategy of intelligence and population security should be 
the basis for air base defense doctrine as well.   
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APPENDIX C. NEW PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE 
BASED ON A COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL* 
Principles Ways Means Ends
Act First • USAF assumes 
that air base 
operations will 










or no later than the 
arrival of US 
aircraft.  This 
includes 
Operational 






• US military forces that 
are capable of training 
and liaising with base 
defense forces as well 
as local police, military, 
and militia 
 
• Insurgent initial 
operating space is 
compressed 




attack the base or 
choose not to 
attack at al 
• Insurgents unable 
to fight 
information war 
• US level of effort 
is immediately 
apparent to the 
public, position 
of strength and 




• Objective  
• Integrated 
Intelligence 
• US/Allies Unity of 
Command – US 
and allies should 
strive to achieve a 
unified command 
structure 
• Small unit action  
 
• US training and 
assistance to 
indigenous forces 
• Sharing of intelligence 
• Aligning US and 
indigenous command 
structure so forces act 
cohesively 
• US air base commander 
liaison with local 
military and political 
leaders 
• Denies sanctuary 





• Information and 
Intelligence can 
be viewed through 




insurgent forces to 
operate at a pace 
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that the insurgents 
cannot match 
• Establishes trust  
 
Protection • Presence  
• Intervention and 
Conflict 
Resolution 
• Train and Advise 
Indigenous Forces  
• Restraint  
• Precise and 
Deliberate Force 
• Civic Action  
• Force Protection  
• US training and 
assistance to 
indigenous forces 
• 24/7 operations 
throughout the area that 
is to be secured 
• Must “act” at the 
lowest level to protect 
the base and 
community against the 
acts of insurgents, 
criminals, dangerous 
incidents, etc. 
• As policemen are 
taught, force must be 
appropriate to the 
situation  
• Deliberate and 
discriminate force must 
always be applied 
against insurgent force  
• Local knowledge and 
situational awareness 
develops into local 
action 
• Monitor (and assist) 
training of indigenous 
emergency responders 
and ensure proper 
execution of any 
project associated with 
the air base 
• Provide competent 
technical assistance 
when requested 
• Offensive actions 
protects US forces 
• No risk avoidance 
• Attacks insurgent 
center of gravity 
as base defense 
forces look like 
the “winner” 
• Denies sanctuary 
to the insurgent 
• Defense forces 
viewed as moral 
force  




• Disrupts insurgent 
system of growth  
• Efficiency of 
action as more of 
the defense is 
burdened by the 
indigenous forces 
• Protects friendly 
center of gravity – 
US public support 
• Minimizes US 
casualties 
Penetration • Friendly forces  
• Local political 
officials  
• AFOSI establishes a 
network to ensure 
indigenous politicians 




• Population  
• Insurgent 
organization  





• Defense forces execute 
a plan to gather 
information from the 
population to expose 
insurgent infrastructure 
and leaders as well as 
other deceptive friendly 
forces 
• Implement IO and 
tactical PSYOP 
operations to influence 
public information 
• Police-type patrols 
penetrate population 
through observation, 
conversation, and field 
interviews 
• Distributed and 
continuous surveillance 
 




• Force Protection 
• Denies insurgent 
sanctuary 
• Disrupts insurgent 
system of growth 
















Perseverance • Air base operations 
often last for years  
• The defense effort 
must start before 
the air base 
operation and may 
not end until long 
after the 
completion of the 
air base mission  
• Dedication of US 
forces to the defense 
• US training and 
assistance to 
indigenous forces 
• Acceptance of Risk 
 
• US level of effort 
is immediately 
apparent to the 
public, position of 
strength and 
dedication is first 
impression 
• Denies sanctuary 
for the insurgent 
• Defense forces 
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APPENDIX D.  MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR AIR BASE 
DEFENSE 
Since the insurgent has been determined to be the true threat to air bases and this 
study has proposed the use of counterinsurgency models as a way of achieving local 
security for air base operations, how do we measure our effectiveness in defending the 
base?  In defending the local area?  The focus of any metric about air base defense should 
be on first – limiting damage to US personnel and resources (protecting the US COG),  
second - dissuading an attack (informational victory), third - disrupting a planned attack 
(informational victory), and fourth – attitude of the population.  The thesis will offer a 
new way of looking at how to measure air base defense success based on a compilation of 
metrics proposed for counterinsurgency by Stephen Basilici and Jeremy Simmons in their 
thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School and by Andrew Krepinevich in his March 2005 
testimony before Congress:221   
Air Base 
Attacks 
This is the most critical metric because it speaks to the information war 
that is waged every time a US air base is attacked.  Number of attacks 
must be considered along with the intensity of attack.  A more aggressive 
attack speaks to the intent and probability of a growing insurgency. Of 
critical importance are: 
- US casualties 
- Damage to US resources 
- Number of attacks 
- Intensity of attacks (tactics employed) 
Although in Iraq and Vietnam, air base attacks may have attained some 
semblance of routine, the Air Force operates almost continuously around 
the world and a single attack could have a devastating impact on an 
operation of less political importance such as peacekeeping, natural 
disaster response, and the GWOT (USAF air bases are located 
throughout Southwest, Central, and Southeast Asia)  
Enemy 
Activity in 
Local Area  
This is only slightly less important as air base attacks because these 
enemy activites normally do not kill US personnel or destroy US assets 
but instead target locals.  However, affecting the US air base operation is 
often the intent of the attacks or a future objective of the enemy.  Of 
critical importance are: 
- Local casualties 
                                                 
221 Krepinevich, testimony before Congree, p. 9-14; Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for 
Unconventional Warfare,” 37-38. 
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- Assassinations and targets 
- Intimidation of local officials  
- Kidnappings, hijackings of local contractors/workers, etc. 




These measurements are important because if done properly these can 
demonstrate the political preferences of the population and who they 
view as the winner in the struggle (i.e., hearts and minds).  Also, these 
can show attitudes of local allies and how the public views them.  Also of 
critical importance are: 
- Allied units morale, desertion rates 
- Enemy morale, desertion and defection rates (often hard to 
measure) 
- Public’s attitude towards US 
- Public’s attitude toward local police/military 
- Public’s attitude towards insurgent 
Intelligence These measurements serve to determine if the US and allies are able to 
achieve situational awareness by protecting and penetrating the local 
population.  Of critical importance are: 
- Initiation of contact (% of US compared to enemy) 
- % IED’s intercepted/destroyed versus detonated 
- % of engagements initiated by indigenous forces 
(police/military/militia) 
- Frequency of actionable intelligence provided by locals.  This 
should be seen as percentage of contacts with the enemy as a 
result of local intelligence.  Speaks to winning the information 





This speaks to the ability of the insurgents to recruit and how attractive 
their cause is to the local populace.  An example is if the insurgents must 
pay locals to set IEDs or participate in an ambush…the higher the price, 
the less people are willing to support the insurgent.  Moreover, if the 
insurgents have to pay for fighters than this is a weakness that the US 
(and in the case of air base defense, AFOSI) can exploit. 
Measures of effectiveness must be established from the beginning of any air base 
defense mission because they are critical in determining the changing nature of the local 
security environment.  It may also be advantageous to include criminal activity of a 
certain nature (weapons, munitions, organized, etc.) especially in areas where criminal 
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activity represents an insurgent-like threat or are used to fund insurgent activity, such as 
in Latin America.222
 
222 Max Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, (2005). Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 
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